Linear programming and the reliability of multicomponent systems

Several problems in the assignment of parallel redundant components to systems composed of elements subject to failure are considered. In each case the problem is to make an assignment which maximizes the system reliability subject to system constraints. Three distinct problems; are treated. The first is the classical problem of maximizing system reliability under total cost or weight constraints when components are subject to a single type of failure. The second problem deals with components which are subject to two types of failure and minimizes the probability of one mode of system failure subject to a constraint on the probability of the other mode of system failure. The third problem deals with components which may either fail to operate or may operate prematurely. System reliability is maximized subject to a constraint ori system safety. In each case the problem is formulated as an integer linear program. This has an advantage over alternative dynamic programming formulations in that standard algorithms may be employed to obtain numerical results.     

Aircraft routing under the risk of detection

The deterministic problem for finding an aircraft's optimal risk trajectory in a threat environment has been formulated. The threat is associated with the risk of aircraft detection by radars or similar sensors. The model considers an aircraft's trajectory in three‐dimensional (3‐D) space and represents the aircraft by a symmetrical ellipsoid with the axis of symmetry directing the trajectory. Analytical and discrete optimization approaches for routing an aircraft with variable radar cross‐section (RCS) subject to a constraint on the trajectory length have been developed. Through techniques of Calculus of Variations, the analytical approach reduces the original risk optimization problem to a vectorial nonlinear differential equation. In the case of a single detecting installation, a solution to this equation is expressed by a quadrature. A network optimization approach reduces the original problem to the Constrained Shortest Path Problem (CSPP) for a 3‐D network. The CSPP has been solved for various ellipsoid shapes and different length constraints in cases with several radars. The impact of ellipsoid shape on the geometry of an optimal trajectory as well as the impact of variable RCS on the performance of a network optimization algorithm have been analyzed and illustrated by several numerical examples. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Influences on threat assessment in a military context

The anchoring effect is a well-studied subject. This article connects the effect with the rules-in-use within a military intelligence institution. Particularly the rules-in-use that dictate that an analyst takes his or hers starting point from recently conducted assessments of the specific area or threat. The threat assessment as well as the written assessment were affected. The results show that officers have an aversion to lower a previous given threat assessment. This gives that to understand risk assessment we not only need to understand the methods used, we also need to understand the institutions in which they are used. This is especially relevant for military intelligence as the assessments are conducted in an environment of high uncertainty.     

Optimal maintenance policies for serial,multi‐machine systems with non‐instantaneous repairs

We study optimal age‐replacement policies for machines in series with non‐instantaneous repair times by formulating two nonlinear programs: one that minimizes total cost‐rate subject to a steady‐state throughput requirement and another that maximizes steady‐state throughput subject to a cost‐rate budget constraint. Under reasonable assumptions, the single‐machine cost‐optimal and throughput‐optimal solutions are unique and orderable, and the multi‐machine optimal solutions have appealing structure. Furthermore, we establish equivalence between the two formulations and provide an illustrative numerical example. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

On‐line parameter estimation for a partially observable system subject to random failure

In this paper, we study the on‐line parameter estimation problem for a partially observable system subject to deterioration and random failure. The state of the system evolves according to a continuous time homogeneous Markov process with a finite state space. The system state is not observable, except for the failure state. The information related to the system state is available at discrete times through inspections. A recursive maximum likelihood (RML) algorithm is proposed for the on‐line parameter estimation of the model. The RML algorithm proposed in the paper is considerably faster and easier to apply than other RML algorithms in the literature, because it does not require projection into the constraint domain and calculation of the gradient on the surface of the constraint manifolds. The algorithm is illustrated by an example using real vibration data. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature

ABSTRACT

There is growing policy consensus in Washington and other Western capitals that economic sanctions are powerful tools to cope with major foreign policy crises. Are sanctions, particularly targeted sanctions, really the potent instruments optimists suggest? Under what circumstances do punitive economic measures induce policy change in sanctioned countries? To probe these queries, in this article I outline the conditions that have been identified as more likely to lead to successful sanctions outcomes in the literature. I also discuss four major shortcomings of existing scholarship. First, the sender-biased interpretation of sanctions effectiveness renders the treatment of the ‘ineffective’ cases with negative outcomes the same as those cases that induce no discernable change in target behavior. Second, the prevalent use of static data from existing sanctions databases reduces the ability of researchers to study various time-specific factors affecting the probability of sanctions success. Third, the dominant state-centric bargaining model in the literature offers limited insight into contemporary coercive measures directed at non-state actors. Fourth, the study of sanctions in isolation of other instruments that frequently accompany them, such as incentives and diplomatic pressure, leads to a partial understanding of the specific role sanctions play in shaping the outcome of key foreign policy initiatives.     

On the equivalence of three approximate continuous review inventory models

This paper considers the problem of computing reorder points and order quantities for continuous review inventory systems subject to either a service level constraint or a constraint on the average fraction of time out of stock. It is demonstrated that three apparently distinct models are equivalent under these circumstances. Using this equivalence, streamlined algorithms for computed lot sizes and recorder points are developed.     

PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE MORAL DILEMMA IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST TERROR

The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre‐emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme‐value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre‐emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre‐emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public‐safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.     

More ado about economic order quantities (EOQ)

This paper is concerned with the determination of explicit expressions for economic order quantities and reorder levels, such that the cost of ordering and holding inventory is minimized for specific backorder constraints. Holding costs are applied either to inventory position or on-hand inventory, and the backorder constraint is considered in terms of the total number of backorders per year or the average number of backorders at any point in time. Through the substitution of a new probability density function in place of the normal p.d.f., explicit expressions are determined for the economic order quantities and the reorder points. The resulting economic order quantities are independent of all backorder constraints. It is also concluded that under certain conditions, the minimization of ordering costs and inventory holding costs (applied to inventory position), subject to a backorder constraint, is equivalent in terms of reorder levels to minimization of the safety level dollar investment subject to the same backorder constraint.     

Single machine just‐in‐time scheduling problems with two competing agents

In scheduling problems with two competing agents, each one of the agents has his own set of jobs to be processed and his own objective function, and both share a common processor. In the single‐machine problem studied in this article, the goal is to find a joint schedule that minimizes the total deviation of the job completion times of the first agent from a common due‐date, subject to an upper bound on the maximum deviation of job completion times of the second agent. The problem is shown to be NP‐hard even for a nonrestrictive due‐date, and a pseudopolynomial dynamic program is introduced and tested numerically. For the case of a restrictive due‐date (a sufficiently small due‐date that may restrict the number of early jobs), a faster pseudopolynomial dynamic program is presented. We also study the multiagent case, which is proved to be strongly NP‐hard. A simple heuristic for this case is introduced, which is tested numerically against a lower bound, obtained by extending the dynamic programming algorithm. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 1–16, 2014     

On constraint qualifications in nonlinear programming

In this paper we examine the relationship between two constraint qualifications developed by Abadie and Arrow, Hurwicz, and Uzawa. A third constraint qualification is discussed and shown to be weaker than either of those mentioned above.     

A manpower planning/capital budgeting model (MAPCAB)

A deterministic resource allocation model is developed to optimize defense effectiveness subject to budget, manpower, and risk constraints. The model consists of two major submodels connected by a heuristic. The first is a mathematical program which optimizes the multiperiod weapon mix subject to the constraint set. The second is a manpower supply model based on a transition matrix in which individual transitions are functions of personnel related budgets and historical transition rates. The heuristic marries the submodels through an iterative process leading to improved solutions. An example is provided which demonstrates how systems are undercosted and overprocured if manpower supply is not properly reflected relative to manpower demand.     

Optimal interdiction policy for a flow network

This paper analyzes the problem faced by a field commander who, confronted by an enemy on N battlefields, must determine an interdiction policy for the enemy's logistics system which minimizes the amount of war material flowing through this system per unit time. The resource utilized to achieve this interdiction is subject to constraint. It can be shown that this problem is equivalent to determining the set of arcs Z* to remove subject to constraint from a directed graph G such that the resulting maximal flow is minimized. A branch and bound algorithm for the solution to this problem is described, and a numerical example is provided.     

BANKING ON NONPROLIFERATION

In the past decade, governments have increasingly relied on financial sanctions to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By targeting not only individuals and entities involved in illicit activities, but also banks that allow transactions to occur, financial sanctions were expected to stanch the flow of funds that support proliferation and compel compliance with international law—notably by Iran. Ten years later, Iran's nuclear program has advanced, calling into question the effectiveness of financial sanctions. Previous research evaluating the effectiveness of financial sanctions has focused on the impact of sanctions on the targeted country or on the enforcement of sanctions by the international community. Little attention has been devoted to their implementation by banks and government agencies. Based on interviews with US and European bank and government representatives, this article argues that the inefficiency of financial sanctions is due to shortcomings in training and information support from governments to financial institutions; governments on both sides of the Atlantic have provided little or no assistance to enable banks to identify patterns of proliferation financing and implement the sanctions regime. To transform financial sanctions into effective nonproliferation tools, governments need to play a greater role in their implementation.     

Collective action and the common enemy effect

How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).     

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND CULTURE

We address empirically the question of why international economic sanctions are, or are not, chosen as instruments of foreign policy and the question of what determines their success. We hypothesize that cultural linkages between nations are an important factor in explaining both instrument choice and conflict outcomes. Countries that share significant cultural attributes are found to be less likely to apply economic sanctions against one another than countries lacking such cultural ties. However, it is precisely in the case of culturally similar sender and target nations that sanctions are most likely to succeed.     

War as a System: A Three-Stage Model for the Development of Clausewitz’s Thinking on Military Conflict and Its Constraints

This article presents a new model for the development of Carl von Clausewitz’s thinking on the factors that constrain warfare. The model posits three stages in his thinking that are determined by two system theoretic dimensions. The three stages are friction as a constraint on the effectiveness of the execution of military plans on paper, suspension as a constraint on the intensity of military action and political objectives as a constraint on military objectives. The two dimensions consist of an interactive perspective in the form of causal feedback loops and a holistic perspective in the form of a political system that forms the context of the military subsystem.     

Optimal policies for M/M/m queue with two different kinds of (N,T)‐policies

In this paper, two different kinds of (N, T)‐policies for an M/M/m queueing system are studied. The system operates only intermittently and is shut down when no customers are present any more. A fixed setup cost of K > 0 is incurred each time the system is reopened. Also, a holding cost of h > 0 per unit time is incurred for each customer present. The two (N, T)‐policies studied for this queueing system with cost structures are as follows: (1) The system is reactivated as soon as N customers are present or the waiting time of the leading customer reaches a predefined time T, and (2) the system is reactivated as soon as N customers are present or the time units after the end of the last busy period reaches a predefined time T. The equations satisfied by the optimal policy (N*, T*) for minimizing the long‐run average cost per unit time in both cases are obtained. Particularly, we obtain the explicit optimal joint policy (N*, T*) and optimal objective value for the case of a single server, the explicit optimal policy N* and optimal objective value for the case of multiple servers when only predefined customers number N is measured, and the explicit optimal policy T* and optimal objective value for the case of multiple servers when only predefined time units T is measured, respectively. These results partly extend (1) the classic N or T policy to a more practical (N, T)‐policy and (2) the conclusions obtained for single server system to a system consisting of m (m ≥ 1) servers. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 240–258, 2000     

Generating Pareto‐optimal boundary points in multiparty negotiations using constraint proposal method

In this paper a constraint proposal method is developed for computing Pareto‐optimal solutions in multiparty negotiations over continuous issues. Constraint proposal methods have been previously studied in a case where the decision set is unconstrained. Here we extend the method to situations with a constrained decision set. In the method the computation of the Pareto‐optimal solutions is decentralized so that the DMs do not have to know each others' value functions. During the procedure they have to indicate their optimal solutions on different sets of linear constraints. When the optimal solutions coincide, the common optimum is a candidate for a Pareto‐optimal point. The constraint proposal method can be used to generate either one Pareto‐optimal solution dominating the status quo solution or several Pareto‐optimal solutions. In latter case a distributive negotiation among the efficient points can be carried out afterwards. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 210–225, 2001