Subcontracting State-Building

Abstract

Contemporary development assistance often takes the form of subcontracted state-building. Foreign donors hire for-profit firms to provide services and to improve or create institutions in developing countries, particularly those experiencing internal conflict. This arrangement creates two counterproductive dynamics: first, it introduces agency problems between donors, recipient states, subcontractors, and citizens; and second, it undermines the long-run development of domestic bureaucratic capacity by creating disincentives for the host government to invest. These dynamics hinder, rather than foster, the legitimacy of state institutions. This paper summarizes trends in external support to state-building since the 1970s and illustrates subcontracted state-building with examples from Colombia.     

Limiting survival functions of self‐similar structures

We show the existence of a unique analytic single parameter limiting survival function arising from the repeated composition of a coherent structure as the number of components tends to infinity. Examples include the repeated composition process of the bridge structure. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Aggregating courier deliveries

We consider the problem of efficiently scheduling deliveries by an uncapacitated courier from a central location under online arrivals. We consider both adversary‐controlled and Poisson arrival processes. In the adversarial setting we provide a randomized (3βΔ/2δ ? 1) ‐competitive algorithm, where β is the approximation ratio of the traveling salesman problem, δ is the minimum distance between the central location and any customer, and Δ is the length of the optimal traveling salesman tour overall customer locations and the central location. We provide instances showing that this analysis is tight. We also prove a 1 + 0.271Δ/δ lower‐bound on the competitive ratio of any algorithm in this setting. In the Poisson setting, we relax our assumption of deterministic travel times by assuming that travel times are distributed with a mean equal to the excursion length. We prove that optimal policies in this setting follow a threshold structure and describe this structure. For the half‐line metric space we bound the performance of the randomized algorithm in the Poisson setting, and show through numerical experiments that the performance of the algorithm is often much better than this bound.     

CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS

Much is made in the security sector reform literature of the role of civil society as an overseer and monitor of the security sector, contributing to improved accountability and governance. This paper looks at how the notion of ‘civil society capacity’ needs to be disaggregated in order to develop meaningful strategies to assist civil society organisations to impact security sector reforms in complex, post-conflict contexts like the Democratic Republic of Congo. It draws on fieldwork conducted with 200 Congolese civil society groups that are attempting to engage in current security sector reform processes, and looks at which capacities are required to improve oversight by civil society groups.