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111.
In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.  相似文献   
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A military cannot hope to improve in wartime if it cannot learn. Ideally, in wartime, formal learning ceases and the application of knowledge begins. But this is optimistic. In 1942, USAAF Eighth Air Force assumed it had the means necessary for victory. In reality, its technique and technology were only potentially – rather than actually – effective. What remained was to create the practice of daylight bombing – to learn. This article (1) recovers a wartime learning process that created new knowledge, (2) tests existing tacit hypotheses in military adaptation research, and (3) offers additional theoretical foundation to explain how knowledge is created in wartime  相似文献   
114.
Given point-to-point demand forecasts of transmission facilities for services such as voice or data transmission in each period of a finite planning horizon, a decision has to be made as to which types of transmission facilities—together with the amounts of transmission circuits—are to be installed, if any, on each link of the telecommunications network, in each period of the planning horizon. The availability of alternative transmission systems with significantly different costs and circuit capacities necessitates the determination of a minimum (discounted) cost facility installation scheme. This combinatoric choice problem is complicated by the availability of switching equipments enabling the transmission of some of the traffic through intermediary points. This possibility of alternately routing the traffic or the facility requirements of certain point pairs further complicates the problem while creating the opportunity to benefit from economies of scale. We present here a heuristic method for finding a good solution for the general problem; namely, we consider multiple transmission systems and multiple alternate routes. Numerical examples are given and computational experience is reported.  相似文献   
115.
Previous lot-sizing models incorporating learning effects focus exclusively on worker learning. We extend these models to include the presence of setup learning, which occurs when setup costs exhibit a learning curve effect as a function of the number of lots produced. The joint worker/setup learning problem can be solved to optimality by dynamic programming. Computational experience indicates, however, that solution times are sensitive to certain problem parameters, such as the planning horizon and/or the presence of a lower bound on worker learning. We define a two-phase EOQ-based heuristic for the problem when total transmission of worker learning occurs. Numerical results show that the heuristic consistently generates solutions well within 1% of optimality.  相似文献   
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