杜威和桑代克教育科学观之争

杜威和桑代克的教育科学观存在着严重的分歧。回顾杜威和桑代克教育科学观的内容、个人实践与影响,可以发现,两位教育思想巨人的教育科学观争论主要集中在三个方面:第一,在对于实验学校的态度上,杜威认为实验学校是教育科学研究的重要组成部分,而桑代克则认为教育测量与统计才是教育科学的中心,实验学校是可有可无的一部分。这一事实反映了二人对于教育科学本质的不同认识,杜威认为教育科学乃是服务于教育实践的规范科学,而桑代克则认为教育科学是进行教育理论生产的实证科学;第二,在教育研究中对于民主理念的理解上,杜威反对一切形式化的等级结构,而桑代克则认为教育研究中的等级结构是教育学科制度化的必要手段;第三,在教育研究的范式选择上,杜威希望将教育学打造成一门标准的学术科系,一种体现自由学科精神的“复数教育学”。而桑代克则是实证主义研究取向的代表。他主张由大学专业学院中真正的科学家来主导教育知识的生产,并由这些职业科学家建立一种“单数教育学”。     

天基预警系统资源调度问题分析

在介绍天基预警系统作战流程,以及天基预警系统资源和任务的分析和描述的基础上,提出天基预警系统资源调度问题,给出其输入输出结构,并以五元组的形式对该问题进行形式化描述。 关键词：天基预警系统、资源调度、形式化描述     

新形势下警卫部队训练工作探讨

部队战斗力的生成和提高主要依靠平时的军事训练来实现。根据公安警卫部队当前任务实际,着眼新形势下的警卫任务执勤需要,就警卫部队训练对象的层级划分和具体训练目标、训练科目和内容、训练管理体制的建立与完善等问题进行探讨。     

舰艇编队协同反导队形配置优化研究

随着舰艇编队网络中心作战模式的产生与发展,其队形配置问题必须重新给予考虑。首先介绍了网络化反导作战系统的远程数据作战能力;其后,从指挥通信、火力掩护和一次耦合杀伤区3个方面给出舰舰间距的约束条件,以远程数据作战条件下编队舰空导弹杀伤区增量最大为优化目标,建立编队舰舰间距优化模型,并在此基础上结合电子干扰的要求,给出了编队队列角的最优范围解算方法;最后,在一定的战场假设下,通过示例的方式对模型的有效性与适应性进行了验证。     

Serious Rules for Nuclear Power Without Proliferation

The authors propose five principles for addressing the major deficiencies of the current treaty-based approach to nonproliferation. These involve: effectively closing the door to withdrawals from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); defining which nuclear technologies fall within the NPT's “inalienable right” provision, so as to maintain a reasonable safety margin against possible military application; expansion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to include greater readiness to use its “special” inspection authority; creation of an NPT enforcement regime, to include a secretariat; and universalizing the NPT so as to apply to all states, while creating a path for current non-parties to come into compliance. There is no illusion here about the prospects for the adoption of this approach. At a minimum, the world needs to be frank about the gap between nuclear programs and current nonproliferation protection. Encouragement of greater use of nuclear power should be predicated on closing that gap.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.     

The Canary in the Nuclear Submarine: Assessing the Nonproliferation Risk of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Loophole

ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows states to exempt nuclear material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarine programs. This material, however, could be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes without the knowledge of inspectors, creating a potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty. This article argues that exercising that loophole today would amount to admitting a nuclear weapon program, making it a particularly poor pathway to a weapon for a potential proliferant. Still, if states like Brazil ultimately exempt nuclear material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine effort, they could set a dangerous precedent that makes it easier for others to use the loophole as a route to a nuclear weapon capability. There are several policy options available to mitigate the damage of such a precedent; most promising is the prospect of a voluntary safeguards arrangement that would allow international inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear material even after it has been dedicated to a naval nuclear propulsion program.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

The South African Denuclearization Exemplar

ABSTRACT

South Africa's nuclear disarmament is a unique historical case, notable in part for the dramatic shift from deception to cooperation. The unprecedented transparency it demonstrated in order to convince the international community of the veracity of their disarmament is heralded as an exemplar for verifiable denuclearization. Less known is how this case affords insights into how a nuclear weapon program can be clandestinely hidden by the ambiguity provided by an otherwise completely legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy program. Using a variety of open sources, including newly declassified internal South African and US government reports, it can be shown that South Africa employed a variety of deceptive tactics before it disarmed, and even for nearly two years after becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews that information to derive instructive lessons on the lengths that a nuclear proliferant state might go to conceal its true capabilities and intentions, and to thwart international discovery of the existence and full extent of an existing—or, in this case, a former—nuclear weapon program.