Production to order and off‐line inspection when the production process is partially observable

This study combines inspection and lot‐sizing decisions. The issue is whether to INSPECT another unit or PRODUCE a new lot. A unit produced is either conforming or defective. Demand need to be satisfied in full, by conforming units only. The production process may switch from a “good” state to a “bad” state, at constant rate. The proportion of conforming units in the good state is higher than in the bad state. The true state is unobservable and can only be inferred from the quality of units inspected. We thus update, after each inspection, the probability that the unit, next candidate for inspection, was produced while the production process was in the good state. That “good‐state‐probability” is the basis for our decision to INSPECT or PRODUCE. We prove that the optimal policy has a simple form: INSPECT only if the good‐state‐probability exceeds a control limit. We provide a methodology to calculate the optimal lot size and the expected costs associated with INSPECT and PRODUCE. Surprisingly, we find that the control limit, as a function of the demand (and other problem parameters) is not necessarily monotone. Also, counter to intuition, it is possible that the optimal action is PRODUCE, after revealing a conforming unit. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Budget allocation,national security,military intelligence,and human capital: a dynamic model

This study develops a dynamic model that integrates military intelligence into the defense capability of the country and the optimal allocation of its government budget. We assert that the effectiveness of the country’s military intelligence is contingent on the quality of its human capital, which, in turn, implies a long-term positive relationship between the government’s various civilian expenditures and its capacity to achieve a cost-effective intelligence and, hence, military capability. This relationship is developed within a multiple-period arms race model between two rivals. Using this model and stylized data for the Israeli–Syrian arms race, we show that an appropriate budget shift from defense to civilian expenditures during the initial periods of the planning horizon will gradually (over a decade, say) increase the quality of human capital in the country and, thus, the effectiveness of its intelligence, which, in turn, will increase the country’s future security and welfare.     

The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization,Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy

The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers.     

ON THE CHOICE OF MULTI-TASK R&D DEFENSE PROJECTS: A CASE STUDY OF The ISRAELI MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Investments in R&D constitute a major share of the expenditures of the hi-tech industry since, generally, they enable firms to successfully compete in the rapidly and constantly changing markets for hi-tech products and services. The role of R&D projects is particularly important in the areas of defense and homeland security due to the nature of warfare and the continuous threats posed by arms races and by terror organizations. This study analyzes the choice of the R&D projects designed to counter multiple related military threats. It develops the methodology required to assess whether it is preferable to develop one project to thwart several related threats, or several distinct projects, each of which provides an answer to one specific threat or a partial set of the threats. An analytic solution is provided and assessed for two simple models with two related threats. A solution of the model is then provided for any number of related threats, using a dynamic programming methodology. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of our model and methodology to Israel’s missile defense problem; that is, we show how to optimally develop systems aimed at thwarting the multiple threats of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles.