French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking Inward or Outward?

ABSTRACT

For some, a specific feature of the French armed forces' adaptation process in the adaptation process would be the capacity to look inward instead of outward in order to identify relevant solutions to tactical/doctrinal problems. This article questions such a narrative, and argues that the French armed forces are as quick as any to borrow from other countries’ experiences. In order to do so, this article introduces the concept of ‘selective emulation’, and compares the French and German military adaptation processes in Afghanistan. The article argues that there is indeed something distinctive about French military adaptation, but it is not what the fiercest defenders of the French ‘exceptionalism’ usually account for.     

Scheduling recurrent construction

A problem we call recurrent construction involves manufacturing large, complex, expensive products such as airplanes, houses, and ships. Customers order configurations of these products well in advance of due dates for delivery. Early delivery may not be permitted. How should the manufacturer determine when to purchase and release materials before fabrication, assembly, and delivery? Major material expenses, significant penalties for deliveries beyond due dates, and long product makespans in recurrent construction motivate choosing a release timetable that maximizes the net present value of cash flows. Our heuristic first projects an initial schedule that dispatches worker teams to tasks for the backlogged products, and then solves a series of maximal closure problems to find material release times that maximize NPV. This method compares favorably with other well‐known work release heuristics in solution quality for large problems over a wide range of operating conditions, including order strength, cost structure, utilization level, batch policy, and uncertainty level. Computation times exhibit near linear growth in problem size. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004     

The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context

ABSTRACT

This article introduces the key tenets of French foreign and security policy during the Cold War, and illustrates the deep challenges to the French consensus raised by the emergence of a unipolar system. There is a growing gap between the rhetoric of French security policy, emphasizing ‘autonomy’ and ‘sovereignty’ out of habit from the Cold War, and the actual security practices showing a gradual embedding within the transatlantic security structures. In the absence of a new transpartisan grand narrative relevant for the contemporary international system, such embedding is easily portrayed in France as a ‘treason’ from a romanticized Gaullist foreign policy.     

Intelligence reform and the transformation of the state: the end of a French exception

ABSTRACT

This article argues that the intelligence sector is a privileged vantage point to observe and analyse a transformation of the State in France, as this transformation deeply affects the heart of the executive power and the French intelligence and security apparatus. Traditionally, intelligence was not conceived in France as a functional tool in the hands of the decision-maker but was rather defined as a ‘regalian power’. Intelligence activities were derived from a very specific conception of the State, and especially the particular notion of ‘reason of State’ (raison d’État). The current intelligence reform prompts speculation as to whether it represents more than a ‘simple’ functional reorganisation or in fact could signify that intelligence is now recognised as a tool in the hands of a ‘État de droit’ (‘liberal state’). The idea of a French ‘exceptionalism’ is addressed through a theoretical approach of the way France redefines intelligence and surveillance in relation with a major evolution of the notion of ‘reason of State’ itself. Then the article illustrates the assumption of a ‘lost tradition’ of reason of State through an analysis of the current reform of the intelligence sector in France. This reform is based on processes of rationalisation, centralization, modernisation and normalisation of both intelligence activities and intelligence services in France. As a conclusion, the article addresses the reactions to the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, and asks whether resilience towards terrorism requires to accelerate the pace of the transformation of the French intelligence sector.     

When are strategic narratives effective? The shaping of political discourse through the interaction between political myths and strategic narratives

Most research on strategic narratives has explored their creation, and their interaction with other elements of national power in the conduct of foreign policy. Yet, the issue of how the targeted political communities receive those strategic narratives, and thus how those narratives are likely to have a political impact, is understudied. This article argues that in order to understand the ways strategic narrative are received within a political community, political myths must be taken into account. It introduces a typology of political myths based on their degree of universality and their degree of coherence with other myths, and shows how those factors influence the reception of strategic narratives. These mechanisms are illustrated through a study of the reception of the Russian strategic narrative in France. This approach offers opportunities to assess the differentiated impact strategic narratives have on political communities.     

More allies,weaker missions? How junior partners contribute to multinational military operations

There is a growing consensus that multinational military operations are often less effective than the theoretical sum of their constitutive parts. Multiple chains of command, restriction on intelligence sharing, and capability aggregation problems can reduce fighting power. However, partners may be necessary to provide legitimacy to an intervention. As such, most studies assume that the state leading a coalition (usually the United States) has to accept a degree of operational ineffectiveness in order to gain political benefits from the participation of junior partners to a multinational military operation. However, such analysis puts all junior partners under the same category, without taking into account the differentiated contributions of those junior partners based on their relative military power and international status. This article explores variation between the junior partners’ contributions and their impact on coalition political and military dynamics. It teases out the implications of adopting a fine-grained analysis of junior partners.