Negotiating regional security and arms control in the Middle East: the ACRS experience and beyond

In this contribution, Jones focuses initially on the experience of Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) and the reasons why this group stalled. The sources of tension that emerged in ACRS, and which ultimately led to its suspension, derived mainly from different views on the relationship between the nuclear and other issues in these talks, as well as the composition of ACRS and its role as a group of the multilateral track of the peace process. Jones emphasizes that regional security discussions in the Middle East must address multiple threats on multiple levels, and ACRS was never politically equipped to do so. Thus, despite the real, if limited, success of ACRS, any real security regime in the Middle East will be the product of a much more inclusive process which recognizes the essential importance of cooperatively addressing multiple security challenges, including those related to the problems of social and economic upheaval in the region. Jones concludes with an argument that the time may be ripe to embark on such a process in the wake of the war in Iraq and other far-reaching indicators of change in the region.     

Responsibility in Complex Conflicts: An Afghan Case

This paper discusses soldiers’ moral responsibility in today’s complex conflicts. The point of departure is the increased focus on soldiers as moral decision-makers in war, illustrated by the introduction of core values in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Responsibility is one of these core values, but it is not clear exactly how we should understand responsibility. I use a case where a group of Norwegian soldiers in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) sought the cooperation of a group of mujahedeen to solve the military mission of establishing security. As confidence between the parties grew, the soldiers became horrified witnesses to a practice of bacha bazi, where a young boy is dressed up for entertainment and sexual abuse. This situation gives reason to question the limits of role responsibility, the status of soldiers’ legitimacy, and the challenges of making morally sound judgments in a multicultural context. The discussion demonstrates that, even if there are restrictions on the soldiers’ freedom to act, a responsibility reaching beyond or extending their role should be recognized as part of the moral reality of modern soldiers.     

US–Latin America’s security: moving through an inflection point?

Recent elections in Latin America, such as those of Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Horacio Cartes in Paraguay, and the impeachment process of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, point to a new direction in Latin American politics and away from the “hard left;” they also point to a new momentum in the security relationship between the US and Latin American countries. Former US President Obama’s 2016 trip to Cuba and Argentina was a clear demonstration of this new security paradigm and also a clear indication that there is a new momentum brewing in the US towards a rethinking and reshaping of security strategies and mindsets. This article will explore the multidimensional security relationship between the US and Latin American countries in light of recent changes in the US’ posture toward the region.     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

Neutrino-Based Tools for Nuclear Verification and Diplomacy in North Korea

We present neutrino-based options for verifying that the nuclear reactors at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center are no longer operating or that they are operating in an agreed manner, precluding weapons production. Neutrino detectors may be a mutually agreeable complement to traditional verification protocols because they do not require access inside reactor buildings, could be installed collaboratively, and provide persistent and specific observations. At Yongbyon, neutrino detectors could passively verify reactor shutdowns or monitor power levels and plutonium contents, all from outside the reactor buildings. The monitoring options presented here build on recent successes in basic particle physics. Following a dedicated design study, these tools could be deployed in as little as one year at a reasonable cost. In North Korea, cooperative deployment of neutrino detectors could help redirect a limited number of scientists and engineers from military applications to peaceful technical work in an international community. Opportunities for scientific collaboration with South Korea are especially strong. We encourage policymakers to consider collaborative neutrino projects within a broader program of action toward stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.     

Case Study Commentary and Analysis: The Moral Sword of Damocles

Case summary, by James Cook (Case Study Editor):

In the final issue of the 2015 volume of the Journal of Military Ethics, we published a case study entitled “Coining an Ethical Dilemma: The Impunity of Afghanistan’s Indigenous Security Forces”, written by Paul Lushenko. The study detailed two extra-judicial killings (EJKs) by Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel in an area stabilized and overseen by a US-led Combined Task Force (CTF). To deter further EJKs following the first incident, the CTF’s commander reported the incidents up his chain of command and used the limited tools at his disposal to influence local indigenous officials directly. Apparently, the ANP unit took no notice. In his commentary on the case study, Paul Robinson considered moral compromise in war more generally. Coalition troops in Afghanistan, for instance, have encountered not just EJKs but also sexual abuse of minors, killing of non-combatants, kidnapping, torture, and widespread corruption. What should the soldier on the ground do if indigenous personnel violate Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) with impunity? Refusing to serve will not right or prevent moral wrongs, while staying on to fight the good but futile fight will mire the soldier in moral compromise. “?… [S]oldiers faced with this dilemma have no good options. The systemic failings surrounding them mean that it is probable that nothing they do will help”. In a concluding note, I suggested that while an individual soldier may indeed have no good options, as Paul Robinson suggests, that soldier’s military and nation at large are obliged to do what they can. At least, they must keep to the moral high ground so as not to give indigenous security forces an excuse to misbehave, and determine the nature of crimes such as EJKs: are they outlaw acts or in fact endorsed by the indigenous culture and perhaps even government? Below Colonel Dave Barnes, himself a veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom, analyzes Paul Lushenko’s case study at “?…?the local, tactical level: If a commander is in this situation – where her unit witnesses an EJK or other war crime – what should she do?”     

THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, the group of stakeholders working to combat biological weapons (BW) proliferation has broadened to include new actors who have not traditionally focused on security issues, including organizations from the public health sector, researchers in the life sciences, and the biosafety community. This has had significant benefits for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the arms control establishment more broadly. However, the BWC's agenda has become increasingly dominated by issues of international health and global health security. By focusing solely on response strategies, the United States and other interested parties risk losing sight of other important elements of a counter-BW strategy, including deterrence and prevention. Focusing on public health-related issues to the exclusion of more traditional security matters puts the nonproliferation regime at risk, because it limits the amount of time that stakeholders have available to grapple with the critical questions facing the BWC and the biological weapons nonproliferation establishment—questions that must be answered if the regime is to survive.     

动态灰色时序系统 DGTS 及其在安全策略规范中的应用

设计安全策略模型时应考虑安全策略的时序特性和灰色特性,还应综合考虑保密性、完整性和可用性三方面的需求。已有的安全模型没有描述时序性和灰色特性,而且一般只侧重描述保密性或完整性。为此,本文提出了动态灰色时序系统（简称ＤＧＴＳ）。本文详细描述了ＤＧＴＳ,以及基于ＤＧＴＳ的动态语义设计的灰色时序安全策略规范语言ＧＴＳＬ。     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues.     

WHILE WAITING FOR THE PROTOCOL

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.     

Leadership and national security: an interrogation of the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria

This study contends that an analysis of the nexus between leadership and security offers useful insights into explaining conflict by stating that the conceptualisation of these argots, especially through the definition of leadership as a process, helps to explain and address Nigeria’s security challenges. By arguing that leaders’ ability to establish mutuality with their followers in any situation and set collectively-generated means for attaining these set goals for societal security, the study shows how such a relationship creates a secured state. This is not the case in Nigeria, where leaders’ security decisions are influenced by external actors rather than by their followers. By showing that the Nigerian ruling elite’s security agendas intersect with dominant global notions of security while neglecting genuine security interests of ordinary Nigerians, the study contextualises the complex global and local security interests in Nigeria. The lack of an intersection at home, however, has contributed to the emergence of extremists such as the Boko Haram sect, as well as the escalation of the acts of violence they perpetrate. As national insecurities become complex and intractable, ‘elegant’ or unilinear solutions – such as a military approach – lack the capacity to address these problems.     

Security sector reform in Africa: Donor approaches versus local needs

Many African states have security sector reform (SSR) programs. These are often internationally funded. But how do such programs account for previously existing security institutions and the security needs of local communities? This article examines SSR all over Africa to assess local ownership and path dependency from a New Institutionalist perspective. It finds that SSR, particularly in post-conflict countries, tends to be driven by ideas and perceptions of international donors promoting generalized blueprints. Often, such programs only account in a very limited way for path-dependent aspects of security institutions or the local context. Hence, the reforms often lack local participation and are thus not accepted by the local community eventually.     

The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.     

Troubled triangle: Russia,Ukraine and the United States

A potentially productive triangular arrangement among Russia, Ukraine, and the United States emerged in 1994 from efforts to constrain nuclear weapons diffusion. By 2001, this promising initiative was nearly moribund, owing to the inability or unwillingness of the parties to fulfill the commitments of subsequent agreements. The domestic and external causes of this failure are many and clear. Yet the advantages to each of reengaging in a trilateral relationship are also plain. This means fulfilling their unfinished agenda by learning from past mistakes, adopting realistic premises and goals, and pursuing ‘bottom up’ as well as ‘top down’ strategies.     

基于纯纠缠态的量子安全直接通信协议

基于纯纠缠态,提出一种量子安全直接通信协议.通信方利用decoy光子来检测窃听.在保证量子信道的安全后,发送方通过控制非操作和von Neumarm测量将秘密消息编码在纯纠缠态上并发送给接收方.由于所有的纯纠缠态都用于传输秘密消息,该协议具有较高的量子比特效率.就实验的可行性来说,该协议可以用当前的技术实现.此外,该协议在噪声量子信道中也是安全的.     

SECURITY SECTOR PLANNING IN AFRICA

The security sector in Africa has often been a threat to citizens instead of being a benefit. Military leaders, feared by politicians for their ability to seize power by force, are often reluctant to be open about problems within the military. The lack of dialogue between politicians, citizens and soldiers has made it difficult for the real problems to be identified or addressed. States need to take stock of their security sector assets, decide how they are to be used and then agree on a clear vision for the future of the military forces within the context of the broader national interest. A defence review, the restructuring of personnel, and a transparent budgeting process can all help to achieve a more motivated and better-equipped force. A properly planned transition from the old system to the new will ensure that only manageable steps are attempted and long-term goals are not sacrificed because of short-term crises.     

Ideology,ballots, and alliances: Canadian participation in multinational military operations

The decision to employ force abroad is often a contentious political decision, where partisanship plays a crucial role. Prior to military intervention, political parties usually make their ideologically distinctive preferences clear and seek to implement them once in power. What remains unclear, however, is how ideology affects the decision to use military force. This article contends that alliance and electoral calculations constrain the ability of political parties to implement their ideological preferences with regards to the use of force. It examines a “most likely” case for the partisan theory of military intervention, namely Canada’s refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq and its decision to commit forces to the war against the Islamic State. It finds that only in combination with alliance and electoral calculations does executive ideology offer valuable insights into Canada’s military support to U.S.-led coalition operations, which contributes to our understanding of allied decision-making.     

Lesotho’s 2015 elections in the context of an ongoing security vacuum

After inconclusive elections in 2012, Lesotho had a coalition government for the first time, made up of three political parties that had a narrow majority in parliament. The new government, however, faced several challenges, some of which were of its own making. The agreement among the three parties was to literally divide the government into three parts, leading to a continuous stalemate in its operation; the most serious consequence was the prorogation of parliament and the resultant attempted coup. The flight of the prime minister to South Africa and his return under a Southern African Development Community (SADC) security detail provided a short-term solution to Lesotho's security crisis. Under Cyril Ramaphosa's mediation, the prorogued parliament was conditionally opened and the election date set for 28 February 2015. However, the security dilemma – whereby the prime minister, who is also minister of defence, has no control over the military – remains. When elections are held, there does not seem to be a guarantee that they will be held in peace; moreover, there are now fears that the losers will not accept the results of the elections because of the security vacuum in Lesotho. This article argues that peace can only be salvaged by enhanced SADC security before, during and after the elections. It argues that the SADC mission should remain beyond the elections to oversee the constitutional changes that are necessary for ensuring long-term stability. On their own, Lesotho politicians are unlikely to be able to work together in order to move the country forward.     

Synopsis of Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in southern Africa

This article presents a synopsis of Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in southern Africa, published by Ashgate in 2012. It focuses on SADC's efforts to establish a common security regime; conflict and peacemaking in southern Africa between 1992 and 2011; and the prospects of SADC becoming a security community. It summarises the reasons for SADC's difficulties in the sphere of regional security and politics, namely the weakness of member states, their unwillingness to surrender sovereignty to communal mechanisms, and the absence of common values among them. The main conclusion is that these problems lie primarily at the national level and cannot be solved at the regional level. SADC is a forum of states and it cannot do anything that these states will not permit it to do.