基于微分平坦的高超声速滑翔飞行器轨迹规划

针对高超声速滑翔飞行器再入轨迹规划问题,提出了一种基于微分平坦理论的三自由度轨迹生成方法。在分析纵向运动简化模型的微分平坦属性基础上,将纵向参考轨迹规划问题映射到平坦输出空间,消除微分动力学约束的同时降低系统设计的维数,进而提高求解效率;采用全局插值多项式参数化平坦输出函数,将问题转换为非线性规划问题求解;设计比例-微分反馈控制律跟踪纵向参考轨迹,同时采用航向角误差走廊控制侧向运动,实现三自由度轨迹生成。仿真分析表明所提出的方法能够较快生成满足多种约束且性能优化的飞行轨迹。     

一类随机生态-流行病系统的分析

对一类食饵染病的随机食饵-捕食者系统,应用伊藤公式,给出系统均衡解的全局随机渐近稳定的条件,并通过数值模拟对理论结果进行论证.     

Group support for political violence: The role of emotions and expressive choice in creating conflict or providing peace

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence which does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be a Nash equilibrium it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace.     

模拟体系对抗价值链的网络同步模型

描述战斗毁伤"规模效应"的Lanchester模型默认作战体系内部是"完美的"。本文扬弃此假设,首次从作战体系内部"共识"涌现的视角提出了一个模拟体系对抗价值链的网络"同步效应"模型,研究了战场变化、个体/群体认知、自同步与对抗均衡等概念的网络拓扑和权值演化形式,并发现在对抗均衡条件下无标度网络具有"同步脆弱性"。     

Purchase and retrieval competition for seasonal produce

We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.     

状态空间表达下控制系统的稳态误差

经典控制理论对系统稳态误差的讨论从传递函数入手,重点是对系统开环传递函数的研究,当系统的输入是任意函数时,引入动态误差系数方法来研究稳态误差,但是当输入具有高阶导数时,动态误差系数将很难得到.现代控制理论中的状态空间表达下求系统的稳态误差很好地解决了这个问题.利用矩阵之间的运算来表示动态误差系数,并且可以得到任意输入下的稳态误差值,在线性定常系统下的推导结果还可以适用于线性时变系统,具有一定的普遍性.     

基于广义标准轨迹的平衡滑翔状态反馈制导方法

对多约束条件下远程助推滑翔飞行器再人滑翔飞行问题,提出了一种基于广义标准轨迹的平衡滑翔状态反馈制导方法.建立了远程助推滑翔飞行器的动力学模型,确定了飞行轨迹约束条件,详细阐述了基于广义标准轨迹的平衡滑翔状态反馈制导方法的制导原理,设计了远程助推滑翔飞行器的侧向和纵向制导律,并采用LQR( linear quadratic regular)方法设计了纵向制导参数,仿真验证了该方法的可行性.与以往再人滑翔制导方法不同,该制导方法主要利用飞行攻角的变化来调节飞行轨迹,飞行过程中飞行器的速度倾侧角较小.仿真结果表明,该制导方法能满足远程助推滑翔飞行器的再入滑翔制导问题,并且具有较好的鲁棒性和自适应性.     

临近空间飞行器纵向逆控制系统设计

建立了临近空间飞行器无动力滑翔阶段的纵向运动模型,并应用动态逆方法推导了模型的逆系统.系统相对阶等于绕质心运动模型的系统阶数,实现了绕质心运动模型的线性化.为了克服纵向运动模型的隐动态和参数的不确定性,在内环动态逆控制器的基础上,设计了外环最优调节器.仿真结果表明:飞行器纵向逆控制系统可以准确跟踪俯仰角或攻角指令,并对参数不确定性和外界干扰具有较好的鲁棒性,具有工程适用性.     

滑翔导弹再入拉起段弹道优化设计与制导

对滑翔导弹再入弹道进行了分段,根据再入拉起段的特性建立了弹道优化设计模型,认为导弹在再入拉起段弹道终点时应处于纵向力平衡状态,使用Gauss伪谱法进行了再入拉起段的能量最优弹道优化计算;利用基于伪谱法优化的弹道在线生成,实时产生控制指令,实现了再入拉起段的闭环弹道控制.仿真结果表明,Gauss伪谱法弹道优化具有精度高、计算时间短等特点,闭环弹道控制能较好地消除风、再入参数偏差等干扰的影响,具有应用于在线制导的潜力.     

Markets for surplus components with a strategic supplier

We study markets for surplus components, which allow manufacturers with excess component inventory to sell to firms with a shortage. Recent developments in internet commerce have the potential to greatly increase the efficiency of such markets. We develop a one‐period model in which a monopolist supplier sells to a number of independent manufacturers who are uncertain about demand for final goods. After uncertainty is resolved, the manufacturers have the opportunity to trade. Because uncertainty is over demand functions, the model allows us to endogenize both the price of final goods and the price of components in wholesale and surplus markets. We derive conditions on demand uncertainty that determine whether a surplus market will increase or decrease supplier profits. Increased costs of transacting on the surplus market may benefit manufacturers, because of the impact of these costs on the supplier's pricing power. The surplus market can decrease overall efficiency of the supply chain, since the benefit of better allocation of components may be outweighed by an increased double‐marginalization effect. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.