以数据为中心的天基预警系统视图模型研究

借鉴美国国防部体系结构框架思想(Department of Defense Architecture Framework,DoDAF),从核心体系结构实体、体系结构建模集和建模步骤几方面研究了以数据为中心的体系结建模方法,针对天基预警系统的特点和在反导中的应用,采用体系结构工具System Architect（SA）从系统层面建立了典型的天基预警系统的系统视图模型,对理解天基预警系统体系结构、开展天基预警系统顶层设计研究具有一定的参考价值。     

When Programming Trumps Policy and Plans: The Case of the US Department of the Navy11

Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of conformance with them. The article concludes with specific and detailed recommendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes.     

The national defense function and federalism: the importance of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act

Countries with a federalist system of government have different arrangements for providing national security. US national security is provided by national and State defense forces. The quintessential national function – national defense – experienced some changes that enhanced the role of the States. Policy changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (2008 NDAA) introduced new roles for the Governors and the State defense forces, or the National Guard. This article explores how the interests of Congress and States aligned in the 2008 NDAA such that the national defense function changed. This article finds that the national government continues to have the central coordinating role, but that the politics and provisions of the 2008 NDAA changed the national–State relationship in mission, decision-making, and command and control so that US federalism in the national defense function is evolving in unexpected ways.     

网络化防空导弹体系拦截联盟形成问题

拦截联盟形成是网络化防空导弹体系(NADMS)中的新问题,旨在确定目标、火力节点以及制导节点三者之间的最优匹配关系,使得NADMS整体作战效能最大。结合NADMS的分布式无中心节点体系结构,剖析了拦截联盟形成问题的本质,形式化定义了体系中出现的新型一体化作战能力;分别从运筹学与整数规划、组合优化以及经济学博弈问题角度对拦截联盟形成问题进行形式化描述,并深入探讨了集中式和分布式的拦截联盟形成方法。     

美军针对高超声速武器的反导预警能力发展态势分析

高超声速武器具有飞行速度快、精确毁伤和高效突防等特点,具有重要的战略威慑和实战应用价值,它能够大幅改变未来战争的态势,已成为大国打破战略平衡、打赢未来战争的新型“杀手锏”。随着高超声速武器逐步走向战场,世界各主要国家的反导防御体系将向更高预警维度、更快反应速度和更大打击力度的天地一体联合防御方向发展。本文分析了高超声速武器作战优势及其对未来战争的影响和威胁,阐述了美军现有反导预警能力的基本架构与能力缺陷,对其未来反高超声速武器的预警能力建设及发展态势进行了研判与预测。美军“优先发展天基反导作战体系,发挥低轨卫星主体作用”的反高超声速武器发展思路对于军队反导反高超声速武器能力建设具有一定的启示和借鉴作用。     

Performances of the defense industrial base in France: the role of small and medium enterprises

This paper employs an economic and statistical approach to get an overview of the defense industrial base (DIB) in France. It allows us to identify its main characteristics and to measure the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). An original data-set was built, thanks to the information from the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the French Customs Central and National Administration, the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and all the most relevant organizations specialized in the development, production or maintenance, repair, and overhaul of military goods in France. Overall, the DIB turns out as being composed of about 1800 enterprises in France (subcontractors included), of which three-third are SMEs. Along with high market concentration ratios, these enterprises are characterized by a significant military/civil duality, high labor productivity rates, and intensity in Research and Development.     

国防科技风险投资基金“一体两翼”发展构想

发展国防科技风险投资基金是提高国防科技创新能力、推进武器装备投融资机制改革的重要途径。本文在论述设立国防科技风险投资基金必要性的基础上,明确了基金设立的三种基本类型,设计了"一体两翼"模式构想,为国防科技风险投资基金发展提供了遵循。     

Israeli foreign policy and the arms race in the Middle East 1950–1960

Previous accounts of the arms race in the Middle East during the 1950s have focused on the imbalance that resulted from the ‘Czech deal’ of September 1955. While that transfer of weaponry by the Soviet Union to Egypt constituted both a historical turning point and sharp acceleration of the arms race, it was only one of several changes in the regional strategic balance of that decade. This article makes extensive use of archival material in order to identify five phases of the arms race of the 1950s and analyze the manner in which Israeli policy‐makers dealt with the exigencies of procurement during each phase. Except for a brief period following the arms deals with France in 1956 that marked the beginning of the fifth phase examined below, the Israelis never abandoned the attempt to obtain arms from the United States. Israel's success in maintaining a high degree of independence in foreign policy throughout this period was the result of arms purchases from Britain and France that marked each phase of the arms race examined here. Yet, the Israelis considered arms from both of these Western powers to be temporary substitutes for the arms relationship with the USA that came about during the 1960s.     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.     

Chalk vs Guns: Some economic consequences of an announced French scenario 1

This paper explores whether defense contractors' manufacturing technology advantages over purely commercial firms might be associated with differences in their workforce and organizational practices. It uses unique original data collected specifically to test workforce and organizational complementarities in implementation of advanced manufacturing technology in small manufacturers. Findings are that defense contractors: (1) have higher and deeper rates of advanced manufacturing technology use; (2) have greater perceived success in achieving manufacturing goals; (3) are more likely practitioners across a diverse spectrum of advanced workforce and organizational practices. Then, (4) econometrically, the defense contractors' higher reported levels of achievement in implementing advanced manufacturing technologies are positively associated with those organizational and workforce practice differences.