Country survey: military expenditure and defence policy in Norway 1970–2013

This article examines military expenditure and defence policy in Norway from 1970 to 2013. Until 1990 Norwegian military expenditure remained between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite constant GDP shares, the military expenditure could not sustain a large and properly armed mobilization army. The constant nominal defence budgets of the 1990s accentuated the Norwegian Armed Forces' underlying imbalance between tasks, structure and budget. Around year 2000, large organizational reforms were effectuated, in which costs, the number of man-years, and underlying imbalances between tasks, structure and budget were reduced. Military expenditure increased in nominal terms between 2003 and 2013, while real military expenditure remained practically constant.     

Robust ship scheduling with multiple time windows

We present a ship scheduling problem concerned with the pickup and delivery of bulk cargoes within given time windows. As the ports are closed for service at night and during weekends, the wide time windows can be regarded as multiple time windows. Another issue is that the loading/discharging times of cargoes may take several days. This means that a ship will stay idle much of the time in port, and the total time at port will depend on the ship's arrival time. Ship scheduling is associated with uncertainty due to bad weather at sea and unpredictable service times in ports. Our objective is to make robust schedules that are less likely to result in ships staying idle in ports during the weekend, and impose penalty costs for arrivals at risky times (i.e., close to weekends). A set partitioning approach is proposed to solve the problem. The columns correspond to feasible ship schedules that are found a priori. They are generated taking the uncertainty and multiple time windows into account. The computational results show that we can increase the robustness of the schedules at the sacrifice of increased transportation costs. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 611–625, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10033     

Teaching Professional Ethos

This article investigates the communication of professional ethos, the ethical standards of a profession in training, from passing on ideas of patients’ welfare in medical schools to communicating values in military academies. The article examines this through a consideration of the consequences of Wittgenstein’s discussions on the nature of language: how words and sentences acquire meaning. Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, the paradox that any act can be brought into correspondence with a rule and thereby that any “meaning” might be applicable to what is being taught, must make us re-evaluate assumptions about a professional ethos as a guide for professionals in their future practice. If, as Wittgenstein asserts, the meaning of a word is its use, we must abandon ideas of an essence of professional ethos encapsulated in words. Ethical standards of the professions are not reducible to a set of rules. Instead teachers must seek to expand the learner’s repertoire of responses and invite different answers rather than a pre-established correct answer.     

When will the long nightmare come to an end?

This article seeks to show that the emotive reconciliation project in Zimbabwe, which is currently spearheaded by the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, is not new in the Zimbabwe polity. Its incarnation under the Government of National Unity clearly indicates the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of the initial reconciliation project, which was enunciated immediately after independence in 1980. In this article we argue that while the notion of resuscitating reconciliation is an important step towards durable peace, this institutionalised, state-centric and state-propelled project is haunted by the very same challenges that undermined and shattered its predecessor. We further assert that the reconciliation and healing project, which is politically engineered and institutionally driven without being inclusive and community driven, is a mere token that comes at the expense of durable peace and the actual victims of violence and impunity.     

A drive to regime change through nonviolent economic warfare: The post-Mugabe era, 2017–2019

ABSTRACT

This article examines efforts made by the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance to bring about regime change through nonviolent economic warfare including its subsequent failure. The 30 July 2018 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe led to a victory by Emmerson Mnangagwa but it was disputed by Nelson Chamisa. Since August 2018, the political opposition led by Chamisa sought to make the country ungovernable by waging a nonviolent economic war nicknamed Kuzvidira jecha (pouring sand) against the Mnangagwa administration. This was punctuated by price hikes, fluctuation of the local currency, artificial food stuff price hikes and fuel shortages which caused serious challenges for most Zimbabweans. This was primarily intended to bring about regime change via public unrest against the Mnangagwa regime. On the contrary, the anticipated public uproar failed to foster regime change in Zimbabwe despite widespread adverse socio-economic effects. This led to the nonviolent participants resorting to violent tactics instead of adhering to nonviolence. Consequently, it was the failure to adhere to nonviolent principles by opposition advocates which forced the Mnangagwa regime to deploy its own instruments of violence in an effort to protect lives and property.     

Regional mediation strategy: The case of Zimbabwe

The growth and survival of the field of conflict resolution can only be attained if practice is used to generate theory, rather than a reliance on the current situation where theory attempts to direct practice. Some conflict resolution practitioners believe that theory and practice cannot be separated. This article evaluates the art of mediation using Zimbabwe as a case study, where the strategy was used in an attempt to resolve the Zimbabwean conflict that began in 1999. Employing primary and secondary sources, the article delineates the major characteristics of mediation and clarifies principles of the strategy. It further establishes the affinity and dissonance between practice and theory. In addition, it asserts that in the Zimbabwean case, the achievements of insider-partial mediation as a strategy were limited. In the long term the mediation strategy failed because the Government of National Unity did not fulfil all the outstanding issues enunciated by the global political agreement as a precursor to free and fair, credible and legitimate elections. In opposition to the mediation targets towards sustainable peace, Zimbabwe witnessed rushed elections before the accomplishment of the issues at stake, leading to the overall failure of the insider-partial mediation.     

On Growing Operating Costs in the Armed Forces

Operating costs per unit of input or output are often claimed to grow faster in defence than elsewhere in the economy. In this paper, we outline several possible reasons as to why operating costs increase at higher rates in defence, including differences in the input factor mix and productivity growth, the technological complexity required to maintain the relative effect of weapon systems and a gradual reduction in the number of units and activity. We investigate whether operating costs grow at a faster rate than elsewhere in the economy, by estimating growth in real output unit costs in the Norwegian Armed Forces for the period 1994–2013, using activity as a measure of output. We find no increase beyond general inflation in structural (fixed) costs, whereas activity-based (variable) costs per unit of activity increase significantly.