The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.     

Birth of a norm champion: how South Africa came to support the NPT’s indefinite extension

In 1995, South Africa was in a special position. It was: a new party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the first country to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons, led by a charismatic leader, and seen as a champion of disarmament principles. Yet South Africa’s new leaders were also interested in affirming their position within the Non-Aligned Movement, which was adamantly opposed to the NPT’s indefinite extension. Why, then, did South Africa decide to support the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995? Existing scholarship has ascribed too much credit to pressure from the United States, overlooking domestic debates in South Africa and the bifurcation between professional diplomats and political elites. This article, building on new archival sources and in-depth oral-history interviews with major actors, demonstrates that South African diplomats opposed indefinite extension while South African policy elites allocated little attention to the topic until late in the game. The findings contribute to our understanding of South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship, as well as the politics of global nonproliferation.     

美国网络安全人才培养机制

加强网络安全人才队伍建设已经成为世界主要国家抢占网络空间制高点的战略举措。近年来的研究表明,美国通过发布专门的网络安全人才培养国家战略,设立专门的网络安全人才培养卓越中心,开发专门的网络安全人才培养在线资源,形成了一套较为成熟的惠及全民的网安全人才培养机制。     

Investigating optimal replacement of aging air force systems

An availability‐oriented approach has been developed to decide when to replace an aging system. For an existing system, it is optimal to operate another year if and only if the incremental cost per available year is less than the lifetime average cost per available year of a new aircraft. We illustrate our approach using United States Air Force KC‐135 tanker data. In demonstrating our approach, we find it will be optimal to replace the KC‐135 by the end of the decade.     

FOUNDATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: PREPARING TO KEEP THE PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the continent of Africa, particularly Greater East Africa, has played an increasingly signifi cant role in United States (US) national security strategy. Transnational security threats and political authoritarianism continue to plague the region, creating calls for greater US and international involvement. Before reacting to the situation, however, it is prudent to pause, reflect, and understand that the United States developed strategic relations with nation-states in the region well before contemporary concerns for international terrorism and ungoverned spaces entered the strategic lexicon. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of Greater East Africa's strategic history, this paper examines the core strategic relationship in the region, US-Kenya relations, its origins and implications, and offers policy recommendations that will affect future international security.     

The ‘African COP’

The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) had been anticipated as the ‘African COP’, not only due to the African venue but also due to the opportunity it would afford African countries – with South Africa at the helm – to steer the debate on a global climate change regime. With the conference now over, lobby groups, international organisations, negotiators, observers and commentators alike have been taking stock of its outcome. Despite the litany of developmental and security implications of climate change, COP17 got underway with little hope that much might actually be achieved. In light of the discouraging condition of the global economy, with leading developed economies suffering financially, states were hardly in a mood to be making concessions that would impact their fiscal health. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached. Questions remain, however, about the significance of the outcome of the African COP for the world at large, but ultimately also for Africa.     

POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION POINTERS FROM THE PAST: Lessons from the British Nuclear Weapons Program, 1952–69

Becoming a nuclear weapon state and sustaining a militarily credible nuclear weapons capability is far from trivial, especially for medium powers. Such a capability is demonstrated by much more than firing a first test or acquiring significant quantities of fissile material; capability is indicated by factors including weaponization, delivery of weapons, reliability and effectiveness of weapons and their delivery systems, fissile material availability, and nuclear and non-nuclear testing. Files in the British National Archives shed considerable light on the problems faced by the nuclear weapon program of the United Kingdom from 1952 through the late 1960s. The question is whether this experience is unique or if it instead offers insights into the potential problems faced by, or facing, other medium or aspiring nuclear weapon states. The proliferation-related topics highlighted include: fissile material production, nuclear testing, the first weapon, weapon delivery rates, non-nuclear testing, delivery platform problems, and long-term maintenance and capability sustainability. Further research could provide clearer insights.     

THE EFFECTS ON SOUTH ASIA OF DEEP US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

Significant nuclear reductions by the United States can affect other states in one of five ways: by directly altering their strategic calculations and postures; by indirectly altering their strategic calculations and postures by affecting the behavior of third-party states; by undermining formal US deterrence commitments; by eroding the United States's perceived ability to provide “informal” deterrence through the maintenance of an active global presence; and by creating normative pressure for states to emulate US nuclear reductions. Only the erosion of “informal” deterrence is likely to affect South Asia; to the extent that significant US nuclear reductions affect South Asia, then, their impact is likely to be destabilizing.     

The Race that wasn't

ABSTRACT

Graham Farmelo's new book on the early British nuclear weapon program assembles a fascinating cast of characters in a gripping narrative. It particularly succeeds at illustrating the importance of “atomic energy” imagery in the United Kingdom well before the discovery of fission, and provides nuanced insights into Churchill's handling of issues relating to the atomic bomb and scientific expertise. However, in arguing that the British had a “lead” on the manufacture of atomic bombs that was “lost” to the United States during the early Manhattan Project, the book overstates its case, and in the process misunderstands what it took to make the bomb.     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.