边防检查站信息安全建设问题探析

随着公安边防检查站信息化建设的不断推进,基层边防检查站暴露出了大量信息安全隐患,并发生了多起信息安全事故。针对边防检查站信息安全建设中普遍存在的问题,提出了提高官兵信息安全意识、构建信息安全技术人才保障体系、健全信息安全管理机构等措施,以期为边防检查站信息安全建设提供借鉴。     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks

A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017     

Variables inspection for SPC‐quarantined production

When a control chart signals an out‐of‐control condition for a production process, it may be desirable to “quarantine” all units produced since the last in‐control SPC sample. This paper presents an efficient procedure for variables inspection of such “SPC quarantined” product. A Bayesian sequential inspection procedure is developed which determines whether the out of control production is of acceptable quality. By inspecting the units in reverse of the order in which they were produced, the procedure is also capable of detecting the point at which the process went out of control, thus eliminating the need to inspect units produced prior to the onset of the out of control condition. Numerical examples are presented, and the performance characteristics of the procedure are demonstrated using Monte Carlo simulation. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 159–171, 2001     

Bayesian inference based on partial monitoring of components with applications to preventive system maintenance

Consider a binary, monotone system of n components. The assessment of the parameter vector, θ, of the joint distribution of the lifetimes of the components and hence of the reliability of the system is often difficult due to scarcity of data. It is therefore important to make use of all information in an efficient way. For instance, prior knowledge is often of importance and can indeed conveniently be incorporated by the Bayesian approach. It may also be important to continuously extract information from a system currently in operation. This may be useful both for decisions concerning the system in operation as well as for decisions improving the components or changing the design of similar new systems. As in Meilijson [12], life‐monitoring of some components and conditional life‐monitoring of some others is considered. In addition to data arising from this monitoring scheme, so‐called autopsy data are observed, if not censored. The probabilistic structure underlying this kind of data is described, and basic likelihood formulae are arrived at. A thorough discussion of an important aspect of this probabilistic structure, the inspection strategy, is given. Based on a version of this strategy a procedure for preventive system maintenance is developed and a detailed application to a network system presented. All the way a Bayesian approach to estimation of θ is applied. For the special case where components are conditionally independent given θ with exponentially distributed lifetimes it is shown that the weighted sum of products of generalized gamma distributions, as introduced in Gåsemyr and Natvig [7], is the conjugate prior for θ. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 551–577, 2001.     

建筑消防设施运行可靠性探析

简要阐述了建筑消防设施的主要分类、作用、维护管理要求等,着重分析了消防供电、供水、设施联动、人机协调等方面可靠性存在的问题,从落实检测保养、人员素质、预案演练、监督检查等方面分析问题形成的原因,并提出解决问题的几点措施。     

ISO质量管理体系引入边防检查执法工作的思考

ISO9001是企业有效的质量控制管理体系,在其他行政管理部门中也有应用。在公安边防执法规范化建设工作中,如何对边防检查执法质量进行全程监控,是困扰边防部队执法规范化建设的瓶颈。将ISO9001质量控制管理体系引入边防检查行政执法实践中,有利于实现边防检查行政执法质量的新突破。     

建筑工地消防安全监督检查探讨

针对建筑工地火灾隐患多,火灾事故频发,火灾损失重大的现状,从施工单位忽视消防安全工作的重要性、工作人员消防安全意识淡薄、消防监督执法不充分等几个方面分析建筑工地火灾事故多发的原因,提出了建筑工地消防安全工作对策。     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.