Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

Wellington's use of intelligence developed throughout his military career. Arguably, his experiences in India taught him the importance of intelligence, but it was during the Peninsular War that he honed his analytical techniques. As the war progressed, he developed sophisticated methods for the integration of strategic intelligence – largely gathered by civilian agents – with operational intelligence – collected by military personnel. This allowed him to develop operational conceptualisation, which in turn contributed to the successes he achieved over the French forces in Iberia. However, more than anything, it was his considered use of intelligence, combined with intricate deception operations in the latter stages of the conflict, which deprived the French of reliable intelligence on his own movements, and demonstrated his understanding of the importance of intelligence. This article investigates Wellington's increasing awareness of the importance of intelligence and deception during the Peninsular War.     

IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war

This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.     

The use of undercover military units in counter-terrorist operations: a historical analysis with reference to contemporary anti-terrorism

This article examines the use of specialised plain-clothes military units in counter-terrorism, concentrating on examples involving liberal-democratic states. It analyses the benefits and problems arising from clandestine military activity, focusing in particular on British army units (notably 14 Intelligence Company and the Force Research Unit in Northern Ireland). The article concludes by arguing that such formations have a clear utility – notably in gathering intelligence on terrorist groups – but other aspects of their role are inherently controversial (notably in cases where undercover soldiers use deadly force against suspected terrorists). It also states that plain-clothes military operations need to be conducted on the basis of accountability, both for strategic reasons, and also in accordance with the norms of liberal democracy.     

Clash of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their super power sponsors: Implications on the war against Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.     

基于AFSA的自抗扰控制器参数整定

自抗扰控制器（ADRC）的参数众多,通常依赖于人工试凑优化,控制系统的性能好坏过分取决于设计人员的经验且效率不高。针对ADRC的参数选取问题,首次利用鱼群算法（AFSA）全局寻优能力强,鲁棒性好的特点,结合已有的参数整定经验,提出了一套基于AFSA的ADRC参数整定规则,并进行了数字仿真。仿真结果表明,经由基于AFSA参数整定规则优化过后的ADRC具有良好的动静态特性,提高了设计效率,验证了该方法的可行性和有效性。     

“算法战争”的概念、特点与影响

分析了"算法战争"的概念,考察了美军围绕筹划"算法战争"所展开的相关举措,讨论了"算法战争"的潜在影响,并指出了其局限性所在。建议跟踪研判"算法战争"的未来演变趋势,依托军民融合加强算法储备,重视反制措施的研究和伦理探讨。     

公安边防人力情报源可信度影响因素分析

公安边防部队的情报来源以人力情报源为主,通过社会学研究方法对公安边防人力情报源可信度影响因素进行分析,得出5大类影响因素,并对所得结果加以解释,分析计算出各影响因素重要程度权重值,对公安边防人力情报源可信度影响因素重要性进行了排序,为构建公安边防人力情报源评价指标体系奠定基础。     

Military intelligence and the war in Dhofar: An appraisal

This article examines the role military intelligence played in the Dhofar campaign between 1970 and 1976. Drawing on an array of sources, it examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in prosecuting a successful operational campaign against a Marxist inspired insurgency, but equally, the importance that intelligence played in consolidating the Al Bu Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar itself, the material benefits to be had from the discovery and production of oil had yet to be realised.