The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942

It has become commonplace, especially in the post-Vietnam strategic environment, to quote Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. We are told that military operations are dictated by, and must serve, clear political ends. Such thinking has been invoked to support everything from punitive strikes, to peacekeeping missions, to the ‘Powell’ doctrine and its political ‘exit strategies’, but at times political policy and military operations do not mix. In 1942 the Royal Navy bowed to political pressure and, against its collective better judgement, continued the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. These military operations culminated in the destruction of convoy PQ 17 in early July. This conflict between political policy and military strategy provides an object lesson of why in war issues of means and priorities must outweigh the importance of any given political policy.     

A case study in early joint warfare: An analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean campaign of 1942

Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of ‘jointness’.

This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronising its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness.

Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness ‐ a single tri‐service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter‐service rivalry ‐ and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.     

Deviant globalization: the application of strategic landpower*

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US landpower was able to gain control rapidly over terrain. However, that control ebbed as US presence weakened. Non-state actors, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda, gained control of segments of the population. Transnational Criminal Organizations capitalized on this permissive environment to strengthen their networks, often eroding the legitimacy of the host nation government, fueling regional instability, and, ultimately, undermining US policy objectives. The proliferation of deviant globalization, or the connectedness of subversive elements, is a key indicator of future conflict. Strategic landpower is uniquely positioned to influence the physical, psychological, economic, and social interactions of various non-state actors and their association with deviant globalization. It is no longer enough to seize and hold terrain. Landpower must also have the capability to influence the actions and attitudes of populations on that terrain wherever and whenever these interactions occur.     

Shifting power,preventive logic,and the response of the target: Germany,Russia, and the First World War

If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power.     

MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS: A CONCEPTUALISATION

This exploratory paper outlines the special macroeconomic features of countries populated by two groups of people engaged in internal conflict yet forming a central government for generating benefits that cannot be privately attained. Each group exerts an influence on the central government in accordance with its relative military strength. The central government collects taxes, exports the country’s natural resources and tourist attractions, attracts external grants and loans, and distributes the net revenues between the rival groups. The paper highlights the implications of the groups’ investment in military strength for the state’s net revenues and their distribution, for the state’s external debt, and for the groups’ ability to maintain and increase their ranks, production capital and per capita income.     

The optimal size of a storage facility

The appropriate size for a piece of fixed capital equipment (measured in units of capacity) depends on the anticipated demand for its services and on its cost. Using several models developed in the study of optimal inventory policy we derive the contribution to cost reduction that additional storage space makes under each of these models. Comparison of the sum of the discounted benefits (ie., reduced operating cost) with construction costs for additional storage space then yields the optimal size of the storage facility.     

A logistic regression/Markov chain model for NCAA basketball

Each year, more than $3 billion is wagered on the NCAA Division 1 men's basketball tournament. Most of that money is wagered in pools where the object is to correctly predict winners of each game, with emphasis on the last four teams remaining (the Final Four). In this paper, we present a combined logistic regression/Markov chain model for predicting the outcome of NCAA tournament games given only basic input data. Over the past 6 years, our model has been significantly more successful than the other common methods such as tournament seedings, the AP and ESPN/USA Today polls, the RPI, and the Sagarin and Massey ratings. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006.