Boko Haram and the challenges of Nigeria's war on terror

Boko Haram terrorism has been recognized by Nigerian President Jonathan as the most threatening and complex security issue in Nigeria since independence. In response, the Federal Government of Nigeria has committed itself to different counterterrorism measures, which are largely dominated by “hard politics” and military mobilization. Spending heavily on defense to upgrade military hardware and train personnel in a counterterrorism role, Nigeria has also boosted its strategic importance in the “Global War on Terror”. However, this attempt has become unpopular as it has failed to contain Boko Haram within a short time frame and has made insufficient headway against unabated terror, with human rights costs among the host communities and amidst a surge of stakeholders' discordance. As a matter of concern, this article seeks to assess Boko Haram as an opponent in Nigeria's war on terror (WOT) and to ascertain the challenges the country faces, the alternative measures open to it, and possible ways forward.     

On the utility of security fences along international borders

States confronting cross-border intrusions of terrorism, illegal immigration, and/or drug trafficking weigh the costs of such intrusions against the costs of imposing barriers to prevent or curb the intrusions. In such situations, the degree of national security afforded a state depends, in large measure, upon the degree of border openness the state chooses. Depending upon the intensity and frequency of the intrusions – expressed in terms of opportunity-cost functions – a state might have little choice but to pursue a border policy of zero openness. It is this relationship of border openness to national security that explains why many states choose to construct security fences. In the 49 cases of security fences examined, many – among them Israel vis-à-vis the West Bank, India vis-à-vis Pakistan, Turkey vis-à-vis Greece in Cyprus – the construction of security fences becomes more complicated by their placement on lands whose sovereignties are disputed.     

Does counterterrorism spending reduce the incidence and lethality of terrorism? A quantitative analysis of 34 countries

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US government increased its counterterrorism (CT) funding and created several Federal Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security; Transportation Security Administration; and National Counterterrorism Center. Similarly, the 7 July 2005, London bombings also compelled the British government to increase its CT funding. These examples illustrate a phenomenon that when states experience terrorism, they dramatically increase public safety spending in order to reduce or eliminate the incidents of and casualties resulting from acts of terror. Using statistical data collected from 34 countries covering nine years, this article examines recent CT spending increases. Critically, the authors explore whether recent public safety expenditures can measurably reduce the number of domestic and international terrorist attacks. The implications of their findings should be salient for policy-makers’ assessments of their countries’ current CT strategies and policies concerning their respective Intelligence and Security Communities.     

Kinetic responses to global terrorism: Lessons from Africa

This essay recalls the immediate and longer-term responses of the US and its allies to the events of 9/11. It contends that the die for contemporary developments in transnational terrorism was cast in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 – in particular the launching of sustained ‘anti-terrorist’ military combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more covert ‘kinetic’ operations elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. The essay seeks specifically to expose the counter-productivity of using military operations as the primary antidote to transnational terrorism. Focusing on the African ‘laboratory’ and the spread of transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy, particularly in West and East Africa, the essay concludes that radical Islamists have mastered the ‘battle of the narrative’ and that the Western penchant for dispensing a kinetic brand of medication is feeding rather than fighting the virus of global terrorism.     

Accounting for Lebanese Muslims’ perspectives on the Islamic state (ISIS): religious militancy,sectarianism and personal attributions

This article seeks to determine the correlates of Lebanese Muslims perceptions of the Islamic State (ISIS) which are measured using the hypotheses that commitment to political Islam, young age, education and occupational status would predict approval of ISIS. In view of the accentuated polarisation between Sunnis and Shiis along sectarian lines, it is proposed that dislike for the Shiis would enhance the level of support for ISIS. The study was based on a cross-sectional survey Lebanese Muslims (N?=?302) administered during the fall of 2015.The suggestion is that adherence to the tenets of political Islam, sectarianism and educational attainment are major predictors of endorsement for ISIS.     

试论国际恐怖主义蔓延的原因

美国的新霸权主义政策是国际恐怖主义蔓延的政治原因 ,愈演愈烈的民族分离主义运动是国际恐怖主义蔓延的民族原因 ,宗教极端主义和原教旨主义是国际恐怖主义蔓延的宗教原因 ,高科技的发展为国际恐怖主义增添了新的形式和手段。     

Ethnic groups,political exclusion and domestic terrorism

This study examines whether the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power is an important contributing factor to domestic terrorism. To empirically test this question, we employ a negative binomial regression estimation on 130 countries during the period from 1981 to 2005. We find that countries in which certain ethnic populations are excluded from political power are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks and to suffer from terrorist casualties; furthermore, ethnic group political exclusion is a more consistent and substantive predictor of domestic terrorist activity than general political repression or economic discrimination.     

Other side of the Iranian coin: Iran’s counterterrorism apparatus

Iran’s support for terrorist groups is the subject of countless articles and monographs. Less emphasis is placed on Tehran’s efforts to fight terrorist groups targeting the Iranian state. Yet, modern domestic and foreign terrorist groups have targeted Iran for decades. As a result, the country has developed fairly sophisticated, albeit opaque, counterterrorism apparatus and mechanisms. This article sheds light on the Iranian counterterrorism apparatus and efforts since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, drawing on several years of fieldwork in Iran, interviews with current and former officials, and Persian sources.     

Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience

In June 2016, the Colombian Government and the FARC insurgent movement signed a ceasefire agreement, which brings the two sides one step closer to putting an end to over five decades of war. Unfortunately, Latin America has a rich history of insurgent movements, particularly during the cold war era, some of which continue to operate today. Most of these movements disappeared due to military operations, though some did so via peace negotiations. This essay aims to discuss the various ends of Latin American insurgencies to answer whether, indeed, insurgents can be negotiated with.     

Outflanking missile defences: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,nuclear weapons and terrorism

Ian Bellany, an Emeritus Professor of Politics at Lancaster University, died in July 2011 at the age of 70, after a long and painful struggle with myelofibrosis, a rare and invariably terminal blood cancer. Between early 2009 and August 2010, under contract to Hurst & Co., he worked intermittently on a book about nuclear terrorism, which he provisionally entitled Before the Storm. The editor and I are grateful to Michael Dwyer at Hurst & Co. for releasing the draft. What is published here is an edited version of that draft. It may seem presumptuous to speak for Ian, but I am sure he would also have liked to thank the doctors and nurses of the NHS Morecambe Bay Universities Hospital Trust, whose skill, knowledge, and flair for improvisation kept him alive and writing for much longer than anyone expected. Alastair Bellany, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA.

In the past, terrorists have tended to eschew acts of extreme violence for fear of alienating those whom they wish to persuade and attract to their cause. The first to discard this philosophy was the Aum group in Japan, which sought to use anthrax and acquire a nuclear weapon. Since then, attitudes have changed, spurred on by the impact on public perception of the successful Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on New York and Washington. By crossing the line between moderation and extreme violence, terrorist groups retain one valuable capability: they are much less easily deterred and have few inhibitions. This article considers the three nuclear options open to terrorists – produce a radiological contaminant bomb; build a nuclear bomb; or steal or get given a nuclear device. It examines the possibilities and probabilities of each option and considers how the implementation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions might impose some constraints on terrorists’ nuclear ambitions. By examining the doubtful nuclear security practices of different states and providing statistical evidence of an increase in levels of international terrorist violence, this article points to determined terrorists in time acquiring the means to acquire one or other variants of a nuclear weapon. It concludes that it is not a matter of “if” but “when.”