France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

公安消防队灭火救援行为所涉及的法律问题探讨

随着我国法制化建设的不断发展以及实践中不断涌现的法律案件和纠纷,关于公安消防队灭火救援行为所涉及的法律问题越来越引起人们的关注,从公安消防队灭火救援主体的法律性质,公安消防队灭火救援行为的法律性质,当公安消防队灭火救援行为造成损害时利益受损者可以寻求的法律救济途径等三个方面对公安消防队灭火救援行为所涉及的法律问题进行了探讨。     

试论联合国维和行动的理念演变

联合国维持和平行动的指导理念随着国际局势的发展而不断变化,其中既有自身的发展与完善,也折射时代的演进和各种政治力量的对比。联合国维和行动产生初期遵循绝对中立理念,冷战后准军事介入阶段带有明显的隐性强权理念,反恐时代则对维和理念演变产生了新的影响。     

White hull or white elephant? Soft power and the Chinese hospital ship,the Peace Ark

Although soft power is now seen as an indispensable foreign policy tool, its efficacy has rarely been put to a rigorous empirical test. Using data from HARMONIOUS MISSIONs 2010, 2011 and 2013, this article seeks to examine the degree to which the soft power engagement missions of the Chinese hospital ship, the Peace Ark, has advanced Chinese interests. Although any conclusions drawn must be considered preliminary, as so little time has passed between the ship's visits and the current analysis, this research indicates that these missions’ impact on advancing Chinese interests was at best limited. Although observations from a single set of cases are unlikely to settle the debate between soft power advocates and detractors, it is hoped that this research will serve as a catalyst to further empirically based research on this topic.     

Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, I question whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? I answer the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. I then use the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, I consider the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.     

New directions for African security

African security, particularly conflict-related political violence, is a key concern in international relations. This forum seeks to advance existing research agendas by addressing four key themes: domestic politics and peacekeeping; security sector reform programs; peace enforcement; and the protection of civilians. Each of the articles in this forum makes a case for analyzing African agency when it comes to African security. As a way of introduction, this short article sets out the main debates and concludes by providing further directions for future research.     

浅析听证制度在消防行政执法中的应用

以当地消防部门首次行政处罚前的听证会为例,对《公安机关办理行政案件程序规定》中听证程序进行解析,论述了公安消防部门在行政执法中对听证制度需引起高度重视的必要性,并分析了在听证过程中需着重注意的细节和问题,就深入研究听证制度提出建议.     

消防监督执法规范化建设的认识与思考

加强消防监督执法规范化建设是提高消防部门执法能力、构建和谐消防安全环境的根本保证。消防部门作为公安机关的重要组成部分,在消防监督执法工作实践中,要勇于研究、勤于探索,把消防执法规范化建设全面推向深入。分析了当前消防监督执法规范化存在的问题,提出了推进执法规范化建设的建议。     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.