Should competing firms reveal their capacity?

In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

基于数学建模的油罐容积表校正

油罐在使用过程中因地基下沉、地震、管线存油、发油频繁等因素的影响,往往会出现变位,造成计量不准,需要对油罐容积表进行校正,数学建模法可较好地解决油罐变位后油罐容积表的校正问题。由建立的油罐数学模型得到无变位时的罐容表,经过实际数据检验和分析得出误差因子。分析误差因子的由来,利用误差因子修正变位后模型,根据修正后的变位模型得出变位容积表。     

Resale price maintenance contracts with retailer sales effort: Effect of flexibility and competition

In Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, the manufacturer specifies the resale price that retailers must charge to consumers. We study the role of using a RPM contract in a market where demand is influenced by retailer sales effort. First, it is well known that RPM alone does not provide incentive for the retailer to use adequate sales effort and some form of quantity fixing may be needed to achieve channel coordination. However, when the market potential of the product is uncertain, RPM with quantity fixing is a rigid contract form. We propose and study a variety of RPM contracts with quantity fixing that offer different forms of flexibility including pricing flexibility and quantity flexibility. Second, we address a long‐time debate in both academia and practice on whether RPM is anti‐competitive in a market when two retailers compete on both price and sales effort. We show that depending on the relative intensity of price competition and sales effort competition, RPM may lead to higher or lower retail prices compared to a two‐part tariff contract, which specifies a wholesale price and a fixed fee. Further, the impact of RPM on price competition and sales effort competition is always opposite to each other. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

三维数据场的可视化

三维数据场是普遍存在的。本文给出一个三维标量场和矢量场的可视化方法：对计算或实测产生的离散数据重构三维连续场的分布,构造数据场的整体发光模型,并根据发光模型计算视屏投影区域上各象素点的光强值,采用直接体绘制（ｄｉｒｅｃｔｖｏｌｕｍｅｒｅｎｄｅｒｉｎｇ）及视觉增强处理绘制出场的可视化图象,通过特征面处理绘制出场的局部分布图象。图象层次及细节丰富,反映了场的分布信息。系统具有较强的交互功能,静态、动态显示功能及友好的用户界面。     

The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements

When selling complementary products, manufacturers can often benefit from considering the resulting cross‐market interdependencies. Although using independent retailers makes it difficult to internalize these positive externalities, the ensuing double marginalization can mitigate within‐market competition. We use standard game theoretic analysis to determine optimal distribution channel strategies (through independent retailers or integrated) for competing manufacturers who participate in markets for complements. Our results suggest that a firm's optimal channel choice is highly dependent on its competitive positioning. A firm with a competitive advantage in terms of product characteristics (customer preferences) or production capabilities (cost) might benefit from selling through company‐controlled stores, allowing coordinated pricing across the two markets, whereas a less competitive firm might be better off using independent channel intermediaries to mitigate price competition. We consider two scenarios depending on whether the two firms make their distribution channel decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Although firms are unlikely to make such decisions at exactly the same instant, the simultaneous model also serves as a proxy for the scenario where firms decide sequentially, but where they cannot observe each other's strategic channel choices. For the sequential case, we find that the sequence of entry can have tremendous impact on the two firms'profits; whereas in some cases, the first mover can achieve substantially higher profits, we find that when the two markets are of sufficiently different size and only loosely related, a firm with a competitive advantage might be better off as a follower. Interestingly, our results suggest that, when the markets are of rather similar size, both firms are better off if they enter the industry sequentially. In those cases, the first entrant has incentive to reveal its planned channel strategies, and the follower has incentive to seek out and consider this information. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

海拔高度对发动机泵机组性能的影响

介绍250型泵机组基本参数,详细阐述该型发动机泵机组的动力传递关系,应用FST2E型测试台架开展泵机组发动机高原效能模拟试验,获取发动机在不同海拔高度的功率、燃油消耗率和油耗量数据,拟合生成发动机负荷特性曲线。定量分析不同海拔高度发动机功率下降对离心泵体积流量、效率、扬程等的影响,得出泵机组体积流量、扬程、效率的下降规律。研究结果可为现有泵机组的使用及新型泵机组的研制提供理论依据和数据参考。     

开流形的曲率与拓扑

应用比较几何的方法研究了完备非紧且具有特定曲率条件的黎曼流形,证明了在一定Pinching条件限制下,流形具有有限拓扑型或者微分同胚于Rn。     

高超声速飞行器前体外形设计与气动特性分析

利用数值计算开展了高超声速飞行器前体气动特性的考察,重点研究了三维效应对于前体流场及预压缩性能的影响,提出了抑制三维侧缘溢流影响、改善三维前体气动性能的前体侧缘设计思想,考察了侧缘外形的容积效率,提出了有效容积效率的概念和评估方法,对于不同侧缘形式的前体构型进行了气动特性的考察,给出了不同前体构型气动特征的变化规律。     

吻切锥乘波构型优化设计与分析

吻切锥乘波构型是未来高超声速有动力巡航飞行器气动外形重要的设计参考。采用参数化设计方法实现了吻切锥乘波构型的设计,并利用工程估算的方法对构型的气动性能进行了分析;在多参数正交试验分析的基础上,开展了以升阻比,容积和容积率为目标的设计优化。CFD计算显示,优化的外形具有良好的升阻比和容积率性能,且底部流动均匀,是实现高超声速飞行器前体/超燃发动机进气道一体化的重要参考。     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015