要地防空中的光电对抗战术

介绍了光电精确制导武器和光电对抗装备的特点,进而分析得出要地防空中要采用分层对抗战术,并分析了实施方法和运用方式,给出了战术配置原则,从技术、战术和地形气候方面分析了影响战术配置的因素,对部队开展基地训练中的光电对抗战术训练具有一定的参考价值。     

RAIN,GROWTH, AND CIVIL WAR: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCATION

We re‐examine the Miguel et al. (2004 Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. 2004. Economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 725–753. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) study of the impact of growth on civil war, using growth in rainfall as an instrument. Miguel et al. (2004 Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. 2004. Economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 725–753. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) – in our view, erroneously – include countries participating in civil wars in other states. Restricting the conflict data to states with conflict on their own territory reduces the estimated impact of economic growth on civil war. We show how spatial correlations in rainfall growth and participation in civil conflicts induce a stronger apparent relationship in the mis‐classified data.     

Individual preferences and the demand for military expenditure*

Whose preferences determine the tradeoff between security and civilian output in deciding upon budget allocations to defence? This paper considers the role that consumer preferences might play in influencing military spending. We propose normative criteria to judge the economic or political efficiency of defence provision at a given time, and test them using Australian survey‐based micro‐data. Our results suggest that the political system has not delivered a simple social‐choice translation of individual preferences into collective outcomes, nor has it delivered results consistent with simple majority‐voting median preferences.     

Book reviews

This paper defines the global economic costs of conflict and suggests two key criteria, namely comprehensiveness and consistency, which are necessary for a valid calculation of such costs. A critical review of the literature reveals that most studies focus on national income losses, using counterfactual regression models, finding a negative impact on growth both for conflict countries themselves and for their neighbors. However, the debate is quite fragmented and the literature fails to combine these insights in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Furthermore, there is little work thus far on integrating aggregate and micro‐level estimates of the costs of conflict.     

Defence R&D expenditure: The crowding-out hypothesis

The impact of defence expenditure on the economy has been widely studied through different types of models. However, the results from these studies have not reached definitive conclusions, and have left a gap in the analysis of the impact of defence R&D expenditure at the economy level. Defence R&D has specific characteristics, which lead to market failures: public good, high risk and uncertainty, national security. Also, defence R&D creates two types of externalities: negative (crowding-out), and positive (spin-off). Crowding-out is the major economic debate about defence R&D. This paper analyses the crowding-out hypothesis by applying three types of models for the UK case: supply, demand, and demand-supply models. From these three models the most reliable is chosen and applied to the individual cases of France, Germany, Japan and USA. The paper also reports the results for the pooled data of these five countries, and for four error component models. The results from estimating such models shed light on the defence R&D crowding-out hypothesis.     

The Demand for Turkish Defence Expenditure

Although a number of studies concerning Turkish defence-growth relation have been published in recent years, little attention is given the demand for Turkish defence expenditure. This is an important issue for understanding which variables contribute to the determination of the demand for military expenditure. However, it is difficult to develop a general theory or a standard empirical approach for the determination of the demand military expenditure. This study models and estimates the demand for Turkish defence expenditure for the period 1951-1998 using autoregressive distributed lag approach to cointegration (ARDL) following the methodology outlined in Pesaran and Shin (1999). This procedure can be applied regardless of the stationary properties of the variables in the sample and allows for inferences on long-run estimates, which is not possible under alternative cointegration procedures. The findings suggest that Turkish defence spending is determined by NATO's defence spending, Greece's defence spending and some security considerations.     

Military expenditure and economic growth: peru 1970–1996

The present study examines the effects of military expenditure on growth in Peru in the period from 1970 to 1996. By using a Deger‐type Simultaneous Equations Model it is possible to break up the net effect into supply‐ and demand‐side influences. The former consist of positive externalities of defence activities on the other sectors of the economy, while the latter can be described as crowding‐out of civilian investment. Estimations find the supply‐side effects to be insignificantly different from zero, while the crowding‐out effect of defence spending is significant and substantial. It is thereby established that defence expenditure has a negative overall effect on economic growth in Peru. Although several caveats – including specification problems of the Deger model, the quality of the data used, a relatively small sample and the presence of autocorrelation in the estimations – must be considered, these results turn out to be quite robust with respect to estimation methods (3SLS, 2SLS, OLS) and slight modifications to the model. They are also consistent with previous empirical findings from other countries and cross sectional studies.     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.     

Territorial contestation and repressive violence in civil war

This study models the structural sources of variation in the use of selective (discriminate) repression within 89 civil wars fought between 1981 and 2005. The severity of repressive violence is modeled as a function of the amount of territory being contested by the insurgents. This idea is operationalized using measures of the location, size, and density of insurgency violence. The analysis finds evidence that the repressive behavior of both governments and rebel groups is linked to conflict geography. Governments violate physical integrity rights more frequently and kill more civilians the greater the overall amount of territory under contestation. Rebels kill more civilians in highly dispersed insurgencies that lack a clear epicenter.