《中国近现代史纲要》模块化教学改革探索

突出＂中国近现代史纲要＂思想政治理论教育的主题和优势,增强思想政治教育的针对性、实效性,要求教师在教育教学中始终坚持以学生为本的教育理念,不断改进教学方法、增强教育亲和力;不断改革传统的课堂教学单一模式,加强实践教学,建立注重学习过程和环节考核的模块化教学模式。     

电视文化对青少年婚恋观的负面影响及对策

婚恋观是人生观的重要组成部分。青少年时期是人生观、价值观形成的关键时期。随着电视机的普及、收视率的提高,电视文化这种新的文化形态对青少年的发展及教育的影响日渐广泛,电视中一些不良信息对青少年婚恋观的形成具有潜移默化的影响。本文着重从电视文化的传播特点和传播内容两方面入手,分析电视文化对于青少年婚恋观的负面影响,并针对如何减少电视文化对青少年婚恋观的负面影响做了初步探讨。     

航天装备大数据资源平台构建技术研究

航天装备研制涉及论证、研制、生产、试验、综合保障等各个环节,所产生的数据具有种类多、数据量大、异构性强等特点,且数据资源分散于各科研机构院所,形成一个个数据孤岛,严重制约了型号数据的统一管理和协同应用。为了建立“逻辑统一、物理分散”的航天装备统一大数据中心,本文提出一种航天装备大数据资源平台构建技术,该平台基于统一的数据编目规范,综合利用云计算、微服务、区块链等技术,可实现多维异构数据深度融合管控,实现基于型号科研生产活动下的数据逻辑统一管理和实体分布式存储,能够解决航天装备整个研制活动全要素全过程的数据采集和可控共享的现实需求,为各业务场景下的数据分析奠定基础。     

信息化条件下装备保障组织变革的新逻辑

分析了装备保障组织作为一个开放的复杂系统,面对信息化所带来的巨大变化,其结构变革的必然性以及变革所要遵循的基本原则,指出了信息化时代装备保障组织所应具有的基本特征。     

维和任务区当地译员的重要作用与素质要求

维和行动中的当地译员是一个特殊群体,在维和任务中具有重要作用。当地译员必须具备保密性、中立性、服务性等基本素质。因此,最大限度地调动当地译员的工作热情、提高其职业素质、是保证维和行动顺利完成的重要环节。     

新经济环境下内部审计风险形成的主客观因素及防范

本文从客观和主观两个方面分析社会主义市场经济条件下,内部审计风险形成的原因,并尝试提出了相应的防范措施,即增强内部审计人员的风险意识、提高内部审计队伍的整体素质、采用内部审计的科学方法、加强内部审计的机构管理和完善内部审计的监控制度。     

NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship,Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy

In nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, many governments pursue multiple objectives, and changes in policy can occur rapidly—and often unexpectedly. For these reasons, understanding nonproliferation requires empathy and imagination rather than just historical fact. This article considers one teaching tool to encourage such insight—simulations—and demonstrates how teaching and scholarship can interact to improve our understanding of the complex decisions and negotiations involved in nuclear nonproliferation. The article consists of five parts: first, it explains the benefits of simulations as both a policy development tool in Washington and as a teaching tool in universities; second, it describes the pedagogical strategy of the Stanford University simulation program; third, it shows how the simulations have identified and highlighted theoretical and substantive insights that are often neglected in scholarly studies of nonproliferation; and fourth, it describes how students are tested to enhance the learning experience from the simulation. Fifth and finally, the article provides concluding observations about how using simulations in the classroom can help scholars develop insights that improve their understanding of real-world nuclear negotiation dynamics and outcomes.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

From the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the Intervention Brigade

The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been characterised by chaos and insecurity for a number of years, but the rise of the M23 rebellion in 2012 once again highlighted just how dire the humanitarian and security situation is. For most of 2012, the crisis was addressed through negotiations between M23 and Kinshasa, mediated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). However, 2013 marked the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement (PSC Framework), and the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2098, which contains the mandate of the long-awaited Intervention Brigade (IB). The PSC Framework calls on Kinshasa to implement substantial political reforms while also urging the neighbours of the DRC to stop interfering in its internal affairs. The IB is mandated to carry out targeted operations against the so-called ‘negative forces’ that operate in the eastern DRC. For now, hope of resolving this ongoing crisis hinges on the continuing ICGLR negotiations, the implementation of the PSC Framework and the success of the IB. However, there are critical questions about all of these processes that need to be answered and understood, as the expectations for these processes – especially in the case of the IB – are extremely high. Will the ICGLR manage to negotiate a peace agreement and will the IB succeed, or will they go down in history as yet another failure to save the eastern DRC?     

Deferred verification: verifiable declarations of fissile-material stocks for disarmament purposes

ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament.