卫星任务调度问题的约束规划模型

卫星任务规划与调度是空间资源管理的重要内容之一,其目的在于为卫星系统的任务计划编制提供科学合理的决策手段与依据。卫星任务调度问题的重要特点在于,调度任务存在可见时间窗口约束。只有在可见时间窗口内,调度任务才可能执行并完成。在进行合理假设的基础上,建立卫星任务调度问题的约束规划模型。对基本禁忌搜索算法进行改进,提出了模型求解的变邻域禁忌搜索算法。应用结果表明,约束规划模型的建立与求解是合理的。     

射频识别系统的多目标识别-反碰撞算法

对多目标识别技术的二进制搜索算法、时隙ALOHA算法进行了剖析,并对ALOHA算法用概率论和数理统计的方法进行了深入的理论分析,得出要根据所设计的射频识别系统的特点合理采用各种算法方可得到良好的效果.该算法的实现对提高高速公路上自动收费系统、人员和物流管理等各领域的工作效率具有一定的指导意义.     

Relaxed sequencing games have a nonempty core

We study sequencing situations with a fixed initial order and linear cost functions. Cost savings can be obtained by rearranging jobs. Next to finding an optimal order, an additional issue is formed by the division of these savings. Cooperative game theory studies this issue. A common assumption states that cooperation between players is restricted to groups that are connected according to the initial order. The value of disconnected groups is defined additively over their connected components. In this paper we allow players in disconnected coalitions to switch places as long as they do not hurt the players not in the coalition under consideration. The resulting games are called relaxed sequencing games. Although they have been studied before, no general results on stable profit divisions have been derived so far. In this paper we prove that relaxed sequencing games have a nonempty core, i.e., they all have stable profit divisions. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply 1 to comment 1

Kovenock and Roberson's [2011] comment provides initial work which has the potential, when suitably extended, to advance the research frontier. Kovenock and Roberson's paper consists of three sections. The first section is an interesting introduction. The second section, titled ‘Model and Main Result,’ provides no contribution beyond Hausken [2008a]. It consists of Equations (1)–(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken, and Equation (11) which is equivalent to the utility requirements u???0 and U???0 provided after Equation (17) in Hausken. The third section provides interesting ideas about mixed-strategy equilibria that can be extended in future research.     

战时装备调配保障决策模型构建研究

分析了战时装备调配保障决策的特点,运用模糊聚类分析法对装备调配保障对象进行了分组和优先级排序,以此为基础,运用目标规划法构建了战时装备调配保障决策模型,最后,通过实例验证了模型的可行性和有效性．     

潜艇运动对被动声纳浮标搜索的影响

由于被动声纳浮标隐蔽持续探测,潜艇可能由于机动进入浮标探测范围,从而增加了被探测概率。首先,在分析已有模型局限性的基础上,从潜艇运动对浮标搜索影响的原理出发,建立单枚浮标新增搜索区域模型,分析了单枚浮标搜索概率的影响因素,然后建模分析了潜艇运动对浮标拦截线搜索概率的影响因素,得出了影响作用仅对浮标作用距离、间距和航向敏感的结论,并对作战使用方法提出相关建议。     

基于非对称balls-into-bins的高效平衡负载分配模型

在大规模数据中心和P2P覆盖网络等复杂网络负载平衡分配中,前人提出了多种多样的负载分配方法,但许多方法为了达到更好的平衡负载指标,追求越来越复杂的算法,使得时间复杂度和算法复杂度很难控制在合理的范围之内。本文在研究了经典balls-into-bins、Azar balls-into-bins和balls into non-uniformbins等模型的基础上,提出了一种新颖高效的非对称balls-into-bins平衡负载分配模型,该模型具有异构的balls、异构的bins,以及不同的bin选择概率,能以很高的概率将最大负载均衡地控制在合理的范围内,通信负载很小,且具有很好的可扩展性,通过拓展,该模型在负载平衡的诸多领域都将有广阔的应用空间。     

基于不完全信息演化博弈模型的网络舆情传播羊群行为

以网络舆情传播过程中大部分人对事实不了解为前提,在这部分群体内构建基于不完全信息环境的两人对称演化博弈模型。提出了两人对称博弈矩阵来决定个体策略的选择,建立了复制动态方程说明不同策略群体比例的演化方向,演化时引入个体的记忆长度,根据设定的交互规则更新各自的观点值及记忆列表。仿真分析模型表明,在此环境中很容易产生羊群行为,群体内的个体都选择盲从并且观点保持一致。此外,羊群行为的集聚产生受多种因素影响,主要与采取分析策略的交互利益、成本系数以及记忆长度有关。本文对科学分析引导网络舆情的传播有一定实际意义。     

基于巡逻历史与道路优先级的武警巡逻策略

针对武警巡逻车辆配置问题,引入了Dijkstra最短路径算法、K—means聚类算法以及计算几何的相关理论,建立了一套警车巡逻模型,并提出了评价巡逻效果的量化评价标准。采用Dijkstra与K—means算法解决了静态警车配置问题;针对警车动态巡逻方案的设计,提出了基于巡逻历史与道路优先级的道路概率选择算法,并给出了不同情况下的警车配置以及巡逻方案。通过MATLAB仿真实验,证明了算法及模型的先进性和实用性。     

Market entry strategy in the presence of market spillovers and efficiency differentiation

Firms form various alliances or use brand extensions to enter new markets in order to improve their operational efficiency and create a positive spillover. However, they do not always know the implications of these strategies for market entry and multimarket competition because the sale of products in one market can have negative spillover effects on product sales in other markets. We present an analytical framework to examine whether and how (i.e., by choosing alliance entry or independent entry) competing firms should enter a market in a situation where market spillovers occur when a firm enters a spillover-producing market to sell products that may increase or decrease the consumers' willingness to pay for products in the primary market. Our analysis shows that the operational efficiency (or quality differentiation ability) of firms in a spillover-producing market varies, and hence, the impact of market spillovers differs for firms. We identify the key factors, such as bargaining power, brand value difference in the primary market, and the extent of efficiencies and spillovers, that determine the firms benefitting from the different entry strategies. Specifically, we show that firms would be more willing to choose an alliance strategy to enter a spillover-producing market if the negative spillover is small and alliance efficiency is high. In contrast, if an alliance entry is not favored, the firms' relative operational efficiency is crucial for them to decide whether to enter the market independently under moderate spillover conditions. Finally, we show the implications of market entry strategies for managers.