网络中心战中的协作及其量化模型研究

协作是网络中心战的原则之一.协作的概念及其量化模型是目前网络中心战研究中的一个热点.在详细解释了信息时代中协作的概念基础上,分析研究了协作的维以及网络中心战中的信息域和认知域的协作,指出协作既有利也有弊.进而,将协作的影响简化为协作对完成作战任务的时间上的影响.利用信息熵量化了协作带来的"正影响",利用Logistic方程量化了协作带来的"负影响",综合这两种影响给出了简化的协作量化模型.最后指出了该模型适用于量化诸如防空作战中的协作等时间关键的协作.     

发动机冷却燃料做功潜力?分析

在高马赫数飞行下,用燃料冷却超燃冲压发动机壁面的冷却需求量大于发动机燃烧量。为了降低燃料的冷却量以及实现燃料冷却量和燃烧量的匹配,采用?分析法对超燃冲压发动机壁面燃料冷却工质进行做功潜力分析。发动机壁面冷却燃料的特性决定其热量?大小。根据发动机壁面温度分布、热流密度分布计算热量?,建立稳定流动燃料工质的?平衡方程。结果表明：在壁面最高温度为1200K时,传入壁面的热量为562.4kW,其中理论热量?为541.3kW;冷却燃料工质流量的增加,最大输出功减小;燃料工质出口温度增加,输出功减小,燃料工质出口压力增加,输出功基本不变。     

基于直接算法的合成孔径雷达干涉测量几何精度分析

直接将绝对相位差引入距离方程和多普勒方程答解地面点坐标,称为合成孔径雷达干涉测量直接算法。利用引入含有合理误差的模拟InSAR像坐标、绝对相位差和相应的轨道参数作为起算数据,求得含有误差的地面点坐标,实现了InSAR直接算法的几何精度分析。为了把基线长度和姿态的误差引入轨道空间位置,提出了相应的数学模型。计算结果表明,直接算法与经典算法精度基本相同。     

结合多层快速多极和ILUT预处理算法分析复杂目标的电磁特性

分层快速多极算法(MLFMM)和ILUT预处理算法被结合来分析电大尺寸目标的电磁散射和辐射特性。采用矩量法求解电磁场积分方程,最终须要求解一线性方程组。分层快速多极算法被用来加速用迭代法求解线性方程组时的矩阵向量乘积的运算。ILUT预处理算法被用来降低方程组系数矩阵的条件数,加快迭代法的收敛速度。计算实例表明了该方法的通用性和高效性。     

一类脉冲时滞抛物型方程解的振动准则

讨论了一类含脉冲的时滞抛物型方程解的振动性,利用格林公式以及Jensen不等式,得出了该方程在一类边界条件下解的振动准则。     

整环上不定方程组的通解公式及其应用

借助Z上矩阵A∈Mm×n(Z)的标准形式D=VAU=diag(d1,d2,…,dq,0,…,0),得到了整环上不定方程组AX=B的通解公式以及矩阵初等变换法.     

一类非线性时滞双曲型偏微分方程的振动性

研究一类非线性时滞双曲型偏泛函微分方程解的振动性,利用微分不等式方法和广义Riccati变换,获得了该类方程在第一类边值条件下振动的新的充分条件,所得结果通过实例加以阐明.     

Do Military Expenditures Crowd-out Health Expenditures? Evidence from around the World, 2000–2013

Abstract

The paper examines the relationship between health and military expenditures using pooled cross-sectional (197 countries) and time series (2000–2013) data. Simultaneous equation models were employed to estimate the relationship between an array of public sector expenditures in order to address potential endogeneity. Our empirical findings strongly support the crowding-out hypothesis whereby increased military expenditures reduce the capacity of government to direct expenditures to health expenditures. These findings were robust to alternative specifications explored in the sensitivity analyses. Compared with upper-middle-income countries, the crowding-out effect became more pronounced among lower-middle-income countries. Consequently, this study shows that increased military expenditures negatively impacts health expenditures, and therefore poses as an important risk factor for population health and individual well-being. Moreover, it is the poorest of nations that are most sensitive to the negative effects of increased military expenditures.     

The economic effects of international trade in armaments in the major western industrialized and developing countries†

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases.     

The effect of catastrophes on the strategic customer behavior in queueing systems

We consider the single server Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. During the repair time new arrivals are allowed to join the system. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural linear reward‐cost structure with two types of rewards: A (usual) service reward for those customers that receive service and a (compensation) failure reward for those customers that are forced to abandon the system due to a catastrophe. We study the strategic behavior of the customers regarding balking and derive the corresponding (Nash) equilibrium strategies for the observable and unobservable cases. We show that both types of strategic behavior may be optimal: to avoid the crowd or to follow it. The crucial factor that determines the type of customer behavior is the relative value of the service reward to the failure compensation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013