Inequalities involving the lifetime of series and parallel systems

Let {Xⁱ} be independent HNBUE (Harmonic New Better Than Used in Expectation) random variables and let {Yⁱ} be independent exponential random variables such that E{Xⁱ}=E{Yⁱ} It is shown that \documentclass{article}\pagestyle{empty}\begin{document}$ E\left[{u\left({\mathop {\min \,X_i}\limits_{l \le i \le n}} \right)} \right] \ge E\left[{u\left({\mathop {\min \,Y_i}\limits_{l \le i \le n}} \right)} \right] $\end{document} for all increasing and concave u. This generalizes a result of Kubat. When comparing two series systems with components of equal cost, one with lifetimes {Xⁱ} and the other with lifetimes {Yⁱ}, it is shown that a risk-averse decision-maker will prefer the HNBUE system. Similar results are obtained for parallel systems.     

Optimal control for entry of many classes of customers to an M/M/1 queue

A method is developed for determining the optimal policy for entry of customers from many independent classes of Poisson arrivals to a first-come, first-serve (for customers admitted to the queue) single-server queue with exponential service times. The solution technique utilizes a semi-Markov formulation or the decision problem.     

Casualty Rates of US Military Personnel During the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

Abstract

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, which ended in August 2010, nearly 3500 hostile deaths occurred among US military personnel and 32,000 more were wounded in action (WIA). More than 1800 hostile deaths occurred during Operation Enduring Freedom (in and around Afghanistan) through 2014 and about 20,000 were WIA. A larger proportion of wounded personnel survived in Iraq and Afghanistan than during the Vietnam War, but the increased survival rates were not as high as some studies have asserted. The survival rates were 90.2% in Iraq and 91.6% in Afghanistan, compared with 86.5% in Vietnam. The casualty rates varied between the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and before, during, and after the respective surges. Amputation rates are difficult to measure consistently, but I estimate that 2.6% of all WIA and 9.0% of medically evacuated WIA from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters combined resulted in the major loss of a limb. Elevated non-hostile death rates (including deaths due to accidents, illnesses, homicides, or suicides) resulted in about 220 more deaths in Iraq and about 200 more deaths in Afghanistan than would have been expected in peacetime among populations of the size deployed to those two conflicts.     

The “motivated bias” dilemma in warfare and intelligence

The goal of this article is to challenge the assumption of rationality in the behavior of decision-making units involved in security, defense, intelligence and warfare and to consider the influence of “motivated bias” in such instances. A review of motivational literature within international politics and a discussion of literature applying “motivated biases” to warfare and strategic surprise will offer an alternative view of the primacy of rationality in such decisions.     

Taboos and regional security regimes

A security regime is an uneasy compromise where the relationship among the parties is generally undefined, limited in scope, and transitional. The relationship is undefined, because the parties are usually former adversaries who, for the moment, do not think of war as a feasible or practical, or, under some conditions, even a possible instrument. Yet they are far from being allies. A security regime differs in important ways from an alliance or a security community. A security regime is also limited. What happens inside the regime is only a part of what happens in the larger relationship. Participation in a regime does not imply clear behavioral expectations outside the security arena. Finally, the parties to a security regime are usually in a transitional relationship; although the parties have moved away from a full-scale adversarial relationship, where they are going is less clear. Security regimes do not develop in a linear sequence to become ‘security communities’.