美国空军飞机战伤修理的发展及其对我们的启示

论述了美国空军战伤修理在方针、组织、培训、战伤修理规程、备件及工具箱、设计、试验数据库、新技术开发和常用抢修技术等方面的发展。同时提出了我空军战伤修理在这些方面的发展建议。     

MPP Fortran 程序中串行循环的优化

在大规模并行处理系统中,通讯开销是影响程序性能的一个重要因素。本文提出了一种ＭＰＰＦｏｒｔｒａｎ程序中串行循环的优化技术：在串行循环中加入同步控制、将串行循环转换成共享循环。该技术能减少通讯开销、提高程序的性能。     

五参数寿命分布S(α,β,λ,μ,δ)

在四参数寿命分布的基础上增加了一个非中心参数,进而提出五参数寿命分布S(α,β,λ,μ,δ),并给出了定义、基本性质及其证明。     

对数正态分布加速因子的Bayes估计

基于对数正态分布形式以及分布对数标准差不变的条件,运用Bayes方法对对数正态分布加速寿命试验条件下的加速因子进行分析。首先基于全寿命试验数据和随机变量函数分布的理论推导出加速因子的先验分布;然后由Bayes公式结合少量的现场截尾试验数据,得出加速因子的Bayes估计模型;最后给出实例进行说明。     

谱分析方法在仿真结果分析中的运用

文中给出了谱估计的分析，并将它直接应用于仿真系统输出量的特性分析。对于仿真的可信性问题，讨论了相容性检验方法，特别是小子样现场试验下，仿真与现场试验之间的一致性问题。     

异构资源类型下多无人机任务分配

针对多无人机在执行侦察、打击任务的过程中携带任务资源的异构性,以及任务对于异构资源的要求,设计了一种改进的基于共识的捆绑算法(consensus-based bundle algorithm, CBBA)。考虑任务价值、任务执行时间窗以及航程代价等条件建立了多无人机对地目标侦察、打击任务分配模型。利用K-medoids聚类分析方法对多无人机进行基于距离和携带资源平衡的聚类,以解决多无人机对于异构资源类型的要求。对打击任务进行子任务生成,并利用改进后的CBBA求解所建立的任务分配模型,通过对比仿真实验验证了算法的可行性和有效性。     

A genetic algorithm with neighborhood search for the resource‐constrained project scheduling problem

The resource‐constrained project scheduling problem (RCPSP) consists of a set of non‐preemptive activities that follow precedence relationship and consume resources. Under the limited amount of the resources, the objective of RCPSP is to find a schedule of the activities to minimize the project makespan. This article presents a new genetic algorithm (GA) by incorporating a local search strategy in GA operators. The local search strategy improves the efficiency of searching the solution space while keeping the randomness of the GA approach. Extensive numerical experiments show that the proposed GA with neighborhood search works well regarding solution quality and computational time compared with existing algorithms in the RCPSP literature, especially for the instances with a large number of activities. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

数学模拟中产生正态随机数的方法研究

针对在火灾烟气和其他气态物质扩散的模拟研究中经常遇到正态分布的随机数的产生问题进行研究,探讨了特殊分布随机数的产生方法。特别给出了正态分布随机数的产生算法及其代码,并进行了验证。结果表明了所述产生正态随机数算法的可行性和可靠性。     

Optimal sample size allocation for tests with multiple levels of stress with extreme value regression

In this article, we discuss the optimal allocation problem in a multiple stress levels life‐testing experiment when an extreme value regression model is used for statistical analysis. We derive the maximum likelihood estimators, the Fisher information, and the asymptotic variance–covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimators. Three optimality criteria are defined and the optimal allocation of units for two‐ and k‐stress level situations are determined. We demonstrate the efficiency of the optimal allocation of units in a multiple stress levels life‐testing experiment by using real experimental situations discussed earlier by McCool and Nelson and Meeker. Monte Carlo simulations are used to show that the optimality results hold for small sample sizes as well. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007