The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

TERRORISM: FACTS FROM FIGURES 1

If international terrorism is on a rising trend, an important source of confirmation or refutation of this is time‐series data on terrorist activity. Using chiefly data collected by the RAND/MIPT consortium we show using basic statistical analysis that in the period 1968–2005 the yearly number of all international terrorist incidents shows no trend over time, but fluctuates year on year in a random manner. On the other hand some indicators do show a definite trend over time, principally the steady rise in the number of incidents that are death‐dealing in nature. A further conclusion is drawn, showing that the proportion of these incidents leading to deaths above a given level is virtually fixed.     

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

精密加工过程切削用量和表面粗糙度关系的模糊化处理方法

在金属切削原理中,用切削用量可以估计理论表面粗糙度。由于切削过程的复杂性,实际加工表面粗糙度和理论表面粗糙度有较大差距。本文采用模糊模式识别方法,对切削用量和表面粗糙度的关系进行了实验研究。本人介绍的理论方法、实现技术路线和实验结果,为以后开展ＦＭＳ或ＣＩＭＳ中智能化质量监控技术的进一步研究打下了基础。     

履带车辆转向性能指标分析及实验研究

转向性能是评价履带车辆机动性的重要指标之一.文中针对转向角速度、转向半径和转向消耗功率3个指标,分别在不考虑履带滑转滑移的理想条件下和考虑履带滑转滑移的实际情况下,对履带车辆的转向性能进行了讨论和分析,对2种条件下履带车辆的转向性能的变化进行了比较.为了对履带车辆在转向过程中履带的滑转和滑移程度进行定量的分析,定义了履带的滑转和滑移系数.通过实车实验,对分析结果进行了验证.     

防空多传感器网络的拓扑优化模型

防空多传感器网络是防空网络化作战体系结构的重要组成部分。针对防空多传感器网络的网络结构模型,研究了已知网络中单元节点的位置和数量,如何最优确定网络中继器的位置、数量及其与单元节点的连接关系,即网络拓扑优化设计问题。最后给出了防空多传感器网络拓扑优化设计的数学模型及其求解方法。     

van der Pol 振子在负反馈作用下的动力性态分析

本文从非线性振动理论和反馈控制论的角度研究了ｖａｎｄｅｒＰｏｌ振子在负反馈作用下的动力性态,用中心流形法和形式级数法分析了ｖａｎｄｅｒＰｏｌ振子的局部稳定性和Ｈｏｐｆ分叉行为,用Ｒｕｎｇｅ─Ｋｕｔｔａ法给出了仿真结果。     

2K-H 行星传动的极限传动比

在行星轮系机构综合中,研究行星轮数目与极限传动比的关系有着极其重要的意义。本文根据２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构的同心条件、安装条件和邻接条件,采用统一的符号,对满足上述条件的所有（六种）２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构,导出了行星轮个数与极限传动比的统一关系式,得到了所有２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构的极限传动比计算公式,为２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构的综合提供了理论根据。     

炸药装药在压剪加载下的起爆特点

进行了两类压剪加载实验：（１）利用石英的平面正碰撞产生压剪加载的实验,采用电磁质速法测试装药试件内部不同质点的运动情况,分析炸药装药中发生化学反应的可能性;（２）在压剪炮上采用平行倾斜碰撞产生压剪加载的实验,观测炸药装药爆炸的可能性。由实验可以看出：在亚爆轰状态的压缩加载应力条件下,剪切的联合作用对炸药的起爆起到敏化作用,适当比例的压剪加载造成更加敏感的炸药起爆响应。文中给出了起爆响应规律和响应机制的实验分析。