大型柔性起竖臂的有限元建模与分析

针对使用中的振动问题,基于ANSYS软件平台建立某大型柔性起竖臂合理的有限元模型,获得其固有振动特性、刚度和强度等设计数据。分析表明,使用中出现的振动现象是由于外载荷频率接近起竖臂一阶固有频率所致,而起竖臂刚度和强度设计整体合理,但存在局部应力集中和强度设计偏于保守的问题。     

无线传感器网络信息质量评估的柔性框架

为建立完整统一的无线传感器网络信息质量评估体系,提出可灵活剪裁的柔性框架来动态地评估无线传感器网络应用中信息的准确性和时效性。该框架基于信息融合理论和时间刻度标记技术,在sink节点聚合网络中所有传感器节点的信息。将信息融合结果近似为真值,利用观测信息与融合结果的数值或语义差异分别评估测量数据和决策信息的准确性。根据信息获取的截止期限和延迟敏感性,分三类描述和建模信息时效性,并通过轻量级的信息获取时间测量法量化。采用滑动窗口机制和增量计算方法,动态地更新评估结果。通过仿真三个目标监测应用场景的信息时效性评估和两个环境监测应用场景的信息准确性评估验证了框架的有效性。仿真结果与信息质量参考基准吻合,表明该框架能够灵活地评估不同无线传感器网络应用中信息的准确性和时效性。     

基于Vague集的防空武器系统机动能力评估技术

针对已有评估方法存在的不足,提出一种基于Vague集的防空武器系统机动能力评估新方法。分析了影响防空武器系统机动能力评估的指标因素,给出了各评价指标的模糊值表示及指标权重的计算方法,该方法能有效避免传统的专家打分法造成的主观偏差。在此基础上,建立了基于Vague集的防空武器系统机动能力综合评价模型,给出了评价其优劣的排序方法。最后通过实例分析验证,该方法评估结果准确,对指挥员科学决策具有一定的参考价值。     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.