Book reviews

John Lawrence Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. Chapel Hill and London; The University of North Carolina Press 1994. Pp.vii + 239, 1 map, biblio., index. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–8078–2169–1.

Robert Holland (ed), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945. London: Frank Cass, 1994. Pp.x + 256; index. £32 (cloth); £15 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4516–8 and 4109 X

Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp.242, index, $35/$17.50 (paper). ISBN 0–8032–8369–5.

William M. Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994. Pp. xii +308, 3 maps, biblio., index. $69.95/£39.95 (cloth); $29.95/£16.95(paper). ISBN 1–85649–266–4 and 266–4.     

An evaluation of incentive contracting experience

Incentive contracts are intended to motivate defense contractors to perform more efficiently and control costs more closely. By increasing the total profit as actual costs are reduced below a predetermined cost target, they encourage contractors to achieve cost under runs. Consequently, the principal advantage claimed for these contracts is that they make the financial incentives to reduce costs more effective. This study examines the effectiveness of incentive contracts as a means for controlling defense procurement costs. The study considers the various effects that incentive contracts may have on both contractors' performance and contract costs, and presents empirical evidence suggesting that these contracts may not have accomplished their intended goal of increased efficiency and lower procurement costs.     

Book reviews

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security. By Stephen Iwan Griffiths. SIPRI Research Report No. 5. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1993), ISBN 0-19-829162-0, £16.50.

Red Storm on the Reich, By C.J. Duffy. Routledge, London (1991) ISBN 0-415-0359-9, £35.00.

Gangsters and Revolutionaries. By R. Cribb. Allen and Unwin, ISBN 0-O4-301296-5 (1992), £12.95.

The Cyanide War. By E. O'Ballance. Brassey's, London (1989). ISBN 0 08 036695 3, Price £18.00.     

Use it or lose it: On the incentives to spend annual defence operating budgets

In most western countries, there is a strong incentive for defence department budget-holders to expend all of the funds they are authorized to spend in a fiscal year. In this paper, we question whether this emphasis makes sense. We develop a model of a defence department’s operating expenditure assuming a fixed level of funding for a year and uncertain costs. The results of the model suggest that the incentive for departmental managers to expend all authorized funds is inefficient. We explore the implications of the model for the Department of National Defence (DND) in Canada in light of the recent criticism of DND lapsed funding by the Auditor-General of Canada.     

The performance of cannibalization policies in a maintenance system with spares,repair, and resource constraints

This article presents the results of comparing the performance of several cannibalization policies using a simulation model of a maintenance system with spares, repair, and resource constraints. Although the presence of cannibalization has been incorporated into a number of maintenance system models reported in the literature, the questions of whether cannibalization should be done and what factors affect canibalization have received little attention. Policies tested include both no cannibalization and unlimited cannibalization as well as other based on the number of maintenance personnel available, the short-term machine failure rate at the time of cannibalization, and the relationship between the mean cannibalization and repair rates. The best policies found are those that allow cannibalization only when it can be done quickly relative to repair or when it can be done without delaying part repair actions. The policy of complete cannibalization (always cannibalize when it is possible) is found to perform poorly except when either average maintenance personnel utilization is very low or when mean cannibalization times are very short relative to mean repair times. The latter result casts doubts on the appropriateness of the assumption of complete cannibalization in many models in the literature.     

‘Backing the wrong horse’: Japan in British Middle Eastern Policy 1914–18

The course of Anglo‐Japanese relations prior to 1914 rendered senior British policymakers nervous regarding possible Japanese aggrandisement in the Middle East. This article explores the factors which precluded British acceptance of Japanese military involvement there when, both before and during World War I, the idea was discussed. Particular reference is made to the views of the India Office and to those of Lord Curzon and the subject is analysed in the broader context of British Middle Eastern policy.