基于效费比的武器目标分配

有效武器目标分配(WTA)是防空阵地的核心。分析了目标毁伤收益、武器损伤关键战术指标因素,提出基于效费比的WTA评价标准,建立了针对多目标的WTA模型,并研究了用遗传算法求解模型的方法。该遗传算法通过设计一种武器目标分配的染色体编码,利用最优保存策略选择运算、均匀交叉运算、非均匀变异运算来求解。仿真结果验证了模型的合理性和算法的有效性。     

模拟电路中非零交叉情况下故障最小范围的确定方法

为确定模拟电路非零交叉情况下故障元件存在范围,提出了一种K故障下诊断的新方法。它是一种确定故障元件存在的最小范围的方法,即在十分现实的K故障下,确定能代表电路所有元件并给出在K故障假设下的最优可测试元件组,使故障定位工作只局限于该组元件。通过可测试值计算和规范式不确定性组与最优可测试成分组的确定,可以诊断故障元件的范围。     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013     

Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

层次分析法的水下航行器维修性指标分配方法

基于层次分析法的水下航行器维修性指标分配方法把层次分析法应用到水下航行器维修性指标分配方法中,即邀请专家对故障的检测和隔离方式、可达性、可更换性和测试的困难等级进行两两比较,得到评价矩阵,据此,可以得到分配结果.这种方法克服了按故障率和设计特性分配法在设计特性相差不大时存在的缺陷,把定性分析与定量分析相结合.在设计初期即明确设计目标,除了考虑到单元的故障率还兼顾了初期设计过程中的不确定性.将这种方法应用于某水下航行器的维修性分配,结果表明,该方法具有实用价值.     

控制分配在平流层飞艇姿态控制中的应用*(专题约稿)

针对平流层飞艇一般采用多控制机构的特点,提出了将广义逆控制分配方法应用到飞艇姿态控制系统中,并根据飞艇控制机构特性采用了加权伪逆控制分配算法。飞艇姿态控制仿真结果表明：设计的控制分配方法可以有效实现多控制机构的协调操纵,姿态角控制效果良好,避免了单一操纵舵面过早进入饱和状态的情况;合理调整控制分配权值可减少能量损耗,实时性较好,便于工程实现。     

大学自习教室优化设置研究

针对目前大学自习教室资源浪费普遍存在的现象,将学生上自习与否视为独立同分布随机变量,从自习教室的管理与维护成本、电费成本以及学生的满意度3个方面出发,建立了双目标随机规划模型,并在模型基础上提出了大学自习教室设置的一般方法。通过实例分析,对模型的正确性和有效性进行了论证。结果表明:在各种情况下,该模型都能很好地解决自习教室设置这一问题,并且能在学生满意度较高的条件下,节约能源13%以上。该模型可以有效地对自习教室进行优化设置,不仅提高了资源利用水平,而且节约了能源。     

无人机飞行训练资源配置效率的AHP-Arena综合评价方法

为降低传统层次分析法(analytic hierarchy process,AHP)赋权过程主观片面性影响,提出了一种综合AHP与Arena仿真建模技术的无人机训练资源配置效率评价方法。基于飞行训练流程分析,确定了训练资源配置效率影响因素和效率评价指标,建立了层次型综合评价体系,概括了AHP-Arena综合评价步骤。利用Arena建模软件构建训练流程动态仿真系统并验证有效性,采用单变量数值仿真法、均方差决策法完成了影响因素客观赋权,通过线性加权综合法得出综合评价系数,实现资源配置效率评价与方案优选。实例应用说明了该方法的有效性,同时,该方法可推广至其他类似的训练过程中,亦可为其他多因素、多指标评价决策过程提供借鉴。     

一种基于最小生成树的无线多跳网络信道分配算法

为提高无线多跳网络的吞吐量和传输可靠性,提出一种信道分配算法。该算法优先考虑最小生成树上的可用信道,为每个节点分配信道资源;然后考虑利用生成树外其他可用链路,为节点提供信道资源,以提高吞吐量。算法通过考虑每个用户的通信需求,可以充分利用空闲信道资源。仿真结果显示,相比于不考虑最小生成树外链路时,有效地提高了网络整体吞吐量。     

Budget allocation under uncertainty and the costs of war and insecurity

This study presents a framework and models for the analysis of government budget allocation into defense and civilian expenditures in situations of uncertainty about the incidence of war. The models display the intricate relationships between security levels, subjective probabilities of the occurrence of war, and potential war damages. We show that poor countries tend to perceive greater probabilities of war than their richer rivals, and that the psychological burden of insecurity is larger when the country’s wealth is larger and when its preference for security is higher. We apply our models to the Israeli–Syrian arms race and show that the higher rate of growth of Israel’s gross domestic product relative to that of Syria is expected to lead to an increase in Syria’s perception of the likelihood of war and to a decrease in Israel’s perception of such a likelihood. We also show that if Syria’s regime becomes ideologically more extreme, the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s security at the level that it enjoyed prior to the change will be very high, whereas the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s welfare will be moderate.