Responsibility in Complex Conflicts: An Afghan Case

This paper discusses soldiers’ moral responsibility in today’s complex conflicts. The point of departure is the increased focus on soldiers as moral decision-makers in war, illustrated by the introduction of core values in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Responsibility is one of these core values, but it is not clear exactly how we should understand responsibility. I use a case where a group of Norwegian soldiers in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) sought the cooperation of a group of mujahedeen to solve the military mission of establishing security. As confidence between the parties grew, the soldiers became horrified witnesses to a practice of bacha bazi, where a young boy is dressed up for entertainment and sexual abuse. This situation gives reason to question the limits of role responsibility, the status of soldiers’ legitimacy, and the challenges of making morally sound judgments in a multicultural context. The discussion demonstrates that, even if there are restrictions on the soldiers’ freedom to act, a responsibility reaching beyond or extending their role should be recognized as part of the moral reality of modern soldiers.     

DELEGATES,DIALOGUE AND DESPERADOES

Progress in the DRC peace process has continually originated from sources outside of the existing agreements, treaties and protocols. This has been the case since the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Of great concern is the increase in armed groups who shoot their way to the negotiating table and then assert themselves within the ICD. The implication is that military action, not popular support for a manifesto, has propelled individuals and groups into positions of power. Many of these groups seek to pre-empt the democratic process of the elections to be held two years from now. Against this background, ordinary citizens in the DRC have faced terrible living conditions. Forced to flee from the marauding groups (especially in the east), hundreds of thousands of Congolese have sought refugee in neighbouring states. Furthermore, in the two Kivu provinces and the Ituri region, intense fighting has erupted between the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and amongst former allies: Rwanda and Uganda. The ICD, though expected to provide a new political order, has not achieved that goal. The ICD did not reach agreement on a constitution, a balanced transitional authority, or the formation of a new national army. Agreement has only been secured through discussion outside the framework of the ICD process.     

Conflict circuit breakers in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

Conflict resolution in the African Great Lakes Region has been linked to the protocols and projects agreed upon at the Second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The ICGLR created a continental-wide framework of conflict circuit breakers focused on resolving the structural and surface situational causes of the 1996 to 2003 armed conflicts that drew in at least six nations and destabilised the entire region. The implementation of these protocols and projects will serve as a test for the African Great Lakes Region to move away from conflict and into a cooperation and development phase; however, the effort to bring peace, stability and development will face obstacles not only in the security sector, but also in developing infrastructure, civil society, and good governance. In summary, this article contends that peace in the Great Lakes Region will depend equally on two factors: internal governance and building civil society institutions, and focused regional interlocking circuit-breaking institutions.     

Human Security and the State in Africa

The most recent major document on human security tells us more about the ideal of human security than how this worthy objective can best be achieved. This is a problem because most African states were created to serve as a bulwark against further colonial rule rather than provide domestic order and protection for their citizens. Many African states have since become battlegrounds for ethnic or economic struggles. Neither a new and committed African leadership, nor intervention by the international community, is likely to transcend this problem and effectively advance the human security agenda. A reformed African state—one which induces leaders to be more concerned with advancing the interests of their people more broadly—remains the only viable alternative. The problem is that any reform of African states will also involve difficult trade-offs and dilemmas.