两个认证协议的安全缺陷

刘丽等作者在《装甲兵工程学院学报》第19卷第2期中,利用非齐次线性方程组给出了一种身份认证协议和一种消息认证协议。指出了这2个协议在设计上存在的安全缺陷,并给出了几种可能的攻击方法。     

一种基于SOAP安全的网络中心发布/订阅机制

针对网络中心发布/订阅系统异步、松散耦合和多对多通信等特点,采用了SOAP消息传递机制对信息进行了封装,从而屏蔽了信息的异构性。考虑到信息传输的可靠性,采用XML-Encryption机制构造SOAP消息,为消息交换和数据传输提供一种安全的保证。实际应用表明该系统在网络中心战中有较好的应用前景。     

避雷针保护范围的图形仿真与图解法分析

针对避雷针设计过程中计算公式过于复杂的问题,提出了利用平面几何作图求解避雷针联合保护范围的方法,给出了单支、双支和四支避雷针保护范围的作图解题步骤,并利用计算机图形仿真,给出了避雷针保护范围的空间结构图形。     

信息安全保障与信息作战的关系探究

为了给信息作战计划的制定、行动的实施提供安全保障指导,探讨了信息安全保障与信息作战(IO)之间的关系,以几种典型信息作战要素和信息作战空间的三个层次为对象,详细分析了信息安全保障与二者之间的关系。为军队信息安全保障体系的建立提供一定理论支持。     

动态灰色时序系统 DGTS 及其在安全策略规范中的应用

设计安全策略模型时应考虑安全策略的时序特性和灰色特性,还应综合考虑保密性、完整性和可用性三方面的需求。已有的安全模型没有描述时序性和灰色特性,而且一般只侧重描述保密性或完整性。为此,本文提出了动态灰色时序系统（简称ＤＧＴＳ）。本文详细描述了ＤＧＴＳ,以及基于ＤＧＴＳ的动态语义设计的灰色时序安全策略规范语言ＧＴＳＬ。     

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

Making sense of the Southern African Development Community

SADC has a poor record in advancing peace and security in Southern Africa. Many identify poor policy frameworks and weak technical capacities as the major obstacles. Laurie Nathan goes beyond these easy explanations in his important new book on SADC. Absence of common democratic values and reluctance to surrender state sovereignty are key factors preventing SADC from making progress according to this book. This article argues that Nathan overstates the case and that there are real prospects and potentials for making further progress in regional cooperation. The lessons from the history of European integration also points to the important role of regional leadership. South Africa, in coalition with other likeminded countries, may still be in a position to move the SADC project forward.     

TURKEY'S NUCLEAR COMEBACK

As worries have grown about global warming and the sustainability and price of fossil fuels, the demand for nuclear energy has increased, and nuclear power is increasingly viewed as a reliable and clean resource. However, the so-called nuclear renaissance coincides with an international security environment in which the norms of nuclear nonproliferation seem to be eroding. Turkey, a non-nuclear weapon state, plans to generate nuclear power to meet future energy demands, but it is aware of and concerned with regional proliferation trends. Questions have also been raised regarding Ankara's rationale for using nuclear energy, as well as its potential motivations and capabilities regarding future proliferation. This article will provide an overview of Turkey's nuclear energy history and plans, as well as the proliferation-related questions that could arise; it will also look at the domestic debate on nuclear energy and Turkey's status as a non-nuclear weapon state.     

The case for demilitarising Lesotho

ABSTRACT

The Kingdom of Lesotho spends around five per cent of its annual budget – some 700 million Maloti ($US52.6 million) in 2017 – on the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). Lesotho’s geographical position means that the LDF has no meaningful role regarding its primary function of defending the country from external aggression and it hardly engages in its secondary functions. In addition, the LDF has a long history of interference with democratic processes and engaging in human rights abuse. The financial resources currently allocated to the LDF could do far more for security, widely defined, if they were allocated to a number of other government expenditure categories.