面向EUP的军用软件保障机制研究

软件保障是软件密集型装备和系统持续可靠地发挥作战效能的有力保证。从软件保障原则、保障组织和保障过程等方面,研究了面向EUP过程(Enterprise Unified Process,EUP)的军用软件保障机制,初步探讨了在EUP全生命周期中规划、组织和实施军用软件保障的方法。     

美军作战实验室的现状和发展

美军作战实验室建设走在世界的前列。从20世纪90年代初至今,美军已初步建立起从技术、战术到战役、战略,从兵种、军种到联合作战的完整实验体系。分析美军热衷于作战实验室建设的主要原因,概括介绍了美军主要的作战实验室及其主要技术手段与工作程序,分析了美军作战实验室的特点和发展趋势,在此基础上得出了组织管理与顶层设计、新技术研究与应用、需求牵引与研究成果有效应用、建设投入与重点等方面的启示,对于指导我军作战实验室建设具有重要的借鉴作用。     

作战指令自动生成的关键模块设计*

作战指令的自动化生成主要涉及到汉语分词技术、语法分析和代码生成。将作战文书归结为一个半结构化的自然语言信息抽取问题,采用数据融合方法实现词法分析,采用编译原理的技术实现语法分析,采用规则库最终实现了作战指令的自动化生成,作战指令的自动生成将提高指挥自动化的水平。     

What-If at Waterloo. Carl von Clausewitz’s use of historical counterfactuals in his history of the Campaign of 1815

In this article, I analyze the use of historical counterfactuals in the Campaign of 1815 by Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). Such is the importance of counterfactuals in this work that its gist can be given in a series of 25 counterfactuals. I claim that a central role is played by evaluative counterfactuals. This specific form of counterfactuals is part of a didactic method that allows Clausewitz to teach young officers a critical method that prepares them for the challenge of decision-making in real warfare. I conclude with the enduring relevance of Clausewitz’s use of evaluative counterfactuals for contemporary military historiography.     

Operational idealism: doctrine development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army under Soviet threat, 1969–1989

This article analyses the doctrine development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) coping with the Soviet military threat between 1969 and 1989. In the 1970s, the PLA applied a doctrine of ‘active defence and luring the enemy into depth’ based on its traditional operational art. In 1980, the PLA decided to focus its doctrine on positional defence. In 1986, the PLA introduced ‘integrated operations and prioritised strike’, a generalised doctrine that originated from its war history. Many organisational and intellectual challenges in peacetime doctrine development contributed to the PLA’s operational idealism, including its aging leadership, command structure, attitude towards its previous experience, limited analysis of contemporary military developments, and failure in test and validation of doctrines. In the post-Cold War decade, many of these challenges persisted in spite of military modernization efforts. The ongoing military reform has to address these challenges and improve the PLA doctrine development in peacetime.     

Subcontracting State-Building

Abstract

Contemporary development assistance often takes the form of subcontracted state-building. Foreign donors hire for-profit firms to provide services and to improve or create institutions in developing countries, particularly those experiencing internal conflict. This arrangement creates two counterproductive dynamics: first, it introduces agency problems between donors, recipient states, subcontractors, and citizens; and second, it undermines the long-run development of domestic bureaucratic capacity by creating disincentives for the host government to invest. These dynamics hinder, rather than foster, the legitimacy of state institutions. This paper summarizes trends in external support to state-building since the 1970s and illustrates subcontracted state-building with examples from Colombia.     

美军维修改革发展研究

维修保障是武器装备形成战斗力的关键要素。随着国际形势和美国国内经济、科技等方面的发展变化,美军的维修策略、维修技术以及维修保障信息化等方面也在不断变革。总结了2000年前后至今,美军在维修保障方面的重大变革,对其发展趋势进行了预测,并结合我军装备保障实际,积极探索切实可行的有效对策。     

军用车辆采用锂电池驱动时电源管理控制系统的设计

军用车辆采用锂电池组作为动力源可有效解决排放问题,具有高机动性、隐蔽性、稳定性的特性,并能为未来的军用电磁火力平台配置创造条件。其中的电源管理系统关系到军用车辆的电源实施监测控制运行,系统工作效果决定了军用车辆使用的可靠性。通过对军用车辆动力锂电池组电源系统的优化设计,可使锂电池组电源管理控制系统的设计效率得到全面提升。在进行电源管理系统的初步设计过程中,通常需要采用多种不同的方式对其动力体系进行初步的评估。主要针对军用车辆动力锂电池组电源管理系统进行设计分析,并提出了相应的优化措施。     

Too much Western bias? The need for a more culturally adaptable approach to post-conflict security sector reform

The existing guidelines for security sector reform (SSR) tend to draw on theoretical work in the field of civil–military relations, which in turn has been derived from Western, liberal democratic models of governance. Although guidelines strongly advise that local culture and context need to be considered when drawing up objectives for post-conflict SSR programmes, this is not often reflected in practice. This article considers some of the reasons for this, citing both in-country challenges and donor-related issues, and suggests that one of the biggest problems is a lack of alternative, non-orthodox models of civil–military relations to draw upon. It is further suggested that elements of suitable alternative models may be found in states which possess political structures not entirely dissimilar to the Western, liberal democratic ideal, but which can offer different perspectives. Detailed research of these structures should produce a pool of sub-models which could then be employed to create bespoke, culturally appropriate objectives for use in post-conflict SSR programmes.     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.