智能舰艇编队指挥控制系统体系结构设计

针对舰艇编队指挥控制系统协同作战自协同的需要,运用多智能体技术探索舰艇编队指控系统体系结构设计问题.提出了一种由指挥Agent和协同控制Agent构成的智能舰艇编队指挥控制系统,描述了其组织结构,分析了面向任务的协同作战任务分解和分配过程,完成了智能舰艇编队指控系统体系结构的顶层设计.对多Agent技术在舰艇编队指控系统中的应用有一定的参考价值.     

用于视频图像帧间运动补偿的深度卷积神经网络

为探索深度学习理论在视频图像帧间运动补偿问题中的应用,提出一种用于视频图像帧间运动补偿的深度卷积神经网络。该网络由卷积模块和反卷积模块构成,可以处理不同分辨率输入图像并具备保持较完整图像细节的能力。利用具有时序一致性的视频图像序列构造训练样本,采用随机梯度下降法对设计的深度卷积神经网络进行训练。视觉效果和数值评估实验表明,训练得到的网络较传统方法能更有效地进行视频图像帧间运动补偿。     

The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.     

维和警察防暴队迎战原则探析

维和警察防暴队在海地任务区遇到很多实际问题。在执勤执法中灵活运用迎战原则,探讨维和警察防暴队迎战原则的法律依据、行动授权和执行程序,总结在任务区复杂多变的情况下维和警察防暴队如何依托国际法规,合理运用迎战原则,有效使用武力授权,合法利用武器装备,严格遵守执行程序的措施和方法,对于完成维和任务具有一定的指导作用。     

Goodbye to all that: On small wars and big choices

This article reflects on a decade of British counterinsurgency operations. Questioning the idea that lessons have been learnt, the paper challenges the assumptions that are being used to frame future strategic choice. Suggesting that defence engagement is primarily focused on optimising overseas interventions while avoiding a deeper strategic reassessment about whether the UK should be undertaking these sorts of activities, the article calls for a proper debate on Britain's national security interests.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

定量的近距空战训练对抗态势分析方法

针对近距对抗态势分析不能量化的不足,提出一种定量的近距空战训练对抗态势分析方法。该方法以对抗过程中双方的位置关系为基础,结合近距空空导弹的攻击包线,建立位置优势函数和武器优势函数,通过两类函数的线性组合构造对抗态势函数,实现了空战训练对抗态势的定量描述。通过算例验证了该方法的合理性和有效性。     

战术弹道导弹攻防对抗及电子战仿真模型

本文提出一种用于研究战术弹道导弹攻防对抗及电子战的面向对象的仿真模型，结合导弹攻防对抗仿真的特点给出仿真模型的结构，并讨论了相应的仿真算法。     

Conditional commitments: Why states use caveats to reserve their efforts in military coalition operations

Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil–military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations.