A parallel machine replacement model

This paper considers a finite horizon parallel machine replacement problem where a fixed number of machines is in operation at all times. The operating cost for a machine goes up as the machine gets older. An older machine may have to be replaced by a new one when its operating cost becomes too high. There is a fixed order cost associated with the purchase of new machines. Machine purchase prices and salvage values may depend on the period in which they were purchased. The objective is to find a replacement plan that minimizes the total discounted cost over the problem horizon. We believe that the costs in our model are more commonly observed in practice than those previously used in the literature. The paper develops properties of optimal solutions and an efficient forward‐time algorithm to find an optimal replacement plan. A dominance property is developed that further limits the options to be considered, and a simple forecast horizon result is also presented. Future research possibilities are mentioned. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 275–287, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (http://www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10012     

A sequential auction‐bargaining procurement model

One of the most important decisions that a firm faces in managing its supply chain is a procurement decision: selecting suitable suppliers among many potential competing sellers and reducing the purchase cost. While both auctions and bargaining have been extensively studied in the literature, the research that combines auctions and bargaining is limited. In this article, we consider a combined auction‐bargaining model in a setting where a single buyer procures an indivisible good from one of many competing sellers. The procurement model that we analyze is a sequential model consisting of the auction phase followed by the bargaining phase. In the auction phase, the sellers submit bids, and the seller with the lowest bid is selected as the winning bidder. In the bargaining phase, the buyer audits the cost of the winning seller and then negotiates with him to determine the final price. For this auction‐bargaining model, we find a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for the sellers in a closed form, which is simple to understand and closely related to the classical results in the auction and bargaining literature. We also show that the auction‐bargaining model generates at least as much profit to the buyer as the standard auction or sequential bargaining model. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Base‐stock policies in capacitated assembly systems: Convexity properties

We study an assembly system with a single finished product managed using an echelon base‐stock or order‐up‐to policy. Some or all operations have capacity constraints. Excess demand is either backordered in every period or lost in every period. We show that the shortage penalty cost over any horizon is jointly convex with respect to the base‐stock levels and capacity levels. When the holding costs are also included in the objective function, we show that the cost function can be written as a sum of a convex function and a concave function. Throughout the article, we discuss algorithmic implications of our results for making optimal inventory and capacity decisions in such systems.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010