ZIMBABWE'S ZEZURU SUM GAME

Reflecting on the crisis in Zimbabwe, one is immediately struck by the preoccupation of most commentators with President Robert Mugabe and the land reform programme. Many have touted the confluence of these two issues as the main drivers of that country's political, economic and humanitarian woes. This particular perspective, which is most dominant in the media, has captured popular attention. However, while these two factors are certainly important to understanding the current problems faced by Zimbabwe, little room has been left for the consideration of a number of underlying dynamics that have also contributed to the current stalemate. This omission encourages the perpetuation of myths and rumour, and leads to serious miscalculations in the various transition scenarios that have been mooted. One of the dynamics that has been largely omitted from the debate is the critical role played by what we have chosen to term the ‘security dilemma’ faced by Zimbabwe's elite.

This essay will also present Zimbabwe's political crisis as the result of attempts by the ruling elite to block the transition to enhanced democracy. Also central to the article is a conceptual framework that explains how this powerful group has responded to the threat implicit in political transformation, and how the dominant nationalist ideology represented by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) has fed into this dynamic.     

MALAWI GENERAL ELECTION 2004

In the post-Cold World era, West Africa, like most other regions of the world, experienced significant shifts in its approach to, and understanding of security. The outbreak of brutal domestic conflicts in the sub-region and ECOWAS's subsequent deployment of its peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, marked a turning point in the sub-region's attempt to develop a security architecture that began in the 1970s. This paper argues that in the post-Cold War era, West Africa is in the process of evolving from a security complex to a security community. The inter-linked nature of the conflicts in the Mano River basin reinforced the security interdependence of member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These factors, coupled with the close cultural and historical ties, geographical proximity qualifies West Africa as a security complex. The adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacekeeping, the supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons are clearly aimed at the institutionalisation of conflict resolution mechanisms—a move away from the ad hoc approach of the 1990s. If the democratic peace theory holds true (that democracies do not fight each other), one could make the argument that democracies do not harbour dissidents from neighbouring states. Hence, the development and consolidation of a democratic ethos in the sub-region would lead to the eventual development of a security community.     

TRENDS AND MARKERS

Cambodia is a typical example of a post-conflict country where the lack of easily available data to guide policy design is one of the fundamental challenges to be addressed. While Cambodia has benefited from sustained Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) collection and destruction programmes since 1998, these have not been accompanied by any data analysis on the impact of gun proliferation and use or on these destruction programmes. In 2005, the Small Arms Survey (SAS) collected data on firearm morbidity and mortality spanning the last ten years. The objective was to develop methods that can be used for data generation in countries without systematic data collection. Using hospital admissions records and a review of the main English newspaper, the data shows that collection and destruction programmes have made a significant difference to human security in Cambodia. The study also reveals that even where no official data is available in a country, researchers can often derive useful indicators.     

SWAZILAND

The election of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed as the transitional president of Somalia was the climax of the United Nations (UN)-led Djibouti peace process. The election, it was hoped, would herald the beginning of the reconstitution of the Somalian state. Unfortunately, nearly three years after the event, that has still not happened. The government of Sheik Sharif has faced a number of challenges which are yet to be resolved. In the end, the Djibouti peace process has not guaranteed a stable and functional national government in Somalia.