认知电子战综述

认知电子战通常被定义为以具备认知性能的电子战装备为基础,注重自主交互式的电磁环境学习能力与动态智能化的对抗任务处理能力的电子战形态。自其被首次提出以来,以其感知准、推理强、决策快的优势备受国内外研究学者广泛关注。随着人工智能新理念、新技术、新应用的不断涌现,认知电子战步入崭新的发展阶段。为捕捉其未来发展方向,从人工智能角度出发,总结并丰富了认知电子战概念内涵,梳理认知电子战的发展脉络及外国典型项目,搭建认知电子战系统框架及架构,从感知、判断、决策等方面对认知听电子战关键技术进行了全面系统综述,并总结了认知电子战面临的挑战和发展趋势。     

The art of meddling: a theoretical,strategic and historical analysis of non-official covers for clandestine Humint

The building of reliable covers has always been of the utmost importance for clandestine Humint. Using both primary and secondary sources, this study seeks to examine how classical authors and modern scholars have dealt with this topic, and which kind of covers have been the most used throughout history in different sociopolitical contexts, and what are the new perspectives for today’s challenges. Findings suggest that a careful reading of the political milieu in which intelligence officers are required to work, and a certain degree of creativity, are the essential premises for the construction of a plausible cover; that some apparently outdated disguises such as merchants, itinerant monks and philosophers should be understood more broadly today to include business people, humanitarian NGOs and academics; that undercover practices have been theoretically and historically recognized as necessary and convenient by a great number of societies, often with scant regard for ethical considerations.     

Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)?????? since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is made for not just a Belgian homeland security framework, but one that fits into an EU-wide security concept.     

基于SWOT分析的警卫情报工作优化研究

当前,警卫情报工作的范围已经扩展到警卫实战、预警、决策、管理等各个方面,但从总体上看,警卫情报工作仍需进一步优化,以满足日益增长的警卫实践需求。针对警卫情报工作的特点,采用SWOT分析法对警卫情报工作的内外部条件进行客观分析,提出针对性的优化策略,以提升警卫情报工作能力。     

Strategic intelligence during coin detention operations – relational data and understanding latent terror networks

One aspect of the global “War on Terror” that has received limited coverage in the academic literature is the problem of detained persons as it relates to intelligence. This is a surprising oversight, given the number of detainees that the USA has been responsible for (over 25,000 were in custody in Iraq alone at one time during its peak). The detention environment offers a prime strategic intelligence opportunity for the US intelligence community to study the tactics and organizations of individuals who have been removed from the overall conflict. In this article an easily implemented collection program is recommended to be deployed in US/coalition detention centers. The primary recommendation is to gather relational data on detainee communication, both authorized and illicit, and to use these data to perform network analyses of terrorist groups and their individual members.     

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice

This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.     

Sweden and the dilemmas of neutral intelligence liaison

Throughout the Cold War Sweden pursued a declared policy of non-alignment. Sweden nevertheless established security links with a number of Western powers, first of all Britain and the US. The most extensive links were developed in two areas – military technology and intelligence. Intelligence liaison was of crucial importance for the security of non-aligned Sweden, but also significant for the major Western powers in filling gaps in intelligence collection. But intelligence liaison also served as an instrument in a closed policy arena where Sweden could receive or pay back favours, according to a pattern established already during World War II. However, intelligence liaison contained policy dilemmas, some of a more general nature, some specific for a country with an overt policy of non-alignment.     

Atomic intelligence in Norway during the Cold War

Thanks to its geographical location and close military ties to the US and Britain, Norway took substantial part in the Western intelligence effort against the Soviet nuclear weapons programme during the Cold War. Norway's relative proximity to the nuclear weapons test sites on Novaya Zemlya and the nuclear submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula was of particular importance in this regard. Whereas the tasks of surveying the development, deployment and possible employment of Soviet nuclear forces always had first priority, Western atomic intelligence conducted from Norwegian soil and waters was occasionally aimed even at gathering information about the geophysical and possible long-term medical and environmental implications of high-yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.     

‘Masters of today’: military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990–2009

Military intelligence forms a vital element of counter-insurgency operations. When the Colombian military suffered setbacks at the hands of the FARC in the 1990s, military intelligence received much of the blame. It was also accused of human rights violations. With the help of US. financed Plan Colombia, military intelligence has been reorganized, expanded, strengthened with upgraded technical capabilities, constrained to operate within defined legal boundaries, and refocused to match the government's strategic priorities. Human intelligence has laid the groundwork for impressive tactical and operational results since 2006. Nevertheless, like all intelligence services, that of the Colombian military continues to experience problems of structure and political outlook.