WSEIAC模型的中远程空空导弹武器系统效能分析

依据中远程空空导弹武器平台系统的战术指标,建立了中远程空空导弹武器平台系统的效能评价体系.对ADC扩展模型中的人为因素K进行了修正,在能力矩阵C中增加对载机生存能力和信息支持能力的体现.在此基础上给出了修正扩展模型下的系统效能,计算了在原始ADC模型下的系统效能,并对两种模型下的效能差异进行了比较.     

某高炮火控系统射击诸元采集装置设计

在高炮火控系统射击校正中,射击诸元需要以数字量形式送入校射系统作为输入信号使用,而高炮火控系统射击诸元大都是采用三相轴角信号形式的模拟信号。为了解决这一问题,设计了一种高炮火控系统射击诸元采集装置实现射击诸元模拟量向数字量形式的转换。首先分析了射击诸元的采集与测量原理,设计了SCOTT变压、采样保持、A/D转换、正峰值脉冲产生、数据处理与控制等硬件功能电路,阐述了采集装置的总体工作过程,在此基础上进行了软件程序设计。该射击诸元采集装置的研制为高炮火控系统射击诸元的采集以及校射工作提供了一种实用的方法。     

超视距反舰导弹射击方式优化选择

射击方式的选择是反舰导弹作战使用的重要内容。在超视距作战需求的牵引下,传统视距反舰导弹的射击方式受到了巨大挑战。为优化选择超视距反舰导弹的射击方式,建立了两种常用射击方式的导弹捕捉概率模型和目标机动模型,给出一种典型条件不同目标机动航向的导弹捕捉概率,结果表明采用有前置量方式射击无法有效提高超视距导弹的捕捉概率,甚至在某些典型条件下还低于无前置量方式射击的捕捉概率,指出无前置方式是超视距反舰导弹射击的优选方式。     

一种防空指令修正弹控制模式研究

针对防空指令修正弹的方案设计问题,探讨了一种通过选择弹丸在有控段某点停止控制而恰能完成修正指标的外弹道控制模式,推导了有控弹丸平均侧向速度和剩余飞行时间的估算公式,给出了最佳停控点的确定判据.对上述控制模式进行了仿真计算,得到不同修正条件下的侧偏修正量及攻角曲线.仿真结果表明,该控制模式具有较高的控制精度,侧偏修正最大误差不超过±2.5%,且在该模式下弹丸也可保持飞行稳定.该研究结果可用于指导防空指令修正弹的方案设计.     

基于多Agent的编队导弹攻击火力分配的优化研究

目前解决火力分配优化问题的更多的是运用静态的数学模型,忽略了作战是一个激烈对抗的过程.为了更全面地研究编队导弹攻击分配的优化问题,提出了一种基于多Agent的编队导弹攻击火力分配仿真优化研究的方法.首先建立了舰艇Agent的模型,研究了Agent的演化模型,建立了基于Agent的火力分配的优化模型.通过Agent自身的演化,从而达到整个编队导弹攻击的火力分配决策的优化目的.最后给出了仿真试验,对仿真结果数据的分析,验证了方法的可行性.     

7A52铝合金便携式搅拌摩擦焊接头的组织与性能分析

采用便携式搅拌摩擦焊设备,对3mm厚的7A52铝合金薄板进行了焊接,对焊接头的显微组织和机械性能进行了观察测试。研究结果表明:焊接头可分为动态再结晶区、热-机影响区和母材3个区域,而没有明显的热影响区。动态再结晶区组织发生再结晶,生成细小的等轴晶粒;热-机影响区有塑性变形流线,且范围较窄;母材区保持着原来的轧制组织。接头硬度的最薄弱环节在热-机影响区。接头抗拉强度达到母材的70%左右,能够满足战场应急抢修的需求。     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.     

战斗机突防效能模型研究

对战斗机作为突防机突防防守方远程拦截机、高射导弹、高炮阵地问题进行了研究.突防机突防远程拦截机运用齐次马尔科夫链模型,高射导弹防空区和高炮防空区均属于高射武器防空区,将两者作为一个统一的整体进行研究,根据突防飞机数的多少分两种情况分别进行了研究.仿真结果证明了所选用模型的正确性和所采用方法的实用性和有效性.     

红外制导防空导弹落入概率评定研究

红外制导防空导弹飞行试验受用弹量的限制,仅能考核制导精度指标,对导弹落入概率、杀伤区边界条件以及引战配合效率等重要战术技术指标难以进行合理考核。给出了导弹制导精度、脱靶量和落入概率的内在含义,针对红外制导防空导弹攻击高低速目标的制导精度指标,采用弹道仿真与飞行试验相结合的方法,研究了导弹落入概率和制导精度的评定方法,用弹道仿真数据评估导弹落入以目标质心为中心的不同区域的概率。     

A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective

This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy.