Characterization of the nucleolus for a class of n-person games

An inductive procedure is given for finding the nucleolus of an n-person game in which all coalitions with less than n-1 players are totally defeated. It is shown that, for such a game, one of three things may occur: (a) all players receive the same amount; (b) each player receives his quota, plus a certain constant (which may be positive, nerative, or zero); (c) the weakest player receives one half his quota, and the other players divide the remaining profit according to the nucleolus of a similar (n-1)-person game. It is also shown that the nucleolus of such a game yields directly the nucleolus of each derived game. An example is worked out in detail.     

Callable products for an implicit time model with dependent demands

Capacity providers such as airlines and hotels have traditionally increased revenues by practicing market segmentation and revenue management, enabling them to sell the same capacity pool to different consumers at different prices. Callable products can enhance profits and improve consumers' welfare by allowing the firm to broker capacity between consumers with different willingness to pay. A consumer who buys a callable product gives the capacity provider the right to recall capacity at a prespecified recall price. This article studies callable products in the context of the model most commonly used in industry, which handles time implicitly imposing fewer restrictions on the nature of randomness compared to the Poisson arrival process favored in academia. In the implicit time model, capacity providers set booking limits to protect capacity for future high-fare demand. Our numerical study identifies conditions where callable products result in significant gains in profits.     

Estimating the accuracy of the coverages of outer β-content tolerance intervals,which control both tails of the normal distribution

Tolerance limits which control both tails of the normal distribution so that there is no more than a proportion β₁ in one tail and no more than β₂ in the other tail with probability γ may be computed for any size sample. They are computed from X? - k₁S and X? - k₂S, where X? and S are the usual sample mean and standard deviation and k₁ and k₂ are constants previously tabulated in Odeh and Owen [3]. The question addressed is, “Just how accurate are the coverages of these intervals (– Infin;, X? – k₁S) and (X? + k₂S, ∞) for various size samples?” The question is answered in terms of how widely the coverage of each tail interval differs from the corresponding required content with a given confidence γ′.     

On estimating the reliability of a component subject to several different stresses (strengths)

This paper is concerned with estimating p = P(X₁ < Y …, X_n < Y) or q =P (X < Y₁, …, X < Y_n) where the X's and Y's are all independent random variables. Applications to estimation of the reliability p from stress-strength relationships are considered where a component is subject to several stresses X₁, X₂, …, X_N whereas its strength, Y, is a single random variable. Similarly, the reliability q is of interest where a component is made of several parts all with their individual strengths Y₁, Y₂ …, Y_N and a single stress X is applied to the component. When the X's and Y's are independent and normal, maximum likelihood estimates of p and q have been obtained. For the case N = 2 and in some special cases, minimum variance unbiased estimates have been given. When the Y's are all exponential and the X is normal with known variance, but unknown mean (or uniform between 0 and θ, θ being unknown) the minimum variance unbiased estimate of q is established in this paper.     

An application of statistical techniques to estimate engineering man-hours on major aircraft programs

Data on 23 lots of various aircraft programs were gathered. Total engineering man-hours, and information on performance, weight, area, avionics systems, data, and schedule were subjected to least squares analysis. An equation is presented which indicates a relationship between total engineering manhours and a set of seven predictor variables. While the equation derived could only be used with confidence by the manufacturer whose data was analyzed, this article should be looked upon as demonstrating a method of data analysis which others may also find useful, not only for predicting engineering manhours in major aircraft programs, but also in other situations where there is an abundance of possible predictor variables, and the problem is to sort out a meaningful subset of these variables. In order to demonstrate the viability of the formula obtained, comparisons were made with various bid programs.     

THE SUPPLY PRICE OF COMMITMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE AIR FORCE ENLISTMENT BONUS PROGRAM

In fiscal year 1999, the US Air Force introduced a bonus program designed to encourage longer enlistment terms. This regime shift provides a unique opportunity to estimate the elasticity of labor supply at a new margin: the length of the employment contract. A $5000 bonus differential is estimated to increase the probability that a recruit will choose a 6‐year enlistment over a 4‐year enlistment by 30 percentage points. The program is found to be cost‐effective relative to other policies to increase man‐years.     

Managing waiting times of backordered demands in single‐stage (Q,r) inventory systems

We present a service constrained (Q, r) model that minimizes expected holding and ordering costs subject to an upper bound on the expected waiting time of demands that are actually backordered. We show that, after optimizing over r, the average cost is quasiconvex in Q for logconcave continuous lead time demand distributions. For logconcave discrete lead time demand distributions we find a single‐pass efficient algorithm based on a novel search stopping criterion. The algorithm also allows for bounds on the variability of the service measure. A brief numerical study indicates how the bounds on service impact the optimal average cost and the optimal (Q, r) choice. The discrete case algorithm can be readily adapted to provide a single pass algorithm for the traditional model that bounds the expected waiting time of all demands (backordered or not). © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 557–573, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10028     

Political games

A modification of the Shapley value is suggested, which takes into account the fact that (due to personal affinities among the players) certain coalitions are more easily formed than others. This is done by assigning to each player a point in space, and looking at the distances between pairs of points. The method seems to be especially applicable to voting games among political parties (in, e. g., parliaments), and, for such games, gives a value which is considerably easier to compute than the usual Shapley value. Some examples are considered.     

Callable products with dependent demands

Capacity providers such as airlines often sell the same capacity to different market segments at different prices to improve their expected revenues. The absence of a secondary market, due to the nontransferability of airline tickets, gives rise to an opportunity for airlines to broker capacity between consumers with different willingness to pay. One way to broker capacity is by the introduction of callable products. The idea is similar to callable bonds where the issuer has the right, but not the obligation, to buy back the bonds at a certain price by a certain date. The idea of callable products was introduced before under the assumption that the fare-class demands are all independent. The independent assumption becomes untenable when there is significant demand recovery (respectively, demand cannibalization) when lower fares are closed (respectively, opened). In this case, consumer choice behavior should be modeled explicitly to make meaningful decisions. In this paper, we consider a general consumer choice model and develop the optimal strategy for callable products. Our numerical study illustrates how callable products are win-win-win, for the capacity provider and for both high and low fare consumers. Our studies also identify conditions for callable products to result in significant improvements in expected revenues.