基于种群分类的变尺度免疫克隆选择算法

提出了一种基于种群分类的变尺度免疫克隆选择算法.该算法通过对目标函数进行非线性尺度变换,突出了全局最优解的优势地位;建立记忆子群实现了种群代际进化信息的交换;依据亲和度将抗体分为精英子群、普通子群、劣等子群,并对其分别执行自适应高斯变异、均匀变异和消亡更新等策略,增强了算法的局部和全局搜索能力.引入小生境技术提高了抗体...     

扩展信念网络模型的军事情报检索系统设计

着眼信息化战争条件下军事情报分类、处理困难的现实,在深入分析军事情报检索系统特点基础上,提出一个基于分类的自动存储和利用查询术语同义词关系扩展信念模型的检索军事情报检索原型系统,详细描述了其存储和检索设计思路.     

Disregarding the Bear: How US Intelligence Failed to Estimate the Soviet Intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition 1

This article analyzes the main factors that contributed to the failure of the US intelligence community to alert against Soviet intentions and the intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition in 1969–70. Based on fresh archival sources, this research describes the US intelligence conception concerning the USSR; explains the crystallization of the intelligence estimate on the probability of Soviet intervention in 1970; deals with the intelligence data that were acquired but eventually ignored; and concludes with several plausible explanations for the intelligence blunder.     

A reply to Larry cable

Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society.     

Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: the role of intelligence

This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland.     

Helping hands: civil–military cooperation and Italy's military operation abroad

In the Post-Bipolar Era the growing complexity of the military operations requires a new approach for the resolution of international crises. Since the end of the Cold War, peace support operations (PSO) have become the mainstay and principal occupation of most Western armies. At the same time, Italy has been one of the most important actors in such an area. The article focuses on the cooperation between military and civil components (a process called CIMIC) as a key variable in the Italian PSOs. We will analyse in detail the main lessons learned from past military interventions as well as the general context in which new tendencies are taking place. The maintaining of a minimum security frame becomes essential to fulfil activities ‘collateral’ to the mission: reconstructing services and infrastructure, food distribution, water and medication, law and order, de-mining, training of local forces, and supporting local institutions. These are the main tasks to obtain thrust and support from the population.     

PHEV电池电荷状态估计设计及仿真

电池管理系统(battery management system,BMS)是混合动力汽车(parallel hybrid electric vehicle,PHEV)能量管理系统中的核心组成部分,而其中电池电荷状态(state of charge,soc)则是PHEV控制策略中的重要参数.针对PHEV动力电池组SOC系统高度非线性和复杂性的特点,提出了一种基于改进的BP神经网络的HEV动力电池组的实时SOC估计,并对网络的收敛性进行了证明.利用大量PHEV动力电池组在行驶过程中充放电的数据样本,对神经网络进行网络训练并且进行仿真.结果表明,与传统离线SOC估计方法相比,能够有效地减小误差,提高电池SOC的精度.     

“爱民固边”战略在新疆反恐情报收集中的应用

恐怖主义犯罪是威胁新疆社会稳定的一个不可忽视的因素。反恐情报收集工作是新疆反恐维稳工作的前提。将“爱民固边”战略方法与公安边防反恐情报收集工作相结合,指出“爱民固边”战略在新疆反恐情报收集q-的应用问题现状,并针对问题提出了方法措施,从而最大限度地发挥“爱民固边”战略优势,维护新疆边境地区的安全与稳定。     

Determining a role for a military ombudsman in the South African National Defence Force

In recent years, South Africa has come to be used by international terrorists as a safe house, for paramilitary training purposes, as a base from which to plan attacks on other countries and as a conduit for financial transactions. South Africa's own counter-terrorism initiatives have been labelled ‘reactive’ by analysts. Indeed, the existing counter-terrorism regime suffers from a lack of political will to issues of corruption and ineptitude bedevilling the security apparatus of the state. However, using lessons learned from other countries, Pretoria can yet turn the tide against international terrorism by adopting more pro-active measures and by undertaking steps aimed at the depoliticisation and decriminalisation of the security forces.     

Does counterterrorism spending reduce the incidence and lethality of terrorism? A quantitative analysis of 34 countries

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US government increased its counterterrorism (CT) funding and created several Federal Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security; Transportation Security Administration; and National Counterterrorism Center. Similarly, the 7 July 2005, London bombings also compelled the British government to increase its CT funding. These examples illustrate a phenomenon that when states experience terrorism, they dramatically increase public safety spending in order to reduce or eliminate the incidents of and casualties resulting from acts of terror. Using statistical data collected from 34 countries covering nine years, this article examines recent CT spending increases. Critically, the authors explore whether recent public safety expenditures can measurably reduce the number of domestic and international terrorist attacks. The implications of their findings should be salient for policy-makers’ assessments of their countries’ current CT strategies and policies concerning their respective Intelligence and Security Communities.