An easy solution for a special class of fixed charge problems

The fixed charge problem is a mixed integer mathematical programming problem which has proved difficult to solve in the past. In this paper we look at a special case of that problem and show that this case can be solved by formulating it as a set-covering problem. We then use a branch-and-bound integer programming code to solve test fixed charge problems using the setcovering formulation. Even without a special purpose set-covering algorithm, the results from this solution procedure are dramatically better than those obtained using other solution procedures.     

Swords,sandals, and insurgencies: Ancient history goes to the movies

This article explores the question of why so few insurgencies from the ancient world have ever made it onto the big screen. Many of these stories have been made into documentaries, but have been ignored by Hollywood. Even those events that have been made into Hollywood films, like the uprising of Spartacus, do not show any of the successful uprisings, only the defeats. Among the possible reasons may be Hollywood's fascination with big wars and big battles rather than small wars because they are more cinematic. Another reason is that American movies are reluctant to show successful slave uprisings or insurgencies against great powers. In the end, all movies are about the present, not the past, and thus Western bias will side with the imperial power, not the terrorist.     

KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST

This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach.     

Democracy and peace: Reply to oneal and russett

The criticism of James, Solberg and Wolfson (JSW) (1999) by Oneal and Russett (OR) is not responsive to the methodologica] issues at stake. JSW argued that war is an endogenous feature of the world political and economic system. If its causes are to be measured, it must be as a structural equation in a simultaneous system. Wedded to the idea that “democracies never fight each other,” OR rely on a single equation to justify their view. JSW claim that such an equation may be an ad hoc reduced form with no causal implications unless the equation is explicitly identified as a structural equation. JSW expand the model to explain democracy and conflict as two endogenous variables. JSW do not claim to have discovered the true relationships between these variables by their minimal expansion of the structural relation. They do show that unless these (and other) variables are treated as part of a system, the results are unstable, contradictory, of minimal size and not a reliable guide to public policy.     

Comparing rational choice and prospect theory analyses: The US decision to launch operation ‘desert storm’, January 1991

The purpose of this article is to compare an expected utility rational actor model of decision making with a Prospect theory psychological model of decision making. Each theory is presented and then applied to the well known case surrounding the United States’ decision to launch Operation ‘Desert Storm’ in January 1991 at the outset of the Gulf War. Our goal is not to present new findings concerning the origins or outcomes of the Gulf conflict so much as to use the case to compare and illuminate the similarities and differences of these two theoretical approaches. Our approach does not assume that these two models are necessarily mutually incompatible alternatives. Our goal is to analyze this case in order to discover the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each model, and to determine how much analytic purchase can be gained by combining them. Finally, we offer some conclusions concerning this contrast.