Attack and defense of ICBMs deceptively based in a number of identical areas

On-site verification of ICBMs in the context of an arms control agreement might involve a situation where an inspector would choose one or more of a number of identical areas to inspect and would have confidence that the other areas had the same characteristics. This article considers optimal attack and defense of missiles deceptively based in a number of identical areas. The attacker may allocate warheads across areas as he desires and uniformly within areas. The defender may allocate interceptors across areas as he desires and either uniformly or preferentially within areas. The effect of restricting the defender to uniform allocation across areas is explored for various assumptions. Robustness of surviving missiles with respect to the number of attacking warheads is studied. Results are presented for a wide range of cases.     

Applying Lanchester's linear law to model the Ardennes campaign

In modern warfare, many believe the decisive factor in winning a battle is seizing the right moment to shift from defense to attack, or vice versa. This paper attempts to bring that perspective to Lanchester's differential equations of warfare, and continues the application of Lanchester's linear law to the analysis of the World War II battle of Ardennes, as reported in earlier issues of Naval Research Logistics by Bracken and by Fricker. A new variable, shift time, accounting for the timing of the shift between defense and attack is explicitly included in our version of the model, and it helps obtain improved goodness of fit to historical data. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:653–661, 2001     

Real-time task scheduling with overheads considered

n periodic tasks are to be processed by a single machine, where each task i has a maximum request rate or periodicity F_i, a processing time E_i, a deadline D_i, relative to each request of task i, a task-request interrupt overhead I_i, and a task-independent scheduling overhead S. Two scheduling strategies are considered for sequencing the execution of an arbitrary arrangement of task requests in time: the preemptive and the nonpreemptive earliest-deadline algorithms. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for establishing whether a given set of tasks can be scheduled by each scheduling strategy. The conditions are given in the form of limited simulations of a small number of well-defined task-request arrangements. If all simulations succeed, the schedule is feasible for the given set of tasks. If any simulation fails, the schedule is infeasible. While interrupt handling and scheduling overheads can be handled by such simulations, context switching overhead resulting from preemption cannot. A counterexample illustrates how the simulations fail to uncover unschedulable task sets when context switching overhead is considered.     

Military autonomy: its origins,limits, and the politico-military dialectic of war

Military officers often oppose political interference in the conduct of war. Political leaders respond by citing Clausewitz’s contention that “war is the continuation of politics with the addition of other means.” Scholarship in security studies and civil-military relations argues that civilians are right to oppose military autonomy because it serves the parochial interests of the military. However, through the dialectical relationship between the violent essence of war and its political nature, Clausewitz provides an alternative explanation for military demands for autonomy. He shows that military and political leaders are prone to an incomplete understanding of war that can undermine strategy and policy.     

Risk pooling in a two-period,two-echelon inventory stocking and allocation problem

The object of this article is to investigate the risk-pooling effect of depot stock in two-echelon distribution system in which the depot serves n retailers in parallel, and to develop computationally tractable optimization procedures for such systems. The depot manager has complete information about stock levels and there are two opportunities to allocate stock to the retailers within each order cycle. We identify first- and second-order aspects to the risk-pooling effect. In particular, the second-order effect is the property that the minimum stock available to any retailer after the second allocation converges in probability to a constant as the number of retailers in the system increases, assuming independence of the demands. This property is exploited in the development of efficient procedures to determine near-optimal values of the policy parameters.     

The optimal linear combination of control variates in the presence of asymptotically negligible bias

The optimal linear combination of control variates is well known when the controls are assumed to be unbiased. We derive here the optimal linear combination of controls in the situation where asymptotically negligible bias is present. The small-sample linear control which minimizes the mean square error (MSE) is derived. When the optimal asymptotic linear control is used rather than the optimal small-sample control, the degradation in MSE is c/n³, where n is the sample size and c is a known constant. This analysis is particulary relevant to the small-sample theory for control variates as applied to the steady-state estimation problem. Results for the method of multiple estimates are also given.     

Israel’s Security Nexus as Strategic Restraint: The Case of Iran 2009–2013

This article examines the debates in Israel between 2009 and 2013 over Iran’s nuclear programme as a reflection of a particular type of civil–military or civil–security relationship. It analyses how key actors within that relationship – particularly those with an intelligence background – engaged with media outlets in Israel and further afield to influence domestic and international opinion over how best to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In so doing, it seeks to address one fundamental question: are governments in Jerusalem any longer the final arbiters over deciding what is in the national security interests of the State of Israel?