Terrorism,Radicalisation and Moral Panics: Media and Academic Analysis and Reporting of 2016 and 2017 ‘Terrorism’

Radicalism or radicalisation has become a serious political and academic theme in recent years and any incident involving Muslims now almost automatically acquires the cachet, as events in 2016 and 2017 have shown. However, despite vast sums and resources expended on the subject no one can define what they mean by ‘it’. This should make us pause and question what precisely it is that causes so much alarm and is it worth the resources, time and effort employed to respond to it?     

The probability of survival of a subterranean target under mtensive attack

This paper deals with the analysis of a model for studying the probability of survival of a subterranean target under an intensive attack. Most of the analysis is based on the assumption that the explosions are circularly distributed about the target and that the number of explosions is known. In the last two sections it is shown what effect a relaxation of these assumptions has on the probability of survival of the target.     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.