智能电子电路虚拟实验室

介绍了一种“电路分析平台”软件,可对模拟及数字电路进行仿真分析.与其他电路仿真软件相比,该软件具有非常好的可视化人机界面和易用性,可以象在实验室做实验那样在电脑上搭接虚拟电路,然后合上虚拟开关接通电源,观察虚拟仪表上的实时显示数据及分析结果,堪称个人电脑上的电子电路虚拟实验室,是电子工程师有力的计算机辅助分析工具.     

基于神经网络的超精密机床伺服进给非线性模型辨识

以双轴Ｔ型结构的超精密金刚石车床的伺服进给系统为研究对象,采用自构造神经网络技术,建立了系统的非线性动态数学模型,为系统非线性控制与补偿提供参考模型     

集成运算放大器的误差分析与补偿方法

本文从应用角度出发,对集成运算放大器主要参数引起的运算误差,进行了深入的研究。在分析方法上采用先研究单项参数对误差的影响,然后对各单项误差进行综合,得到一般表达式。最后,给出明确的结论和补偿方法。     

分布式事务处理模型

本文给出了一个分布式数据库环境下的事务处理模型,该模型强调了在处理用户的事务中,场所间所需要的基本的相互作用,为描述和分析分布式并发控制方法提供了一个统一的框架。本文也是有关分布式并发控制研究的导引性文章,为后续论文奠定了基础。     

基于模糊干扰观测器的高超声速飞行器一体化制导控制方法

为充分利用高超声速飞行器在俯冲段的质心运动与绕质心运动之间的耦合作用和飞行过程中的不确定性，基于模糊干扰观测器提出了三维一体化制导与控制问题。首先根据飞行器的动力学方程以及飞行器-目标的视线角相对运动方程，推导出来适用于倾斜转弯控制的一体化制导控制模型。接着，针对模型中的不确定性采用模糊干扰观测器进行补偿，并使用块动态面方法设计了一种一体化制导控制律。然后，通过选取适当的李雅普诺夫函数证明了闭环系统状态的一致毕竟有界性。最后，仿真结果验证了该一体化制导控制方法的有效性和鲁棒性。     

水下缩比航行体热尾流的红外探测实验研究

根据缩比模型,建立了缩比红外成像实验测试系统,对水下航行体的体积、航行深度、运动速度、尾流排放等进行了缩比设计,设计了多种实验工况,可实现缩比目标模型红外尾流的静态和动态测试,一方面明确红外尾流的可探测性,另一方面掌握红外尾流可探测性的影响因素以及红外尾流的变化规律,为下一步工作奠定基础。     

Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948–1960

This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the ‘Long War’.     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

Global counterinsurgency and US army expansion: the case for recruiting foreign troops

Given the nature of global counterinsurgency operations, the demands of military expansion, and the need for cultural, linguistic, and regional expertise, the United States Army should evaluate the establishment of US-led foreign troop units for its evolving force structure. This article proposes the creation of an American foreign legion based upon the recruitment of US-led, ethnically homogeneous tribal force units to meet the grist mill of counterinsurgency operations. This structured approach would be more beneficial than the current reliance on a de facto American Foreign Legion, represented by private military contractors (PMCs), many of them comprised of foreigners. These PMCs carry a number of oversight, accountability, and legal risks not found in a fully integrated, and US-officered foreign legion. The British Brigade of Gurkhas, the South-West African Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (Koevoet), and the Kit Carson Scouts serve as relevant historical examples where foreign troops were used to supplement national manpower resources.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’