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We consider the single server Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. During the repair time new arrivals are allowed to join the system. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural linear reward‐cost structure with two types of rewards: A (usual) service reward for those customers that receive service and a (compensation) failure reward for those customers that are forced to abandon the system due to a catastrophe. We study the strategic behavior of the customers regarding balking and derive the corresponding (Nash) equilibrium strategies for the observable and unobservable cases. We show that both types of strategic behavior may be optimal: to avoid the crowd or to follow it. The crucial factor that determines the type of customer behavior is the relative value of the service reward to the failure compensation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013 相似文献
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Although previous studies have examined killing as an outcome-oriented measure, few have explored non-killing as a socially organized process. Using letters written by soldiers, police officers, and security professionals found in the magazine Soldier of Fortune, this study examines cases in which they refrain from killing their opponents. Our results indicate that refrained killings by these actors are socially organized in ways that are shaped by situational, environmental, technological, administrative, and moral factors. In addition, it was found that when police officers and soldiers realized the humanity of their opponents, they employed alternative methods to subdue or control without using lethal force, despite situational and legal justifications for doing so. Implications for the sociology, psychology, and ethics of killing – or not killing – are discussed. 相似文献
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