A single‐period inventory placement problem for a serial supply chain

This article addresses the inventory placement problem in a serial supply chain facing a stochastic demand for a single planning period. All customer demand is served from stage 1, where the product is stored in its final form. If the demand exceeds the supply at stage 1, then stage 1 is resupplied from stocks held at the upstream stages 2 through N, where the product may be stored in finished form or as raw materials or subassemblies. All stocking decisions are made before the demand occurs. The demand is nonnegative and continuous with a known probability distribution, and the purchasing, holding, shipping, processing, and shortage costs are proportional. There are no fixed costs. All unsatisfied demand is lost. The objective is to select the stock quantities that should be placed different stages so as to maximize the expected profit. Under reasonable cost assumptions, this leads to a convex constrained optimization problem. We characterize the properties of the optimal solution and propose an effective algorithm for its computation. For the case of normal demands, the calculations can be done on a spreadsheet. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:506–517, 2001     

外军野营供水装备的特点及对我军的启示

分析总结了外军野营净水装备的系列化、高技术化、野战化等特点,提出了我军应从水源、供水规模和使用气候条件等方面成系列研制净水装备,并用高新技术对供水安全、降低能耗等关键技术进行攻关研究,以适应现代战争需要。     

The impact of exponential smoothing forecasts on the bullwhip effect

An important phenomenon often observed in supply chain management, known as the bullwhip effect, implies that demand variability increases as one moves up the supply chain, i.e., as one moves away from customer demand. In this paper we quantify this effect for simple, two‐stage, supply chains consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer. We demonstrate that the use of an exponential smoothing forecast by the retailer can cause the bullwhip effect and contrast these results with the increase in variability due to the use of a moving average forecast. We consider two types of demand processes, a correlated demand process and a demand process with a linear trend. We then discuss several important managerial insights that can be drawn from this research. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 269–286, 2000     

复杂作战任务弹药配备模型

多阶段任务系统(PMS)是一种典型的复杂系统,它包括多个在时间上连续且无相互重叠的基本任务,武器系统的作战过程多数属于这种复杂系统.以某作战单元的一次作战任务流程为例,详细地讨论了多阶段复杂任务系统的特点,并从基本任务阶段的系统可信性、可用度的角度出发,分析了在满足给定火力指标的前提下,建立整个复杂作战任务流程中弹药配备模型的方法.     

装备物资供应业务流程重组研究

为了适应信息化战争的需求，提高部队装备物资供应系统的敏捷性和可靠性，基于信息共享和业务流程的并行、同步化，建立了一个基于协调决策中心的物资供应系统模型，基于该模型对装备物资供应业务流程进行了重组，并提出了对装备物资供应系统业务流程进行重组应注意的一系列问题。重组后的装备物资供应系统可以有效地减少信息流经的环节和可能的信息失真，优化保障资源配置，提高物资供应的敏捷性，增强物资供应的主动性和针对性。     

Humanitarian response to hurricane disasters: Coordinating flood‐risk mitigation with fundraising and relief operations

To alleviate flooding, caused by hurricanes, governments build structural barriers called levees. In addition, relief providers such as the nongovernmental organizations and charities raise funds, and procure and deliver supplies (food, water, and medicines) for humanitarian relief. The strategy for managing disasters must, therefore, weigh the costs and benefits of building levees as well as procuring and delivering supplies. We use a three‐stage decision making framework to study how the investment in levee capacity can be integrated with supply procurements, fundraising, and rapid response. One of our major findings is that a large fundraising cost discourages postdisaster funding, implying relatively large investments in levee and prepositioned supplies. That notwithstanding, a large social value (of saving life) can tilt the balance in favor of postdisaster funding. If the levee capacity increases, funding for predisaster procurement is reduced without affecting postdisaster funding. For a sufficiently large increase in capacity, however, postdisaster response becomes superfluous. We also find that hurricane uncertainty motivates levees with large capacity. In contrast, levee‐failures motivate levees with small capacity.     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

城市消防水源建设存在问题及对策研究

城市水资源匮乏、消防水源布局不合理、规划滞后、管网输水能力不足等多种隐患,已成为影响及时扑救城市火灾的原因之一。对城市公共消防水源建设的现状和原因进行了分析,提出了加强城市消防水源建设的对策。     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008