The Randomization of Terrorist Attacks

The purpose of this article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorist organizations deliberately randomize their attacks (by type, timing, location, and targets) to generate uncertainty and intimidation. A choice theoretic framework is applied to the analysis of the terrorist organization's behavior to determine whether welfare (utility) gains from the randomization of terrorist attacks are plausible and feasible. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence for each resource input but it turns out that randomization cannot manufacture a situation where higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.The results imply that, rather than randomization and instability, the rational terrorist organization is more likely to prefer stability. The findings and implications provide a theoretical explanation for the non-randomness of terrorist attacks.Thismay be one small step towards explaining the patterns – non-randomness – in the time-series of terrorist incidents.     

A special case of the 3 × n flow shop problem

Johnson [2] in 1954 solved the two machine flow shop problem by giving an argument for a sufficient condition of optimality and by stating an efficient algorithm which produces a solution via satisfaction of the sufficient condition. Moreover, Johnson solved two special cases of the corresponding three machine flow shop problem. Since that time, six other special cases have been solved, two contributed by Arthanari and Mukhopadhyay [1], two by Smith, Panwalkar, and Dudek [3], and two of a different nature by Szwarc [5]. This paper contributes an extension to one of the classes described by Szwarc.     

An engagement model to optimize defense against a multiple attack assuming perfect kill assessment

We present an air-defense engagement model to counter an attack by multiple antiship missiles, assuming perfect kill assessment. In this model, the probability of shooting down all incoming missiles is maximized. A generating function is employed to produce an algorithm which is used to evaluate the outcomes. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 687–697, 1997     

On the normality and abnormality of offsets obligations

Defence offsets have often been described as government‐to‐business compensation arrangements or contracts involving “reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market exchange”. This paper argues that it is irrelevant and misleading to use this notion as a criterion for defining offsets.

The paper also explores the apparent inconsistency between the maximising efficiency in defence procurement and the application of offsets requirements. It is shown that defence offsets are a subset of all the price‐quality‐quantity trade‐offs which in general characterise negotiations surrounding complex transactions.

It is argued that although reciprocal or offsetting arrangements are a normal aspect of commercial transacting, the operation of certain offsets schemes namely mandatory offsets obligations, may inhibit the buyer's flexibility in negotiating deals and result in inefficient procurement. This leads us to ask why these offsets schemes have persisted for so long.     

US technological collaboration for nonproliferation: key evidence from the Cold War

ABSTRACT

Although the existing international-relations scholarship argues that technological assistance in the nuclear domain increases the probability of nuclear proliferation, the historical account indicates otherwise. Congressional legislation for nonproliferation, economic sanctions, and poor state capacity—specifically, inept managerial capabilities of the recipient state—explain merely part of the puzzle, but overlook the role of positive inducements offered to impede nuclear proliferation. Historical evidence shows that the United States often provided technological assistance with the deliberate intent to inhibit proliferation. In other words, Washington employed its technological leverage to attain nonproliferation goals. American technological preponderance since the end of World War II made such an approach feasible. This study examines key Cold War cases—Israel/Egypt, India, and West Germany—where the United States offered technological assistance with the deliberate intent to stall nuclear proliferation, thereby underscoring the role of assistance for inhibitive ends.     

The military recruiting productivity slowdown: The roles of resources,opportunity cost and the tastes of youth*

After a decade of successful recruiting, the US military began experiencing recruiting difficulties in the 1990s. Cyclical factors as well as trend factors may have played a role. This paper uses monthly data by state over the period 1989-1997 to estimate models of enlistment and evaluate the various explanations for the recruiting slowdown. Estimates of the impact of economic variables - relative military pay and unemployment - and recruiting resource variables - recruiters and advertising - are similar to those in previous studies. Two trend factors, rising college attendance and declining adult veteran population (influencers), are found to be important factors explaining the decline in enlistment.     

The German arms industry in a European context: A study in successful downsizing

Defence offsets rank as one of the most important and controversial topics within the broad field of defence economics. Arms vendors are likely to view offsetting investment as a distraction, fearful of its potential to hurt the bottom line. By contrast, policymakers in the arms purchasing countries see offsets as an opportunity to extract technology transfer, as well as employment, investment and export sales opportunities. Establishing the actual impact of offsets, however, is not easy. The subject is shrouded in secrecy and myth, with anecdote and generalisation pervading even the intellectual press. This paper seeks to break the mould by offering an empirical case study of the role of offsets in Malaysian defence industrialisation.