Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.     

Limiting survival functions of self‐similar structures

We show the existence of a unique analytic single parameter limiting survival function arising from the repeated composition of a coherent structure as the number of components tends to infinity. Examples include the repeated composition process of the bridge structure. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

What Is Known About Defence Research And Development Spill-Overs?

This article surveys the body of available evidence regarding the spill-over effects of defence R&D. It reviews the routes through which defence R&D spills over to the economy with positive externalities – in terms of new products, technologies or processes; the barriers that impede or block such a process; potential negative repercussions, and the measure of such effects. The main conclusion is that the uncertainty of these effects, and the inaccurate appraisal of their value, hardly supports informed decisions concerning defence R&D policies.     

Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan's ‘ANA’ and the Counter-Insurgency Effort, 2002–2006

Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called ‘Afghan National Army’ run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a ‘national’ army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a ‘national’ army.     

Mimetic and normative isomorphism in the establishment and maintenance of independent air forces

Why do countries have air forces? Organizational alternatives, such as maintaining separate air arms for the army and navy, have become quite rare. The conventional narrative advanced by advocates of independent air forces stress that the primacy of airpower in modern warfare mandates centralized control of most military aviation. In this view, political–military uncertainty has driven mimetic isomorphism – pressure on national governments to organize as others organize so as to fight or deter war just as effectively. However, working from a set of 56 countries that were politically independent within a few years of the establishment of the first ever independent air force (the Royal Air Force) in 1918, and continuing through nearly the present, there is no clear pattern of external military pressure prompting this particular reorganization. Rather, from anecdotal evidence, the cause has more likely been normative isomorphism – a professional craving to look as others look to foster political or personal legitimacy. For whatever reason, though, choices of structures tend to lead to specific choices of policies. Thus, the result suggests that defense ministries looking for more effective or less costly organizational schemas may reasonably consider alternatives to the tripartite army–navy–air force structure.     

A survey of performance issues in defence innovation

This article reviews innovation processes in defence. It analyses the way and the context under which these processes are carried out. The article covers the features of defence goods with impact on innovation, the development of a new good, the institutional arrangements that support these processes and the effect of innovation on industrial market. The analysis helps to identify the causes of facts observed in practice, such as poor performance in terms of product quality, cost or delivery time, as well as to assess potential remedies. Some policy implications, which can be derived from this analysis, are finally outlined.     

Ireland's Ho Chi Minh trail? The Republic of Ireland's role in the Provisional IRA's bombing campaign, 1970–1976

A common criticism levelled at successive governments of the Republic of Ireland during the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ was their alleged inactivity in the face of a ferocious Provisional IRA campaign. Such criticisms were based in large part on the perception of the southern state as a supply base for militant republicanism. The Republic was undoubtedly a formidable logistics hinterland for such militants. However, criticisms of the reactions of authorities in the south are unfair. This article considers the explosives capabilities of the IRA during the first six years of their campaign. It does so with reference to their attempts to obtain commercial explosives as well as measures employed by them to obtain homemade explosives. The article also considers countermeasures employed by the southern government and reveals the extent to which they sought to shut down IRA capabilities in the south. It is argued that, ultimately, the IRA's campaign in this regard could only be contained and never unilaterally halted.     

‘Outside their expertise’: The implications of Field Manual 3-24 for the professional military education of non-commissioned officers

Within the framework of classical theory, the joint US Army-Marine field manual Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) described an ambitious set of skills required for success against guerrillas. But if counterinsurgency, as FM 3-24 describes it, is ‘the graduate level of warfare’, then these two military services have been for years systematically failing to train their talent in the appropriate fields. In today's small wars, NCOs serve as modern-day Mounties, and consequently require at least a modest undergraduate education in armed good governance.     

A O(nm log(U/n)) time maximum flow algorithm

In this paper, we present an O(nm log(U/n)) time maximum flow algorithm. If U = O(n) then this algorithm runs in O(nm) time for all values of m and n. This gives the best available running time to solve maximum flow problems satisfying U = O(n). Furthermore, for unit capacity networks the algorithm runs in O(n^2/3m) time. It is a two‐phase capacity scaling algorithm that is easy to implement and does not use complex data structures. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 511–520, 2000     

On lifetimes in random environments

For a component operating in random environment, whose hazard rate is assumed to be the realization of a suitable increasing stochastic process, conditions are found such that its lifetime is increasing in likelihood ratio (ILR). For the lifetimes of two components of the same kind some comparisons based on partial stochastic orders are presented. Some applications to the case of repairable components are finally provided. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 365–375, 1998