The politics of population

This article suggests some of the principal factors behind the decisions by an increasing number of countries deciding that the achievement of their national objectives required a policy for population, and the way that they are likely to work out. By 1983, 35 developing countries had an official policy to reduce their population growth rate, and in 34 others, the government supported family planning activities--usually for reasons of health or as a human right. The number is remarkable given the many compelling reasons that governments have for not attempting anything so difficult as to modify demographic trends. The future results of population programs, in social and economic terms, are very difficult to quantify, thus defying cost-benefit analysis of the desirability of investing resources in this area, rather than in something else. There are also powerful political reasons why a government might well hesitate before embarking on a policy to reduce the nation's fertility. At the very least, it implies government interference in the most private and personal of human relations, an invasion of human rights, and a disturbance of the traditional patterns of society and behavior. For many countries that are pursuing a policy to limit population growth, the decision has been taken only after the grievous consequences of not having such a policy have already become manifest. The critical question is how soon a government will make the connection among political disobedience, economic and social distress, and the population explosion, and adopt a population policy. Although the number of developing countries that have officially proclaimed a strongly pro-natalist population policy is relatively small, many have Marxist governments. Overall, governments have several strategies at their disposal: 1) improving the accessability and the quality of the service; 2) promoting population education and family planning motivation (with the assistance of the media, folk art, and personal persuasion); and 3) applying a judicious mixture of incentives and disincentives.     

Democracy and peace: Reply to oneal and russett

The criticism of James, Solberg and Wolfson (JSW) (1999) by Oneal and Russett (OR) is not responsive to the methodologica] issues at stake. JSW argued that war is an endogenous feature of the world political and economic system. If its causes are to be measured, it must be as a structural equation in a simultaneous system. Wedded to the idea that “democracies never fight each other,” OR rely on a single equation to justify their view. JSW claim that such an equation may be an ad hoc reduced form with no causal implications unless the equation is explicitly identified as a structural equation. JSW expand the model to explain democracy and conflict as two endogenous variables. JSW do not claim to have discovered the true relationships between these variables by their minimal expansion of the structural relation. They do show that unless these (and other) variables are treated as part of a system, the results are unstable, contradictory, of minimal size and not a reliable guide to public policy.     

Generalized multicomponent systems under cannibalization

Using the theory of Hirsch, Meisner, and Boll, we study the consequences of interchanging parts within a generalized coherent structure. This procedure has been termed “cannibalization.” The theory of cannibalization is extended to the case where each component can operate at several levels of partial performance and a representation theorem is derived, which expresses the state of a system as a function of the number of working parts at each level. The stochastic theory of these systems is then investigated.     

Communication: Wrap‐up on the cost of the gulf war

This paper discusses how crises and war may “disrupt” company activities, and how companies adapt to these disruptions. Croatia is used as a case study. The original hypothesis was that war led to breaks in physical flows: in other words, that companies experienced difficulties in importing and obtaining supplies of goods. Instead, it appears that loss of customers and severely worsened conditions of payment were the principal problems for Croatian companies. Although it does not fall within the scope of this investigation, it is interesting to note that the Croatian government has not imposed any direct rationing on the industrial sector, but rather via the banking system.     

An extensible modeling framework for dynamic reassignment and rerouting in cooperative airborne operations

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), increasingly vital to the success of military operations, operate in a complex and dynamic environment, sometimes in concert with manned aircraft. We present an extensible modeling framework for the solution to the dynamic resource management (DRM) problem, where airborne resources must be reassigned to time‐sensitive tasks in response to changes in battlespace conditions. The DRM problem is characterized by diverse tasks with time windows, heterogeneous resources with fuel‐ and payload‐capacity limitations, and multiple competing objectives. We propose an integer linear programing formulation for this problem, where mathematical feasibility is guaranteed. Although motivated by airborne military operations, the proposed general modeling framework is applicable to a wide array of settings, such as disaster relief operations. Additionally, land‐ or water‐based operations may be modeled within this framework, as well as any combination of manned and unmanned vehicles. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

A branch‐and‐bound‐based solution approach for dynamic rerouting of airborne platforms

This article is a sequel to a recent article that appeared in this journal, “An extensible modeling framework for dynamic reassignment and rerouting in cooperative airborne operations” [ 17 ], in which an integer programming formulation to the problem of rescheduling in‐flight assets due to changes in battlespace conditions was presented. The purpose of this article is to present an improved branch‐and‐bound procedure to solve the dynamic resource management problem in a timely fashion, as in‐flight assets must be quickly re‐tasked to respond to the changing environment. To facilitate the rapid generation of attractive updated mission plans, this procedure uses a technique for reducing the solution space, supports branching on multiple decision variables simultaneously, incorporates additional valid cuts to strengthen the minimal network constraints of the original mathematical model, and includes improved objective function bounds. An extensive numerical analysis indicates that the proposed approach significantly outperforms traditional branch‐and‐bound methodologies and is capable of providing improved feasible solutions in a limited time. Although inspired by the dynamic resource management problem in particular, this approach promises to be an effective tool for solving other general types of vehicle routing problems. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

How not to pay for the war

As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson‐Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance “the small exploit the large.” A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.