Game theoretic analysis of maximum cooperative purchasing situations

This article introduces maximum cooperative purchasing (MCP)‐situations, a new class of cooperative purchasing situations. Next, an explicit alternative mathematical characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games is provided. The allocation of possible cost savings in MCP‐situations, in which the unit price depends on the largest order quantity within a group of players, is analyzed by defining corresponding cooperative MCP‐games. We show that a decreasing unit price is a sufficient condition for a nonempty core: there is a set of marginal vectors that belong to the core. The nucleolus of an MCP‐game can be derived in polynomial time from one of these marginal vectors. To show this result, we use the new mathematical characterization for the nucleolus for cooperative games. Using the decomposition of an MCP‐game into unanimity games, we find an explicit expression for the Shapley value. Finally, the behavior of the solution concepts is compared numerically. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 607–624, 2013     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.     

Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.     

Contractual agreements for coordination and vendor‐managed delivery under explicit transportation considerations

We consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs that include fixed costs as well as stepwise freight costs. We study the stochastic demand, single‐period setting where the buyer must decide on the order quantity to satisfy random demand for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full order for the cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no additional orders are accepted by the vendor. Due to the nonrecurring nature of the problem, the vendor's replenishment quantity is determined by the buyer's order quantity. Consequently, by using an appropriate pricing schedule to influence the buyer's ordering behavior, there is an opportunity for the vendor to achieve substantial savings from transportation expenses, which are represented in the generalized replenishment cost function. For the problem of interest, we prove that the vendor's expected profit is not increasing in buyer's order quantity. Therefore, unlike the earlier work in the area, it is not necessarily profitable for the vendor to encourage larger order quantities. Using this nontraditional result, we demonstrate that the concept of economies of scale may or may not work by identifying the cases where the vendor can increase his/her profits either by increasing or decreasing the buyer's order quantity. We prove useful properties of the expected profit functions in the centralized and decentralized models of the problem, and we utilize these properties to develop alternative incentive schemes for win–win solutions. Our analysis allows us to quantify the value of coordination and, hence, to identify additional opportunities for the vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable transaction into a profitable one through the use of an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor‐managed delivery contract. We demonstrate that financial gain associated with these opportunities is truly tangible under a vendor‐managed delivery arrangement that potentially improves the centralized solution. Although we take the viewpoint of supply chain coordination and our goal is to provide insights about the effect of transportation considerations on the channel coordination objective and contractual agreements, the paper also contributes to the literature by analyzing and developing efficient approaches for solving the centralized problem with stepwise freight costs in the single‐period setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Impact of transfer pricing methods for tax purposes on supply chain performance under demand uncertainty

Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of an intermediate product or service within a firm. This product or service is transferred between two divisions of the firm. Thus, transfer pricing is closely related to the allocation of profits in a supply chain. Motivated by the significant impact of transfer pricing methods for tax purposes on operational decisions and the corresponding profits of a supply chain, in this article, we study a decentralized supply chain of a multinational firm consisting of two divisions: a manufacturing division and a retail division. These two divisions are located in different countries under demand uncertainty. The retail division orders an intermediate product from the upstream manufacturing division and sets the retail price under random customer demand. The manufacturing division accepts or rejects the retail division's order. We specifically consider two commonly used transfer pricing methods for tax purposes: the cost‐plus method and the resale‐price method. We compare the supply chain profits under these two methods. Based on the newsvendor framework, our analysis shows that the cost‐plus method tends to allocate a higher percentage of profit to the retail division, whereas the resale‐price method tends to achieve a higher firm‐wide profit. However, as the variability of demand increases, our numerical study suggests that the firm‐wide and divisional profits tend to be higher under the cost‐plus method than they are under the resale‐price method. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

On sequencing with earliest starts and due dates with application to computing bounds for the (n/m/G/Fmax) problem

Recent efforts to improve lower bounds in implicit enumeration algorithms for the general (n/m/G/F_max) sequencing problem have been directed to the solution of an auxiliary single machine problem that results from the relaxation of some of the interference constraints. We develop an algorithm that obtains optimal and near optimal solutions for this relaxed problem with relatively little computational effort. We report on computational results achieved when this method is used to obtain lower bounds for the general problem. Finally, we show the equivalence of this problem to a single machine sequencing problem with earliest start and due date constraints where the objective is to minimize the maximum lateness.     

The stochastic joint replenishment problem: A new policy,analysis, and insights

In this study, we propose a new parsimonious policy for the stochastic joint replenishment problem in a single‐location, N‐item setting. The replenishment decisions are based on both group reorder point‐group order quantity and the time since the last decision epoch. We derive the expressions for the key operating characteristics of the inventory system for both unit and compound Poisson demands. In a comprehensive numerical study, we compare the performance of the proposed policy with that of existing ones over a standard test bed. Our numerical results indicate that the proposed policy dominates the existing ones in 100 of 139 instances with comparably significant savings for unit demands. With batch demands, the savings increase as the stochasticity of demand size gets larger. We also observe that it performs well in environments with low demand diversity across items. The inventory system herein also models a two‐echelon setting with a single item, multiple retailers, and cross docking at the upper echelon. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

The static theory of transfer pricing

An analysis of the literature of transfer pricing is presented. It is shown that, under assumptions that the firm and its divisions have full deterministic knowledge of their costs and demands, some form of average cost is the appropriate transfer price. What happens when a firm adopts an objective other than profit maximization is further examined.     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

幼儿角色游戏中教师指导身份研究

在幼儿园角色游戏活动的指导中,教师主要表现出三种身份:一为教育者身份,二为教育者与游戏者揉合的身份,三为游戏者身份。教师在观念上认可并向往游戏者身份,在行为上却彰显教育者身份而忽视游戏者身份。为了使教师在角色游戏中更好实现游戏者身份的指导,需要确立游戏者身份规范。     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

On nash subsets and mobility chains in bimatrix games

This work is concerned with constructing, analyzing, and finding “mobility chains” for bimatrix games, sequences of equilibrium points along which it is possible for the two players to progress, one equilibrium point at a time, to an equilibrium point that is preferred by both players. The relationship between mobility chains and Nash subsets is established, and some properties of maximal Nash subsets are proved.     

不同游戏方式下的暴力网络游戏对大学生攻击性的影响

目的:探讨不同游戏方式下的暴力网络游戏对不同攻击性特质大学生攻击性的影响。方法:采用攻击性特质问卷、词汇决策任务和竞争反应时任务对60名大学生进行问卷和实验研究。结果:在不同游戏方式下,被试表现出的攻击性认知和行为存在显著差异(F(2,52)=4.41,P<0.05;F(1,52)=50.06,P<0.001)。高、低攻击性特质者在游戏后的攻击性认知和行为上存在显著差异(F(1,52)=15.25,P<0.001;F(1,52)=82.35,P<0.001)。结论:不同游戏方式下的暴力网络游戏对大学生的攻击性存在不同的影响,相比竞争游戏和单人游戏,合作游戏是一种较好的游戏方式,可以在一定程度减少大学生,特别是高攻击性特质大学生的攻击性认知和行为。此外,暴力网络游戏对大学生攻击性认知和攻击性行为的影响存在一致性。     

Many‐player rendezvous search: Stick together or split and meet?

Rendezvous search finds the strategies that players should use in order to find one another when they are separated in a region. Previous papers have concentrated on the case where there are two players searching for one another. This paper looks at the problem when there are more than two players and concentrates on what they should do if some but not all of them meet together. It looks at two strategies—the stick together one and the split up and meet again one. This paper shows that the former is optimal among the class of strategies which require no memory and are stationary, and it gives a method of calculating the expected rendezvous time under it. However, simulation results comparing both strategies suggest that in most situations the split up and meet again strategy which requires some memory leads to faster expected rendezvous times. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:710–721, 2001     

A cooperative game in search theory

Search theory originates from the military research efforts of WWII. Most researchers of that period modeled their search games in noncooperative games, where players are enemies or compete against each other. In this article, we deal with a cooperative search game, where multiple searchers behave cooperatively. First we describe several search problems and discuss the possibility of a coalition or cooperation among searchers. For the cooperative search game, we define a function named quasi‐characteristic function, which gives us a criterion similar to the so‐called characteristic function in the general coalition game with transferable utility. The search operation includes a kind of randomness with respect to whether the searchers can detect a target and get the value of the target. We also propose a methodology to divide the obtained target value among members of the coalition taking account of the randomness. As a concrete problem of the cooperative search game, we take the so‐called search allocation game, where searchers distribute their searching resources to detect a target in a cooperative way and the target moves in a search space to evade the searchers. Lastly, we discuss the core of the cooperative search allocation game. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

New results on rendezvous search on the interval

In a rendezvous search problem, two players are placed in a network and must try to meet each other in the least possible expected time. We look at rendezvous search on a discrete interval in which the players are initially placed using independent draws (usually assumed to be from the same distribution). Some optimal solutions are known if this distribution is uniform, and also for certain other special types of distribution. In this article, we present two new results. First, we characterize the complete set of solutions for the uniform case, showing that all optimal strategies must have two specific properties (namely, of being swept and strictly geodesic). Second, we relate search strategies on the interval to proper binary trees, and use this correspondence to derive a recurrence relation for solutions to the symmetric rendezvous problem for any initial distribution. This relation allows us to solve any such problem computationally by dynamic programming. Finally, some ideas for future research are discussed. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 454–467, 2013     

Evolutionary determinants of war

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use the concept of evolutionary stability in finite populations. We find that players’ evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.     

A logistic regression/Markov chain model for NCAA basketball

Each year, more than $3 billion is wagered on the NCAA Division 1 men's basketball tournament. Most of that money is wagered in pools where the object is to correctly predict winners of each game, with emphasis on the last four teams remaining (the Final Four). In this paper, we present a combined logistic regression/Markov chain model for predicting the outcome of NCAA tournament games given only basic input data. Over the past 6 years, our model has been significantly more successful than the other common methods such as tournament seedings, the AP and ESPN/USA Today polls, the RPI, and the Sagarin and Massey ratings. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006.     

Political games

A modification of the Shapley value is suggested, which takes into account the fact that (due to personal affinities among the players) certain coalitions are more easily formed than others. This is done by assigning to each player a point in space, and looking at the distances between pairs of points. The method seems to be especially applicable to voting games among political parties (in, e. g., parliaments), and, for such games, gives a value which is considerably easier to compute than the usual Shapley value. Some examples are considered.     

Domestic factors in the making of defense policy: The case of the Netherlands

The importance of domestic factors in explaining the foreign-policy process can, today, not be overlooked. It has been suggested that four sets of variables play an important role in determining the chances for domestic groups to exercise influence on this process: external autonomy, internal (domestic) consensus, the availability of time and the presence or absence of conditions of influence such as legitimacy, resources and access. From a series of case studies on foreign policymaking in the Netherlands two were selected for this article: the introduction of the neutron warheads and the deployment of cruise missiles. Both were very controversial in the Netherlands. They show that under favourable conditions, i.e. divisions within the ruling Christian Democratic Party, committed and well-organized domestic groups which are capable of keeping public opinion mobilized over time can have an important and even decisive influence on the outcome of the making of defence and foreign policy. Domestic conditions being what they are, the making of defense policy in the Netherlands is bound to remain a delicate balancing act for any Dutch government.