Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: motives,prospects and challenges

Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by using English as the language in command and control. The costs of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.     

South African defence policy: the rationale and impact of the SANDF’s primary role and conventional force design

The 2015 South African Defence Review set out to reverse the deterioration of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) capabilities. Within the South African Department of Defence (DOD) this deterioration is expressed mainly in terms of a decreasing defence budget, subsequent declining conventional capabilities and obsolete prime mission equipment. Contemporary research and defence expert debates on this theme, point out the disjuncture between policy ends and the available means, with scepticism for an increased defence budget given the DOD’s lack of internal reform and strategy adjustment. One question that remains largely unanswered in the literature regarding the decline of the SANDF, is why both the policy-makers and the SANDF have remained focused on the primary role of the military (defending territorial integrity) accompanied with an unaffordable conventional force design? This question relates to the aim of this paper and is explored by revisiting initial defence policy decisions and compromises that were made in the 1990s. It is argued that the primary role of the SANDF and its conventional force design suited the interests of both the politicians and the military, but that the drawbacks thereof have harshly caught up with the DOD.     

Military Expenditure as a Proxy for State Power. The Case of France

This paper attempts to build a simple indicator of state power. Military expenditure is the paper’s point of departure, with the definitions given by NATO, SIPRI and others. This definition is discussed and a power version is build, using French budgetary data. Then a defence of the result against traditional or non-traditional critics is presented under an imperative of action. Finally, this concept is enlarged and a new concept of power expenditures is given, one more time using French budgetary data. The conclusion is that this large expenditure concept is an unbiased but imperfect indicator of the will to act, and has to be completed by GDP to indicate the capability to act in the long-run.     

Defence industrial policy – a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy?

This article explores whether it makes sense for national governments to employ defence industrial policies – such as offsets and discriminatory procurement practices – to support their domestic defence industries. This question has so far primarily been discussed by economists, who have argued strongly against the use of defence industrial policies. This article maintains that these economists fail to address the often complex motivation behind the introduction of these policies. It illustrates these shortcomings by contrasting their arguments against a case study of Norway, which accounts for the country’s use of defence industrial polices from the early post-Second World War era up until today. The article concludes that, depending on their objectives, defence industrial policies can be seen as either a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy.     

Militarism in post-war Cyprus: the development of the ideology of defence

This article provides a theorisation of militarism in post-war Cyprus. Based on qualitative empirical research conducted in Cyprus in 2011, the article explores the manifestation and steadfastness of Greek-Cypriot militarism, and the development of this militarism, which appeared after the partition of the island in 1974. In particular, it proposes the ideology of defence as a way to understand post-war Greek-Cypriot militarism. It shows the embedded nature of defence in the idea of the national struggle. It aims at mapping the character of this militarism in order to provide the grounds for future discussion. Only by understanding the interconnecting discourses that made Greek-Cypriot militarism possible in post-war Cyprus, can we understand its past, present, and future.     

Addressing the “headwinds” faced by the European arms industry

ABSTRACT

The European arms industry is challenged by several adverse “headwinds.” Fragmentation leads to costly duplications and, in conjunction with stagnating budgets and sharply increasing costs, prevents firms from exploiting economies of scale and learning. This is exacerbated by size differentials vis-a-vis the leading US arms manufacturers and competition from emerging producers. As some “headwinds” are self-enforcing, far-reaching industrial and policy responses are required to improve the industry's outlook. As exports may not indefinitely compensate for low domestic demand, there is an economic imperative for further cross-border collaboration and consolidation. Despite various EU policy initiatives, progresses regarding the European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence Technological Industrial Base have been relatively slow. It remains to be seen whether the European Defence Fund will be the proclaimed “game-changer,” raising competitiveness of the European arms industry. At the same time, the UK's withdrawal from the EU adds uncertainties.     

弹道导弹防御系统效能分析与措施研究

简要介绍了弹道导弹防御系统的组成 ,提供了系统作战效能计算的主要思想、方法 ,给出了概率计算模型。根据分析结果 ,结合现代战争的作战方式和导弹防御系统的作战特点 ,提出了提高弹道导弹防御系统作战效能的技术和战术措施。     

Texture evaluation in AZ31/AZ31 multilayer and AZ31/AA5068 laminar composite during accumulative roll bonding

This article presents the texture development of magnesium AZ31 alloy in the accumulative roll bonded (ARB) AZ31/AZ31 multilayer and AZ31/AA5086 laminate composite. The comparative study demonstrates that the texture evolution in AZ31 in a multilayer system is strongly influenced by the interfaces. A typical basal texture of AZ31 has been observed in AZ31/AZ31 multilayer with texture intensity increased with the rolling deformation. Presence of AZ31/AA5086 interface in the laminate composite leads to a tilted basal texture along the rolling direction (RD) in AZ31 alloy. The texture intensity of composite increased initially with rolling reduction and weakened at the higher rolling strain. Weakening of texture in AZ31 during the laminate processing at higher strain has been attributed to the development of wavy interfaces in AZ31/AA5086 laminate.     

All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit

The public expects European governments and the European Union (EU) to deal with the security challenges in and around Europe. So does the US, whose strategic focus has pivoted to the Pacific. Washington, DC has made it clear that it will not, and cannot, solve all of Europe’s problems. The call for ‘strategic autonomy’ in the new EU Global Strategy of June 2016 does not come a moment too soon. But should the aim be EU strategic autonomy, without the UK, or can the aspiration still be European strategic autonomy, with the UK? Can nothing be achieved unless all are fully involved? Or are intermediate solutions possible? How EU Member States and the UK answer these questions will determine which degree of strategic autonomy the EU can achieve. With which degree of British involvement. And whether the UK itself will be left with any measure of strategic autonomy.     

Trilateral defence cooperation in the North: an assessment of interoperability between Norway,Sweden and Finland

Norway, Sweden and Finland have proclaimed a willingness to cooperate militarily in a future crisis or conflict despite their diverging alliance affiliation. This article assesses their ability to do so through various elements affecting their interoperability, with Arctic Challenge, a multinational military exercise, as an empirical basis. The analysis finds that the NATO/non-NATO-divide has a negative impact on the trilateral defence cooperation, especially on exchange of information and aspects related to command and control. At the same time, Finland and Sweden have become largely NATO-standardized through their active partnership with the Alliance. This has affected interoperability aspects, such as communication, culture, and the compatibility of technical solutions, in a positive manner. Through agreements with the Alliance, as well as domestic legal changes, the two NATO-partners have facilitated receiving military assistance from Norway and other NATO-members during a crisis. Other agreements between the Nordic countries, however, have been limited to peacetime.