COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

VISIONS OF FISSION

For many years, non-nuclear weapons states have sought binding commitments from nuclear armed states that they would not be the victim of either the threat or use of nuclear weapons—so-called negative security assurances (NSAs). The nuclear weapon states have traditionally resisted granting such unconditional NSAs. Recent U.S. efforts to use nuclear deterrence against the acquisition and use by other states of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, however, have further exacerbated this divide. This article analyzes the historical development of NSAs and contrasts U.S. commitments not to use nuclear weapons with the empirical realities of current U.S. nuclear weapons employment doctrines. The authors conclude that NSAs are most likely to be issued as unilateral declarations and that such pledges are the worst possible manner in which to handle the issue of security assurance.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

An Analysis of the Threat of Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: Questioning the State-based Approach to Chemical Nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to evaluate the threat of malicious chemical use by non-state actors. It finds that non-state actors have primarily turned to ready-to-use crude chemical weapons (CW) instead of traditional CW agents. Interestingly, the worst crude CW attacks have been more destructive than those employing traditional CW. Scenarios for catastrophic consequences exist, but chemical attacks have typically been used to accomplish tactical goals, which leverage psychological and economic impacts. Therefore, successful efforts to counter CW proliferation by non-state actors must be substantially different from those targeting states.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

Japan's plutonium policy: Consequences for nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

What do we mean by nuclear proliferation? What does it mean to proliferate? This article investigates both the literal and figurative meaning of the term “proliferation.” It argues that many of the definitions and conceptualizations of nuclear proliferation often used by scholars are either limited in their utility or logically inconsistent. It then reconceptualizes and redefines the term, incorporating an understanding of both its etymological origins and the geopolitical context in which the phenomenon occurs. It concludes by exploring the potential impact that the politicization of the phenomenon may have on the identification of occurrences of proliferation, from both an academic and a policy-making perspective.     

Limiting behavior of the stochastic sequential assignment problem

The stochastic sequential assignment problem (SSAP) considers how to allocate available distinct workers to sequentially arriving tasks with stochastic parameters such that the expected total reward obtained from the sequential assignments is maximized. Implementing the optimal assignment policy for the SSAP involves calculating a new set of breakpoints upon the arrival of each task (i.e., for every time period), which is impractical for large‐scale problems. This article studies two problems that are concerned with obtaining stationary policies, which achieve the optimal expected reward per task as the number of tasks approaches infinity. The first problem considers independent and identically distributed (IID) tasks with a known distribution function, whereas in the second problem tasks are derived from r different unobservable distributions governed by an ergodic Markov chain. The convergence rate of the expected reward per task to the optimal value is also obtained for both problems. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

特定m维修策略更新过程系统可用度模型

将武器装备系统的组成部分分为3类,通过分析得出适合装备系统的特定m维修策略,能够在保证装备较高使用可用度的同时,最大程度地缩减维修保障成本.利用更新过程某些特性,建立特定m维修策略下的使用可用度模型,简化了使用可用度的计算.     

某小型武器稳定系统的建模及仿真

针对某小型武器稳定系统稳定精度差的问题,构建了其控制系统的数学模型,通过仿真施加试验台架扰动信号,对现系统采用的传统PID控制器进行仿真计算,得到其动态稳定精度,并把得到的和定型试验稳定精度数据对应的外扰模拟信号作为改造后系统的标准扰动输入,对线性自抗扰控制器进行了比对仿真研究.仿真结果表明,系统采用线性自抗扰控制器具有响应速度快、稳定精度高、抗扰能力强的优点.这一方法得到的仿真结果和实车具有较高一致性,可以有效解决实车参数调试困难的问题.     

企业会计政策选择的起因及其定位思考

目前 ,在以会计准则为企业会计政策规范主体的模式下 ,企业对会计政策有较大的选择空间 ,不同的会计政策选择 ,产生企业不同结果的会计信息 ,对企业利害关系集团产生不同的利益分配结果和社会资源配置效率。本文通过分析企业会计政策选择的起因 ,探讨了会计政策选择的正确定位 ,对于企业正确选择会计政策、维护资本市场的健康运行具有一定的借鉴意义