常规导弹作战批量测试优化研究

短时间内测试大批量合格的常规导弹是未来作战的客观要求.结合导弹部队的作战实际情况,分析了当前技术阵地测试所面临的问题,提出了一些改革的方法.改造技术阵地测试设备,提高操作人员的熟练程度,采用并行技术和关键路技术优化导弹测试流程,同时建立战时应急状态下的测试流程,特别是导弹批量测试技术的提出,将极大地提高导弹测试速度,缩短测试时间,为将来技术阵地的建设提供了建议,同时也对将来常规导弹的设计和研制提出了更高的要求.     

侵彻子母弹打击机场目标毁伤阈值确定方法

通过对机场目标的结构及地地常规导弹毁伤要求的分析,结合侵彻爆破子母弹战斗部毁伤机理,根据机场各主要子目标的材料、抗毁特性来选取相适应的毁伤效果指标.在此基础上,构造了不同作战任务要求下的侵彻爆破子母弹毁伤机场目标的耗弹量算法模型.为常规导弹武器打击机场目标耗量的最优算法提供了一种方法,具有一定的参考价值.     

常规导弹火力配置算法

基于理论推导提出了一种解决常规导弹火力配置问题的新算法。通过具体分析,建立了常规导弹打击目标火力配置的数学模型,描述了算法的具体原理,给出了算法的全局最优性证明和具体实现流程。     

SLOWING DOWN TO KEEP THE LEAD IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

We develop a model of military technology competition among states. States can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic rivals’ level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. States can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that states with significant technological leads should sometimes withhold new technologies, only strategically releasing them to trump rivals’ efforts. We develop the model by refining Admiral Jackie Fisher’s roughly articulated concept of ‘plunging’. We then use this refined argument to reanalyze the case of naval rivalries among European powers between the Crimean War and the First World War. Finally, we conclude by discussing the model’s implications for current US military force structure planning.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.     

Deterrence and overseas stability

The use of conventional armed forces in a deterrent role merits close consideration. Instability in weak or failing states can have global ramifications, while efforts to build stability take time. In principle, conventional deterrence can be used to buy the time required for such stabilization efforts. Attempts at deterrence will, however, need to overcome credibility problems stemming from the technical limitations associated with conventional armed forces, and with the likely requirement for multiple external actors to deter multiple intrastate audiences. While deterrence might work under certain circumstances, it will not play as central a role in strategy as it did during the Cold War.     

常规导弹战前运输任务优化模型

制定常规导弹战前运输计划时,各车辆运输时间和运输路线的安排是一个组合优化问题.运用军事运筹学和不确定性优化理论,充分考虑节点冲突性、车辆隐蔽性、任务时间、道路容量等因素,建立了运输任务方案的优化模型.该研究为常规导弹波次作战计划的制定和优化提供模型支持,有助于提高常规导弹作战指挥自动化和部队的生存能力.     

普通建筑用钢与耐火钢火灾高温力学性能对比研究

钢材的高温力学性能是建筑结构耐火设计的重要参数。介绍了耐火钢的特点,通过试验对普通建筑用钢与两种耐火钢从常温到700℃高温的力学性能进行了对比研究,结果表明:温度在400~700℃之间,耐火钢的强度折减系数比普通建筑用钢高出很多;以钢材常温屈服强度的50%为破坏标准,普通建筑用钢与两种耐火钢的临界温度分别为550℃、650℃、660℃。     

“These aren’t the SLOC’s you’re looking for”: mirror-imaging battles of the Atlantic won’t solve current Atlantic security needs

ABSTRACT

Discussion surrounding the announcement of a new NATO Maritime Command for the North Atlantic seems to have settled on the assumption that there is again a vital “sea-line of communication” (SLOC) between North America and Europe as there was supposed to be during the Cold War. The Soviet Union had a large fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines and it seemed very clear that Soviet admirals intended to fight a third “Battle of the Atlantic” in the event of war to prevent Western resupply of NATO. However, this scenario bore no resemblance to what the Soviet Navy actually intended to do in case of war. Changes in technology, notably in submarine propulsion, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile range and accuracy were the real drivers of the Cold War in the Atlantic. Cruise missile-armed submarines that can attack shore-based economic infrastructure are the real threat from the Russian submarine force.